

Lahore Journal of Policy Studies

Vol. 3 No. 1

December 2009

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RESTRUCTURING THE STOCK EXCHANGES IN PAKISTAN: ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY POLICY ISSUES

Abstract

The ongoing global financial crisis has forced a paradigm shift in the thinking about the role of free-markets and public regulation which calls for a re-evaluation of the economic and development policies throughout the world. In this spirit, this paper reviews Pakistan's approach towards stock exchange development through demutualization and consolidation of the country's three stock exchanges. While demutualization can provide organizational flexibility and improve governance, it can also give rise to new and possibly more aggravating conflicts of interest issues and place challenging demands on the regulatory framework. Demutualization can also facilitate in the merger of the exchanges which can help to consolidate liquidity in one marketplace and improve economic efficiency. On the other hand, exchange consolidation could lead to monopolistic excesses and diminish regulatory effectiveness. In the aftermath of the financial crises, it would be prudent to preserve a competitive environment and bolster regulatory effectiveness to deal with the complexity and conflicts of interest arising out of the financial innovations. A third option of encouraging an implicit merger of the exchanges may be more attractive which may allow the markets to reap the benefits of the economies of scale and network externalities, while avoiding creation of a semi-monopolistic and too-big-to-fail institution.

Introduction and Background

The continuing global financial crisis (2007-2009) has forced a rethinking of issues relating to the regulation of financial markets and institution. The hitherto accepted wisdom had placed unfaltering confidence in the functioning of the free-markets which were thought to be self-correcting and needed little public regulation. It is now clear that market oversight and prudential supervision were unable to check excessive risk-taking by the financial institutions and other players in the markets. The fragmented regulatory structures and lack of information sharing among regulators led in particular to overlook the interconnectedness of the financial markets and the systemic risk arising from financial innovation and regulatory circumvention by the banks as well as non-bank entities. The regulatory model that relied on transparency, disclosure, and market discipline to curb excessive risk taking proved inadequate in preventing the market failure. It is certain that we are witnessing a reshaping of the financial regulatory landscape in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Although the origin of the financial crisis lies in the industrialized countries, there are lessons in there for the developing countries as they continue to develop their financial sector, regulatory structure and supervisory capacity. The developing economies are generally weaker in corporate governance, legal infra-structure and supervisory oversight, enforcement and effectiveness. It is appropriate, therefore, to rethink the economic and financial sector policies that have so far been pro-globalization and relied on open and free-markets.

For Pakistan, an important issue has been the re-structuring of its stock-exchanges which is seen as a critical element in the strategy for the development of its capital markets. Over the years 2004-2008, the thrust of the stock-exchange reform strategy has been to demutualize and consolidate the country's three stock exchanges based in Karachi (KSE), Lahore (LSE) and Islamabad (ISE). The exchanges have been structured as mutual non-profit companies owned by the members who also have the exclusive right to trade on the exchanges. The restructuring will convert the exchanges to for-profit corporations owned by shareholders who may or may not be stock brokers, security dealers or market makers as well. Subsequently, the three exchanges may be consolidated into one corporate entity. The Demutualization Ordinance has recently been approved by the National Assembly and is soon expected to be placed for promulgation before the Senate.¹ It seems to be an appropriate time to examine the post-demutualization regulatory and economic issues, particularly, in the light of the recent paradigm shift in the thinking about the role of free-markets and public regulation.

The present study examines the issues relating to the restructuring of the organized stock exchanges in Pakistan, and its implications for economic and regulatory policies. The next section provides an overview of the stock exchanges and related governance issues. This is followed by a section on the demutualization trends in the emerging economies. The fourth section discusses the issues relating to governance structure and the implications of the conversion to for-profit corporations for economic and regulatory policies. The fifth section draws on the empirical evidence on demutualization and exchange performance and the analytical studies on exchange consolidation and competition issues. The last section concludes the paper and summaries the policy implications.

Stock Exchanges in Pakistan

The three stock exchanges in Pakistan based in Karachi, Islamabad, and Lahore, together list more than 700 of the approximately 2,800 registered public companies in Pakistan. The KSE is the dominant exchange in terms of listed securities, market capitalization, volume of trading, and new listings. The regional stock exchanges have been losing market share over time. In 2003 the KSE's share was over 81% of the volume traded, followed by the LSE with 17% and ISE with 2%. By the end of 2007-08 the shares of the LSE and the ISE had declined to 9.2% and 0.4% respectively. Although, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) is responsible for regulating financial markets, the three stock exchanges also serve as the frontline

self-regulatory organizations (SRO) dealing with listing of securities, admission of trading members, market surveillance and broker conduct. All three exchanges are privately owned and are mutual non-profit organizations owned by their broker members who are about 300 in total number. They are registered as companies limited by guarantee and are licensed by the SECP. The mutual form means that by acquiring membership of an exchange, (by purchasing a “card” or a “seat”) the person obtains membership as well as the right to trade on the exchange subject to regulation.

The various problems related to the working of the stock exchanges were examined by the SECP’s Expert Committee (SECP, 2004) which concluded that, “the problems faced by the exchanges are fundamental in nature and exchanges are fulfilling their economic role and discharging regulatory responsibilities to a very limited extent. A mutual structure and fragmented market are at the heart of problem being faced by the stock market. A mutual structure allows control of exchange by only one stakeholder, i.e., brokers. It had also deprived the exchanges of economic and human capital that they need for further development. Because of the mutual structure the reforms in the past have not made substantial impact.”

An Asian Development Bank report (ADB, 2007) seems to endorse demutualization for the Pakistan’s three stock exchanges as a step to further institute regulatory and institutional reforms. The ADB report further suggests two options: (i) merge the three exchanges, or (ii) strengthen linkages between exchanges to achieve a unified national market system in securities. “The second is more realistic under the present circumstances.” The SECP’s Expert Committee, on the other hand advances both demutualization and integration as the remedy for the problems faced by the exchanges.

As noted above, “the Stock Exchanges (Corporatisation, Demutualization and Integration) Ordinance, 2007,” has been approved by the National Assembly. The Ordinance provides for conversion of the stock exchanges into corporations and lays down a road map for integration of the exchanges, in that any two or more stock exchanges may file a scheme of integration for approval of the Commission.

Restructuring of Exchanges in the Emerging Markets

The Demutualization Trends in the Emerging Markets²

Demutualization of stock exchanges has been a major trend globally; in particular, it took place in developed markets quite rapidly. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO 2005) reports that, “In the fifteen years since the first exchange demutualization took place in 1993, 21 exchanges in developed market jurisdictions have been demutualized – representing almost 40% of the membership of the World Federation of Exchanges.” On the other hand, demutualization in the emerging markets has taken place at a relatively slower pace. Up to 2005, exchange demutualization had been completed in only 5 exchanges out of a total of 76 emerging markets which are members of the World Federation of Exchanges. According to the survey by IOSCO Working Group of a sample of 15 emerging

markets, the option of demutualization was considered by the majority of responding stock exchanges, out of which 4 exchanges were in the process of undergoing demutualization. The survey report expressed the opinion that, “It is quite likely that the proportion of those in the demutualization process would decrease substantially” if the sample was expanded to include relatively smaller markets.

According to the IOSCO (2005) report the slower pace of demutualization observed in the emerging markets implies that: (a) either the benefits accruing from demutualization in emerging markets are considerably less than that for a developed market, or the costs are considerably higher; (b) the states of economic and capital market environment in emerging markets are not yet at a level where demutualization is relevant and that there are other more effective alternatives to achieving the goals associated with demutualization.

Motivations for Demutualization

Demutualization is generally considered a step to transform the exchange’s business model in response to the emerging new environment shaped by competition, globalized financial markets and technology. One of the main drivers for demutualization in emerging markets is the increasing competition for global order-flow. In the face of increasing globalization of financial markets, domestic markets now compete directly with regional and international markets. Domestic corporations are able to float securities on multiple markets, and the order flow and liquidity from secondary trading could also easily move to regional and international larger markets which can hurt the smaller domestic markets.

For the exchanges, the corporate form of organization offers the flexibility to strengthen their competitive position by forming strategic alliances, or by bringing in new strategic shareholders who can contribute specialized technical know-how, international skills, and knowledge to the domestic exchange. Another reason for demutualization decision has been a desire to accelerate the development of technology-related infrastructure and capabilities. The IOSCO Working Group’s survey found, however, that the threat of competition from Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs) and Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) was not a dominant driver for demutualization. Among the minor considerations to demutualize is also the need to access new funds.

A strong view is that demutualization can be used to reform the exchange’s governance structure. The idea is that in a mutual form of organizations, there are inherent conflicts between broker interests and the interests of other stakeholders. The essential difference in the corporate organizational form is that there is a separation of ownership from the trading rights. On the contrary, in some countries, after making the adjustments to the exchange’s governance structure, it was decided that demutualization was no longer needed. For example, in Thailand, the steering committee appointed to examine the issue of demutualization recommended that the demutualization of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) should be put on

hold. The committee was of the view that the SET could best meet its objectives and implement capital market development policies under its current structure as a national exchange, rather than as a for-profit entity. A stakeholder-based governance structure was created by having other stakeholders to sit on its board.

Exchange Consolidations

In the developed markets, demutualization and consolidation of exchange have taken place in response to the growing international competition for customers' trade orders (order flow). The European stock exchanges, under the new European Union set-up, faced intense competition from the London Stock Exchange and the Deutsche Borse. Their response was to consolidate and form strategic alliances across geographical borders. For example, the Swiss Options and Financial Futures Exchange merged with the Deutsche Terminborse in 1998 to form EUREX. Similarly, the pan-European exchange EURONEXT was formed through the merger of the Amsterdam, Paris, Brussels and Lisbon exchanges in 2000. Likewise, many exchanges in the emerging markets compete globally for order-flows, and see merger of exchanges as leading to order consolidation (hence liquidity) in one market-place.

Some emerging markets may be relatively too small to provide sufficient depth and liquidity to justify the existence of separate exchanges. Multiple exchanges imply that the various functions must be duplicated. The existence of multiple sets of intermediaries, front-end trading systems and information channels can result in economic inefficiencies. The listing companies and the regulators also need to deal with different sets of compliance requirements for the various exchanges. By consolidating multiple exchanges, economies of scale and scope can be achieved, liquidity enhanced and price discovery improved. On the other hand, the existence of multiple exchanges creates a competitive environment and can lower the cost of intermediation, and/or enhance the quality of services. In addition, a single integrated exchange poses systemic risk to the country's capital markets in case the exchange experiences financial distress.

Another argument for demutualization and consolidation is that it can facilitate cross-border mergers and acquisitions. One consolidated exchange rather than multiple exchanges, also increases the bargaining position of the consolidated exchange with respect to external entities seeking strategic alliances or investment. Unlike the developed markets cross-border mergers and acquisitions may, however, face a higher level of political opposition in the emerging markets as the issues of national sovereignty tend to be more prominent in these countries.

Recently, a greater emphasis is being placed on ensuring a competitive environment. For example, the Australian Stock Exchange attempted to acquire the Sydney Futures Exchange six months after it was demutualized. The proposed acquisition was rejected by the Australian regulators on the basis that the existence of two exchanges is likely to facilitate competition. In Pakistan, the Expert Committee's report noted the various concerns from a lack of inter-exchange competition, but concluded that "the arguments and precedents supporting integration outweigh those against integration."

The issue of exchange restructuring may also be dealt with separately from demutualization. In Malaysia, for example, the consolidation of exchanges was completed approximately 2 years prior to the demutualization of the exchange. In Pakistan, the Expert Committee recommended demutualization to proceed simultaneously with integration of the country's three stock exchanges. In India, on the other hand, the consultative group appointed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India recommended that the decision to merge was a commercial decision that should be left to the respective exchanges. The consultative group doubted that the country's 23 existing stock exchanges serve an economic purpose, and saw corporatization and demutualization as a means to facilitate exchange consolidation.

The decision to consolidate multiple exchanges depends on an individual country's unique circumstances relating to the capital markets and regulatory structures. There are, however, alternatives to a complete merger which allow for most benefits of a cross-border merger to occur while retaining national control over the exchange. These include establishing trading links, strategic investments, and using common trading platforms with regional exchanges.

Regulatory Issues Under the Corporate Model

As the exchanges convert to for-profit companies with broader shareholder bases, the changes in the ownership structure and business objectives raise significant issues as to: (a) the regulatory role of exchanges, and (b) the regulation of exchanges. Exchanges have traditionally performed important roles as frontline regulators for a range of market activities. Exchanges make and enforce regulation in the area of membership, registration of broker/specialists, the listing of securities and the modality of trading itself, such as clearing and settlement. There is a strong public interest in exchanges operating in manner that promotes market efficiency and commands market confidence. The transition to a for-profit business model has far reaching implications for the appropriate regulatory role of exchanges. A major issue is whether the for-profit goals of the exchange would be compatible with its regulatory role in public interest. The IOSCO Report (2001) identifies the following four areas in which exchanges' regulatory role is most likely to be impacted by demutualization:

Balancing Commercial and Public Interest Functions

The risk that the exchange will tend to place more weight on pursuing short-term profits and earnings growth is greater after incorporation. The management and the shareholders of a corporatized exchange are likely to be less connected with the market and less motivated to pursue markets interests and, therefore, less inclined to pursue public interest goals in regulation and development of the markets. The for-profit exchange may lower standards in order to generate additional revenues, such as eligibility requirements for the listing of the securities, though such pressures may also be present in a mutual exchange. The exchange "may place insufficient value on the regulatory process, fail to sustain a strong regulatory culture and be less willing to co-operate with their supervisory authorities and other regulatory bodies." On the other hand, for-profit exchanges stand much to lose if their reputation as provider

of fair and orderly markets is compromised and participants lose confidence in the exchange's ability to protect them.

Misuse of Regulatory Powers

A key concern is that a for-profit exchange, compared to a mutual exchange, may be more inclined to misuse its regulatory powers to secure commercial advantage. This tendency may be stronger when there is no effective competition in the exchange industry or when there are barriers to establishing new exchanges. The regulatory powers could be misused in two ways: (i) by taking regulatory actions to the detriment of competing exchanges and market participants; (ii) by generating additional revenues from excessive regulatory activities. Therefore, some experts feel that a for-profit exchange should play a limited regulatory role.

Financial Risk and Exchange Viability

In order to adequately discharge its functions, the exchange must be itself in sound financial health. It is even more important when an exchange is a country's only exchange. In such a case, if the exchange fails, e.g., goes bankrupt, the financial markets could be extensively disrupted. The semi-monopolistic position of the consolidated exchange would render it *too-big-to-fail* for the country's financial sector and compromise regulatory effectiveness. Even in the case it is not the sole exchange in the country, a sound financial position is necessary to be able to transfer its functions to another exchange without disrupting the markets. If it has extensive regulatory functions, it would also need to have a pool of regulatory expertise.

Financial viability of the exchange is likely to be a more significant issue with for-profit exchanges for two reasons. First, a for-profit exchange is likely to take greater business risks than a mutually organized exchange. It may also seek to provide excessive distributions to shareholders which may weaken its capital base. Second, it will be more difficult for it to raise emergency funds, than for the mutual exchange which may have a right to assess members and ask for capital contribution.

Conflicts Due to Self-Listing

A potential for a major conflict of interest with respect to the exchange's regulatory role arises when a demutualized exchange lists its own stock on the same exchange; almost invariably, the demutualized exchanges have also self-listed. The concern is that whether a self-listing exchange can function effectively as its own regulator, or is it appropriate to allow it to do.

A follow up report of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO 2006) emphasizes the fact that for some regulators demutualization was not the only way to stimulate the development of capital markets, and not necessarily the most desirable. The report points out that the impact of demutualization on the regulatory role for demutualized exchanges is quite substantial. In case there are multiple for-profit exchanges operating in a country,

the responsibility of any one exchange becomes fuzzy and its ability to efficiently discharge its regulatory function suffers. The IOSCO Report discusses various approaches to alleviate such potential conflicts, which include reducing the regulatory obligations of the exchange by transferring these to the government regulator, to an independent entity, or to an industry self-regulatory organization.

The for-profit exchanges would have greater motivation and the access to capital that may hasten consolidation between exchanges and monopoly issues become a real concern. When there is little or no competition, it is more likely that the exchange may use its market and regulatory powers in a discriminatory manner detrimental to the public interest.

Literature on Exchange Governance and Industry Structure

Evidence on Demutualization and Exchange Performance

As the demutualization of stock exchanges has been a relatively recent development, there have not been many research studies on its impact on the performance of the exchanges. An early study by Domowitz and Steil (1999) examined the relationships between stock exchange automation, governance, and the quality of markets. The researchers argue that the demutualized stock exchanges have several benefits over the mutual stock exchanges due to their favorable governance structure. The mutually organized exchange, they argue, have built-in incentives to oppose innovations even if these increased the value of the exchange. Most of the traditional stock exchanges are also regional monopolies. In such cases, their members may even have a greater incentive to oppose improvements in the quality of exchange services, if it would diminish their personal welfare.

Hart and Moore (1996) argue that both corporate ownership and the mutual ownership are inefficient, but for different reasons. In the corporate form the outside shareholders focus on maximizing profits, and tend to make decisions based on the marginal user. The mutual form is inefficient because “the views of the decisive voter are not necessarily those of the membership as a whole.” In exchanges with homogeneous membership, the latter consideration may not be operative. Since traditionally exchanges had a relatively more homogenous membership, the Hart and Moore model provides a rationale for the historically observed cooperative structure adopted by the exchanges.

Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2003) examine the ‘market quality’ of the two competing stock exchanges in India, the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE), the former having a mutual and the latter a corporate governance structure. They make direct comparisons of the market quality of the two stock exchanges with respect to forty major stocks that are dually traded on both exchanges. The empirical tests show that NSE provides a better quality market compared to BSE. They attribute this difference in market quality to the different governance structure of the respective stock exchanges. One policy implication of the Krishnamurti et al. study is that “entrenched monopolies may be

successfully persuaded to modify their behavior by engendering competition in the market place, utilizing technology as a catalyst.” And “that competition has been more effective than regulatory dictates in transforming the errant behavior of the members on the Bombay Stock Exchange.” The authors point out that “the latest technological advances in networking, communications, and information processing, may be utilized to break down barriers to entry in the trading services industry.”

A report by Hughes and Zargar (2006) on exchanges demutualization notes a number of significant changes in the focus and activities of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) following their demutualization. The noted changes include: (a) increased flexibility in decision-making enabling them to make timely decisions; (b) a shift in the management focus away from the members/brokers to their customers such as listed companies and investors, and to marketing, education and information dissemination; and (c) expansion of activities into new but related businesses, diversifying their revenue base, and providing value-adding services to customers.

Mendiola and O’Hara (2003) examine the effect of exchange conversions from cooperative to corporate governance on exchange performance and valuation by looking at both accounting data and stock return performance. They compare the return behavior of newly-listed exchange stock to other IPO’s on each exchange. Their empirical work indicates that the exchange performance tends to improve after the change in corporate governance as reflected by the performance of the exchange shares. Other exchange performance measures such as the liquidity index also generally improve after conversions. The authors attribute the relatively superior performance of the exchange’s IPO’s which tends to persist in the long run to the change in the exchange corporate governance. Their results, however, show that, “for at least some exchanges, changing corporate governance cannot overcome the challenges posed by their adverse economic environment.”

Two papers by Schmiedel (2001 and 2002) employ parametric and non-parametric frontier efficiency methodologies in order to derive relative efficiency values of an exchange based on accounting performance, staff size and transaction data, but not including share price data. The two studies come up with ambiguous results. The first paper shows a positive impact of demutualization on cost efficiency, whereas the second paper indicates that the productivity gains are higher for mutual exchanges.

Serifsoy (2008) uses a balanced panel data set of 28 stock exchanges to examine the effects of demutualization and outsider ownership on the operative performance of stock exchanges. He derives efficiency and factor productivity values for each exchange using Data Envelopment Analysis, and then regresses the individual efficiency and factor productivity values on variables that proxy for the different governance regimes i.e., (1) mutuals, (2) demutualized but customer-owned exchanges, and (3) publicly listed exchanges. He finds empirical evidence indicating that demutualized exchanges are technical more efficient than mutuals. However, the study finds that the demutualized exchanges perform relatively poor with respect to productivity growth and also finds no evidence that publicly listed exchanges possess

higher efficiency and productivity values than demutualized exchanges. It does not support the view that “an outsider dominated exchange is a precondition for dealing adequately with increased levels of competition in this industry,” or that a demutualization process is necessary to install modern trading systems.

Otcherea (2006) examines the value effects of self-listing and the changes in business strategy on the performance of listed exchanges. The study finds that exchanges, whose revenues from traditional sources have come under severe pressure, and those with slow growing net profit margin but high growth in market activities, are more likely to convert from mutual to a public ownership structure. The self-listed exchanges show a better operating performance than their non-listed counterparts. The self-listed exchanges also outperformed the stock market indexes and a control group of non-exchange firms. The study concludes that the publicly traded stock exchanges perform better because public listing brings in better monitoring of managerial performance, and a potential threat of takeover, while demutualization leads to a reduction in agency costs associated with the mutual form of exchange and unlocks growth opportunities and exchange value.

Otcherea and Abou-Zied (2008) examine the effects of mutual-to-stock conversion of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) on the exchange performance and the quality of the stock market. The study finds that the ASX significantly outperformed the overall stock market and the control group, driven by strong operating performance. The study notes that the profitability ratios of the ASX significantly improved over the five years following the demutualization and self-listing, even after controlling for growth in the Australian economy. It also finds evidence of improvement in the market quality as reflected in the increased trading activity by foreign investors and narrowing of bid-ask spreads in the post-conversion period. The authors conclude that, “stock exchange conversion from mutual to publicly traded exchange is not only value enhancing for the exchange and its shareholders, but it is also beneficial for the stock market as a whole.”

Analytical Studies on Exchange Consolidation and Competition Issues

Until recently, stock exchanges were not seen as competing with each other. These were generally regarded as public entities or publicly regulated private organizations. In either case, they resembled a legal monopoly by the nature of their function providing a public good. The recent technological innovations, integration of financial markets, globalization and removal of international barriers on capital movements have created a more competitive environment in the stock exchange industry. In addition many quasi-exchanges and automated trading systems are competing for trading services without offering the listing services. “The borders of what is a market and what is an intermediary become thinner and thinner,” according to Di Noia (2006). The extant studies analyzing the evolution of exchanges in the face of competition and technological advancement have examined two broad aspects of the industry (i) the network effects (ii) presence of economies of scale.

Network Effects

Domowitz (1995) points out that the exchanges generate network externalities which means that the greater the number of customers they serve the higher the utility for everyone. Therefore, the firms want to be listed on an exchange where other firms are also listed, and where many intermediaries trade. The intermediaries want to trade on exchanges where other intermediaries also trade and many firms are listed. The presence of network externalities would then lead to only one exchange surviving, unless regulation or other imperfections would segment the market. Domowitz argues that because of the positive liquidity effect of network externalities and standardization in the exchange industry, common electronic trading platforms, i.e., *implicit mergers*, between existing exchanges will emerge. His analysis indicates that such implicit mergers allow individual exchanges to set prices above marginal cost allowing them to sustain profits in the long run.

Di Noia (2006) analyzes the competition among the exchanges using the network theory and finds that multiple exchanges may end up as one consolidated exchange; however, such consolidation may not or may not represent a welfare efficient outcome. His model shows that the exchanges may arrive at equilibrium, “where exchanges may decide, even unilaterally, to achieve full compatibility through implicit mergers and remote access, specializing only in trading or listing services.” Such *implicit mergers* are shown to be always more efficient than the actual competition, especially in the presence of cross advantages in marginal costs. It concludes that, “regulation should guide or favor implicit merger, eliminating all obstacles to listing and delisting in exchanges and to trading, implementing, in full, remote access.” The model explains the success of automated trading systems that seem to have unilaterally achieved compatibility by listing stocks already listed on the organized exchanges, thus free-riding on the listing services provided by the latter.

Economies of Scale in Exchange Industry

A fundamental issue underlying the stock exchange consolidation is whether competition between stock exchanges is viable. Stigler (1961, 1964) is among the first to point out that the trading of a particular security tends to cluster in a single location. He attributes this tendency to the presence of economies of scale in information production and, therefore, in the price discovery process. Subsequent empirical analysis by Doede (1967) and Demsetz (1968) document the scale economies present in securities markets. The economies of scale will lead to order flow concentration in the market with the lowest execution costs. However, information costs and regulatory barriers can impede this tendency.

Economic analysis based on ‘economies of scale’ argument suggests that, in the absence of regulatory barriers, a single market in securities will emerge given telecommunication technologies which allow markets to function independent of the physical location. Pirrong (1999) predicts that economies of scale will lead to consolidation among stock exchanges. Davis (1990) argues that the harmonization

of regulation in the EU countries and advancement in technology should lower entry barriers and tighten competition between European financial centers and, hence, lead to decline in natural monopolies within countries. Because of significant economies of scale in financial services a single global centre in Europe may emerge. The recent developments in Europe show how electronic networks like EUREX are able to replace trading floors. Advancements in technology indicate that exchange location may have ceased to be critical for market places and that globalized competition between financial centres will lead to consolidations across regions.

Exchanges are considered to be special kinds of firms that produce prices through a combination of listing and trading services. Exchange serve two types of direct customers, firms that list their securities and the intermediaries that trade in these securities. Gaspar and Glaeser (1996) argue that exchange functions involve the handling of complex information requiring face-to-face contacts and hence multiple market places for securities may exist as a means of reducing the fixed cost involved in such interactions. Since telecommunication may complement but not fully supplement complex information requiring human communication, the local financial centres will still have a role to play. Their analysis directly contradicts the argument that telecommunications will eliminate the significance of location.

Gehrig (1998b) shows that multiple markets will exist under free entry of firms when markets are large enough, even in the presence of strong forces favoring agglomeration. Gehrig (1998a) argues that financial markets are not frictionless, in contrast to the usual assumption in finance literature which leads to geographical dispersion of financial activity. There are both *centripetal* and *centrifugal* forces at work in the financial service industry. Major centripetal forces are economies of scale such as in the payment, settlement and currency trading systems. Other centripetal forces include informational spillovers, market liquidity and market externalities, such as a liquid labor market. The centrifugal forces acting to disperse the financial markets come from local differences in market access costs such as transaction costs and localization of information. Financial securities which are priced on the bases of complex local information are particularly subject to centrifugal forces. It follows that exchange functions involving processing of complex and local information is likely to be concentrated in local instead of global financial centers or electronic trading systems. Malkamäki and Topi (1999) find that trading in bond derivatives shifted from national derivative exchanges to the EUREX, but a parallel concentration of trading did not take place for stock derivatives. They argue that this development was consistent with the network externality argument but also with the analysis of Gaspar and Glaeser (1996) and Gehrig (1998a).

Malkamäki (2000) divides the exchange functions into two groups: (1) trading services which involves matching and processing of transactions through use of computers, software and personnel and (2) listing and monitoring of information which involves personnel and regulatory framework to maintain the market and communicate with the clients. He provides empirical evidence on the economies of scale and efficiency in 38 stock exchanges around the world with respect to the two separate aspects of the exchange functioning. The empirical analysis shows that the

trading function leads to significant economies of scale. The implication is that implicit mergers between stock exchanges as suggested by Domowitz (1995) are thus a realistic scenario as far as this function is concerned. The second function performed by a stock exchange involves market regulation, listing of securities and monitoring of trading and listed companies. This function involves complex information and human communication and the empirical evidence indicates that it entails little or no returns to scale. Malkamaki (2000) concludes that, "it might be optimal that listing procedures and communication with companies and other related matters continue to be handled at the national-exchange level." The study, however, also finds that, "the returns to scale exist in the combined operations of the very large stock exchanges, which suggests that scale (liquidity) is a very strong externality for the biggest exchanges."

Discussion and Conclusions

Demutualization across countries has been pursued as a response to the dynamic changes taking place in the global exchange industry and is seen as hand-in-hand with the industry consolidation through mergers and acquisitions. New and possibly more aggravating conflict of interest issues arise when an exchange transforms from a member-owned into a for-profit entity, which are exacerbated in case the exchange's stock is also listed on the same exchange. The post-demutualization structure of the exchange industry places challenging demands on the regulatory framework to prevent potential conflicts of interest on exchanges operating as for-profit entities and self-regulating agencies.

While the demutualization of the exchanges in Pakistan holds promise in improving corporate governance and alleviating conflict of interest inherent in the mutual forms of organizations, it raises concerns as to the regulatory capacity to deal with the newly emerging environment. Previous studies such as Uppal and Mangla (2006) document that the regulatory effectiveness in the monitoring and enforcement of capital market regulation has been relatively weak in Pakistan. The recent global financial crises underscore the need to ensure that the regulatory effectiveness is commensurate with the complexity and pace of innovation in the financial markets.

The decision to allow multiple exchanges to consolidate has to be evaluated from the public interest point of view depending on an individual country's unique circumstances relating to the capital markets and regulatory capacity. The literature on the question of exchange consolidation brings out two competing considerations. On the one hand, both the net-work theory and the economies of scale arguments suggest that the competitive pressure and advancements in communication technology will lead to only one exchange surviving, unless regulation or other imperfections would segment the market. On the other hand, the exchanges are regarded as public entities or publicly regulated organizations, and their output, the exchange services, are considered in the nature of a public good, and their status as a legal monopoly is accepted. In the developing countries they are also expected to play a leading role in capital markets development.

Recently, a greater emphasis is being placed among regulators on ensuring a competitive environment than on enhancing operational efficiency. There is a need to maintain a competitive environment in which enforcement of market regulation is supplemented and supported by market discipline. In addition, a single integrated exchange poses systemic risk to the country's capital markets in case the exchange experiences financial distress. The current global financial crisis points out to the political and economic perils of letting any one institution become *too-big-to-fail*. The possibility that a single consolidated exchange may overextend itself because it can externalize some risks is real and must be considered.

An econometric study into the performance of the Pakistan's stock exchanges (Uppal 2008) shows that the Lahore Stock Exchange appears to be contributing to the price discovery to an appreciable extent and playing an active and competitive role. Elimination of the competitive pressure by a possible merger of exchanges is likely to lead to higher transaction costs, lower incentives for regulatory compliance and diminish motivation for promoting the capital market development.

A possible way out to reap the benefits of the economies of scale and network externalities through consolidation, while avoiding creation of an exchange monopoly, may be to encourage an 'implicit merger' where separate exchanges achieve full compatibility and remote access capabilities in trading and listing services, as discussed in Domowitz (1995) and Di Noia (2006). This would mean consolidation of the trading function involving execution of transactions which entails significant economies of scale. The second function involving market regulation, listing of securities and monitoring of trading and listed companies does not seem to entail economies of scale; it may continue to be handled at the regional exchange level. Recommendation of the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2007) is also to "strengthen linkages between exchanges to achieve a unified national market system in securities" as a more realist option. The Second Generation of Capital Market Reform Programme envisions a unified national market system to be created through systematic exchange of information between various trading platforms, which will allow public exposure of customer orders for the purchase and sale of shares.

We should note a similarity here with the developments in the U.S. in the 1970s. In 1975 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was amended which made it a U.S. policy to develop a national market system for the trading of securities. Subsequently, the SEC encouraged the establishment of several electronic systems to integrate the domestic stock exchanges. Development of the electronic linking systems was also intended to preserve the regional exchanges as competitive forces to the NYSE. A proposal to integrate the markets further by establishing a consolidated limited order book was also considered but rejected which would have allowed the market orders to be executed against the best bid or ask prices posted from all exchanges.³ Blume and Goldstein (1997) note that, "full integration through a consolidated limit order book would eliminate the competition among markets that now exists. As mentioned above, maintaining such competition is one of the goals of the national market system - a goal that is arguably inconsistent with full integration. ... But, in repetition and as a word of caution, there has been little theoretical or empirical

work to show that an overriding goal of public policy should be a complete integration of the markets for the trading of NYSE-listed stocks.”

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge the help and support of the Punjab Planning and Development Department (P&D), of the Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE) officials for the provision of data and detailed discussions, and extends thanks to the participants of the stakeholders’ workshop held by the P&D for their comments. I am indebted to the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments and suggestions. Finally, I am grateful to the Lahore School of Economics for extending facilities and support for the completion of this work. This does not absolve the author of the responsibility for errors and omission in the study.

Notes

¹ The Federal Cabinet approved the Stock Exchanges (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Ordinance on January 22, 2008. The National Assembly approved the Ordinance on October 9, 2009.

² For a thorough coverage of demutualization issues and case studies, see Akhtar and Karmel (2003).

³ “The Commission believes that the liquidity needs of individual and institutional investors can best be provided by policies fostering the development of competition among dealers who are specialists, market-makers and block positioners. Such competition will mitigate the very difficult problem which now exists of developing and enforcing rules designed . . . to prevent specialists from abusing their privileged position”: Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the future structure of the securities markets quoted in Blume and Goldstein (1997).

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ORIENTALISM AND PAKISTAN*

Abstract

The assumptions and practices associated with Orientalism were essential elements in the domination of colonial and post-colonial societies. Despite the long history of struggles against such oppression, no one else provided as thorough a critique of Orientalism as Edward Said. The purpose of this paper is to explore the major aspects of that critique and to apply the relevant parts of them to Pakistan.

Orientalism consisted of cultural deployment to fulfill its purposes. That consisted of clear differentiation between the West and the Orient (i.e., the others) through a valorization regime as well as modes of representation. The understanding of the Orient that emerged reflected the unequal relationship between the observers and the observed. Orientalism also accomplished its purpose through the development of a discourse, which shaped the observers' understanding of reality. From the contributions of many Orientalists some dogmas emerged. The accumulated strength of the Orientalist archive influenced even as incisive a thinker as Karl Marx. It has considerable power in contemporary setting, as the two case studies of Orientalism in action in Pakistan reveal.

The paper concludes by providing further clarification of Said's views, identifying his critics, and spelling out the kind of changes that might be appropriate in Pakistan if Said's views were really taken seriously.

Introduction

An issue that gets frequent attention in Pakistan in a variety of settings – seminars, artistic exhibitions, books and journals, musical performances, op-ed pieces in the newspapers, and conferences – is the role of culture. Among the hotly contested issues are, how much has it changed and in what direction. Furthermore, strongly-held opinions are expressed about the speed, desirability, and consequences of these changes. Often Samuel Huntington's (1998) views on the clash of civilizations are pressed into service on one side or another; Islam's significance invariably surfaces; Indian influence is noted; and so is that of Saudi Arabia.

What is remarkably puzzling about the cacophony of voices heard on such occasions, however, is a prolonged and strange silence. The seminal figure of our times who has, I believe, addressed this issue, and done so from *our* perspective, is rarely included in a thoughtful, compelling, or meaningful fashion. I have Edward Said in mind, whose name sometimes does surface but his critique of Orientalism is rarely, if ever, considered seriously on these occasions. His views on the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict are widely read and discussed, but not (or on rare occasions) his works on Orientalism (Said 1978, 1981, 1994). Furthermore, one has to search long and hard to find courses offered on Orientalism or its critique in the curriculum of any public or private college or university in Pakistan. In most serious conversations, op-ed pieces in newspapers, and even scholarly publications on Pakistan, it gets little or no attention.

The purpose of this paper is to break that silence. Specifically, the purpose of the paper is, first, to introduce Said's understanding of Orientalism and his critique of it, and, second, to indicate the relevance of that critique for Pakistan. Third, the paper helps identify ways in which Orientalism shapes our identities, on the one hand, and cripples our energies and imaginations, on the other. Fourth, it identifies the attacks on Said's work, on the one hand, and the changes that will be necessary in Pakistan if Said's views were really taken seriously.

Role of Power

The exercise of power is as good a place to enter Said's understanding of Orientalism as any other. The kind of power he concentrated on came in the form of a vast colonial enterprise that straddled most of the globe but had its origins in Europe five centuries ago. It rested on a three-legged stool.¹

The first of these consisted of reliance, on varying degrees, on such coercive techniques as guns, bullets, chains, hangings, jails, rapes, and torture. As it relates to colonial subjects like us, the British *raj* allowed, in addition to the use of these coercive means, starvation to claim an estimated 12 to 32 *million* of our lives in India. (See table below)

It requires extended and concentrated attention to start to bring into our consciousness the full dimensions of the exercise of force in this form and on such a scale. And it probably takes even longer to let the full significance of it to sink in. The fact that it was not a single event, that it was repeated not once but twice, should have shaken the foundations of many cherished human possibilities and begun even perhaps to raise questions about the prospects of human redemption. It should have, more specifically, set aside any British claims to civilization, and forfeited any pretensions on their part of setting norms for it or exporting them abroad. The fact that they did not is a testimony to the strength of the third leg of the colonial stool.

Famine Mortality in India

Year	Estimated deaths	Source
1876 – 1879	10.3 million	Digby
	8.2 million	Maharam
	6.1 million	Seavoy
1896 – 1902	19.0 million	<i>The Lancet</i>
	8.4 million	Maharama/Seavoy
	6.1 million	Cambridge
Total	12.2 - 29.3 million	

Note: (1) Source: Davis (2002 :7)

(2) Not included here is another famine that occurred during the British rule. That was in 1943-44, and the number of Indians allowed to die through starvation was very large. The estimates of total deaths vary, but most of these are above three million.

For India, this was horror of unprecedented proportions. And yet, surprisingly, it is the Nazi holocaust and European tragedies that get most of the attention. Referring to mass killings at the hands of the Nazis and the Soviets, Timothy Snyder (2009: 14) felt the need to state that “Historians must, as best as we can, cast light into these shadows and account for these people. This we have not done.” While the shelves of libraries bulging with the literature devoted to the suffering of the Europeans is not considered enough, our starved millions go virtually unnoticed, their deaths mostly forgotten.

Beyond such bone-chilling holocausts, coercion manifested itself on a more regular and frequent basis with the deployment of military forces, and they remained the ultimate basis and source of colonial power. Their mere presence was enough to discourage violent resistance in some cases.

The second leg that supported colonialism was the civil administration. It represented the physical and material aspects of the relationship with the native populations – native bodies (subdued through violence, but also desired), exploitation of colonial resources (crops grown, resources extracted, trade regulated, revenue collected), and administrative means that normalized these practices. Considerable amount of revenue had to be collected, which paid for the military, police, and intelligence services, to support the first leg of the stool, as well as a large bureaucratic establishment that organized the transportation and judicial systems, urban public services, and a variety of other public agencies. British colonial government in India, it is not widely known, was entirely financed by taxes collected from its colonial subjects living within its boundaries (Ferguson 2004).

Paying for our own oppression was only partially reflected in the revenues forcibly collected from us. The trade policies of the colonial government in India were

designed and implemented to initially destroy Indian handicrafts, and later facilitate British textiles' export to India's "open" markets. Granting to only British shipping companies the monopoly over all goods transported abroad is another example, as was Britain's monopoly over opium trade to China, which that country was forced to import. The normalization and pacification functions of the civilian administration in India were pivotal for the transfer of resources and other substantial material benefits that flowed from India's labour and land to Britain's economy.

The colonial enterprise is sometimes justified in the name of imposing order in the midst of the chaos among us, the natives. But such beliefs are either inconsistent with others or ignore the social forces that colonialism unleashed. Another claim made on behalf of colonialism is that it brought progress – often described as economic dynamism (i.e., capitalism) and political democracy – in addition to stability. But such progress, if it occurred, must have been disruptive to the lives of the colonized people, as it was in all other parts of the world, whether colonized or not. *Order and progress are inconsistent claims.* That notwithstanding, both are made simultaneously.

Furthermore, colonialism reflected foreign control, and that, in turn, led to resistance. The need for the heavy investment by the colonialists in coercive methods and the hiring of a large number of European and native employees for that purpose was not an irrational use of colonial resources. It was the intrusion of colonial rule in daily life that produced tensions that periodically proved to be combustible. We did not have to be educated, or even literate, to sabotage, when we did not eventually eliminate, colonial relationship based on racist behavior and economical ruin. Resistance in some way, shape or form was, consequently, frequent, even when it did not fully succeed in eliminating foreign rule. Explosions of various kinds were common and the colonial archive provides rich and vivid record of them.

Colonial powers, like all dominant groups, did not want to incur the heavy cost of dealing with such resistance. How to make the natives less restive? While this is, in one sense, an age-old problem of the rulers seeking to reduce the cost of compliance through expansion of regime legitimacy, some additional problems had to be confronted by the colonial power because it was racially distinguishable from the native population, on the one hand, and it pursued clearly foreign interests through its policies, on the other. These characteristics called for measures that went beyond the usual advice given to legitimacy-seeking rulers.

In other words, propping up a colonial regime on only the two-legged stool of coercive techniques and civilian bureaucracy was obviously prohibitively costly and unlikely to produce optimum results. To stabilize colonial rule permanently – and when that proved to be impossible, to prolong its duration – the third leg acquired heightened significance. It consisted, among other things, of attempts to legitimize the colonial enterprise in the "mother country" as well as the colonies; they were crucial and they were grounded primarily in culture. Said called the variety of such practices Orientalism. That is what Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999/2002: 23) appears to be speaking of when she mentions the "reach of imperialism into 'our heads.'"

How was that accomplished? A short answer is, by the colonial powers making a cultural investment, one from which they are continuing to reap very rich rewards. Such an investment often both preceded the deployment of coercive action and followed it, since both processes had to be legitimated. Said (1978: 39) wrote, “To say simply that Orientalism was a rationalization of colonial rule is to ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact.”

In order to clarify the meaning of that third leg, Said specifically addressed us, readers in the Third World: cultural significance of the Western influence and the potential danger of our collaboration in it. That is what Pakistanis – and people in all the Third World countries – unfortunately are not always aware of, and consequently become enthusiastic collaborators in their own oppression.

[F]or readers in the so-called Third World, this study proposes itself as a step towards an understanding not so much of Western politics and of the non-Western world in those politics as of the *strength* of Western cultural discourse, a strength too often mistaken as purely decorative or “superstructural.” My hope is to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves or upon others. (Said, 1978: 25; emphasis in original)

Paulo Friere (1984: 159) speaks, appropriately enough, of “cultural invasion” in the same vein.

Cultural invasion, which serves the ends of conquest and preservation of oppression, always involves a parochial view of reality, a static perception of the world, and the imposition of one world view upon another. It implies the “superiority” of the invader and the “inferiority” of those who are invaded, as well as the imposition of the values of the former, who possess the latter and are afraid of losing them.

It is in this kind of domination, when it becomes sufficiently reinforced, that can be found some of the explanation for our blocking the memory of the pain and suffering of the past. For our more than 30 million ancestors who were starved to death, for example, no museums have been built, no monuments constructed, and no holidays named. And Orientalized perceptions enable us to evaluate each other’s social standing on the basis of British standards of taste, manners, and refinement.

Cultural Deployment

It is primarily to Said that we owe a serious and contemporary exploration of the role of culture, and particularly knowledge, in our continuous subjugation. There is no better guide, I believe, than him to help us understand how that knowledge about us was, and is, constructed and the purposes it often serves. What we *can* know of ourselves is available for the educated primarily through knowledge, and

that, in turn, came into existence through certain processes, incentives, conventions, previous findings, and the prevailing trends and norms.

While his ideas are of general relevance to the Global South, they are particularly relevant to some areas. According to him, "...it was in the Near Orient..., where Islam was supposed to define the cultural and racial characteristics, that the British and French encountered each other and the 'Orient' with the greatest intensity, familiarity, and complexity" (:41). He reinforced this view later on. Unlike European dominance elsewhere

only the Arab and Islamic Orient presented Europe with an unresolved challenge on the political, intellectual, and for a time, economic levels. For much of its history, then, Orientalism carries within it the stamp of a problematic European attitude towards Islam, and it is this acutely sensitive aspect of Orientalism around which my interest in this study turns (:73-74).

Consequently, a new category was identified by Said to describe what he called Islamic Orientalism.

Central to the construction of images, identity, and consciousness of Europe was its elaborate and expansive network of understandings of itself in relationship to the Oriental "other," a relationship based on multiple and complex levels in which power figures prominently. Said needs to be quoted at length to gain a fuller understanding of the ways through which Western power is exercised.

...Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious 'Western' imperialist plot to hold down the 'Oriental' world. It is rather a *distribution* of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an *elaboration* not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of 'interests' which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it *is*, rather than expresses, a certain *will* or *intention* to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what 'we' do and what 'they' cannot do or understand as 'we' do). Indeed, my real argument is

that Orientalism is – and does not simply represent – a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world. (:12; emphases in original)

He challenged the dominant Western cannon in such a profound way that reverberations from his writings have crossed the borders from the United States to Europe, collectively often called the North, and from there to the Orient, now increasingly called the South, on the one hand, and from one field of study to several others, on the other. *Orientalism* (along with other works) shook the core assumptions and methods in such areas as archaeology, cultural studies, literature, political science (specially comparative politics), history, and Middle-Eastern politics and Islamic studies. Whether any serious scholar in these areas agrees with him or not, she or he *has* to take him into account.²

Conceptual Tools

There is no simple definition of Orientalism; Said’s several books are dedicated to understanding it, tracing its gradual development first in Europe and then in the United States and teasing out the variety of its implications for our contemporary world. (There really is no substitute for reading Said in original. I have read *Orientalism* several times, and each time I have been rewarded by newer or deeper comprehension of the forces that constructed the world we live in and the purposes they continue to serve.)

What Said called Orientalism was, in one sense, simply an academic area of interest in the Orient (whether expressed through research and/or teaching). Among other things, it was also a codified “system of European or Western knowledge about the Orient,” and it became “synonymous with European domination of the Orient” (p: 197). It had not been as thoroughly examined and scrutinized until Said appeared on the scene, and attributed to Orientalism several other meanings as well.

What Said brought to our attention was something less visible but far more important. It was a specific world-view, a sense of reality, and a consciousness of the imperialists that facilitated their remaking the world in their image. In other words, the construction of certain images and knowledge of the Orient of a particular kind was an essential element in the imperial project. Some Saidian concepts may help in introducing his broader ideas.

First, to say that the Orient was represented in a certain way in itself was not objectionable. Reality, for him, was not external to those observing it.

...the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they *are* representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer. If the latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is), then we must be prepared to accept the fact a representation is *eo ipso* [by that very fact] implicated,

intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the “truth,” which is itself a representation. (p: 272)

Second, the relevant question to ask, then, was not whether a representation – found in a travel guide, work of art, anthropological study, investigation of the religious practices of another people – reflected reality accurately but how narrow, prejudiced, self-serving it was of the period in which it appeared.

My whole point about this system is not that it is a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence – in which I do not for a moment believe – but that it operates as representations usually do, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting...(p: 273)

Third, Orientalism provided a method for the Occident to sharply distinguish itself from the Orient. Steven Seidman (2008: 254) writes

Said argued that before there could be an era of European colonization there had to be an idea of “Europe” or the notion that there is a social and geographical space called the “West” in contrast to the “East.” In his view, the ideas of the West and East are not natural and geographical-civilizational complexes. The different people that make up the so-called Orient are diverse in language, culture, history, and politics. ...[W]hile the notions of West/East, Occident/Orient were present as far back as the ancient Greeks, Said argues that it is only in the modern period (eighteenth to twentieth centuries) in Europe that there developed a network of ideas and beliefs [called Orientalism] that were institutionalized in universities, institutes, governments, and popular culture that made a sharp division between the Occident and Orient.

That broad claim on Said’s part has sometimes been misunderstood. It needs to be clarified. Said was not overlooking or minimizing the significance of difference; he was being critical of a particular form it took.

My aim...was not so much to dissipate difference itself...but to challenge the notion that difference implies hostility, a frozen reified set of opposed essences and a whole adversarial knowledge built out of those things. What I called for in *Orientalism* was a new way of conceiving the separations and conflicts that had stimulated generations of hostility, war, and imperial control. (Said, 1978: 350)

The sharpness of that distinction had as its purpose the formation of a European (and later, Western) identity, and its basis was a separation from, and contrast with, the Orient. The need for a clearer sense of identity, especially when it began to mix with colonial expansion, required hierarchical, moral, racial, and other differentiating characteristics, and they, far more often than not, attributed a superior or higher position to the West. Western scholars and political leaders continue, with some exceptions, to maintain that distinction.

Fourth, Said was not suggesting that Orientalism is a bunch of lies concocted by Western scholars. It was, instead, a cultural investment that produced a certain kind of understanding through which the Western consciousness filtered the Orient's behavior, rituals, practices, and motivations. The "positional superiority" of the Westerners – the fact that they had made the deliberate efforts to be in the Orient, and therefore had the power to observe it, *an ability that since the 18th century had no contemporary Oriental counter-part*, made their accounts the primary (and often the only) sources for information, and were for that reason thought to be reliable. Rajiv Malhotra (2009, p. 211), for example, notes that the "Indians had no representation system of the British in Indian epistemic and mythic terms." In a more active and deliberate sense, then, Orientalism was the process through which the Orient is Orientalized – i.e., "knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense *creates* the Orient, the Oriental, and his world." It is the inequality of power that is critical in accumulating such knowledge. "Orientalism is an exercise of cultural strength" (Said, 1978, p. 401; emphasis in original).

Robert Young (2001: 387) clarifies this further.

[N]o one ever assumed that Said was making the simplistic argument that Orientalism was just an ideological supplement to European colonialism, fabricated consciously in direct service of imperialism. White mythologies rather involve an operation of a will-to-truth in the formations of knowledge themselves. What Said shows is that the will to knowledge, and to produce its truth, is also a will to power.

Similarly, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999/2000) states that "Said's notion of 'positional superiority' is useful...for conceptualizing the ways in which knowledge and culture were as much part of imperialism as raw materials and military strength." Her thoughtful comments on this issue are worth quoting.

The imaginary line between "East" and "West," drawn in 1493 by a Papal Bull, allowed for a political division of the world and the struggle by competing Western states to establish what Said has referred to as a "flexible positional superiority" over the known, and yet to become known, world. ...These imaginary boundaries were drawn again in Berlin in 1934 when the European powers sat around the table once more to carve up Africa and other parts of "their" empires. They continue to be redrawn. Imperialism and colonialism are the specific formations through which the West came to "see," to "name" and to "know" indigenous communities. The cultural archive with its systems of representation, codes for unlocking systems of classification, and fragmented artefacts of knowledge enabled travelers and observers to make sense of what they saw and to represent their new-found knowledge back to the West through the authorship and authority of their representations. (:58)

Over time, more and more of that kind of knowledge was accumulated, and each layer confirmed and reinforced the thickening crust of its conclusions. It was no

longer viewed as Orientalized or colonial or racialized knowledge; it was accepted as knowledge – reliable, objective, authoritative, and, with time, even scientific. It was proving itself serviceable also; the benefits of colonialism were increasingly visible – to the colonizers, that is, and were thought by them to be equally beneficial for the colonized as well. The dissenting voices were few and muffled. It was on the foundations of that kind of knowledge that were later built the more specialized areas of study of the Southern nations’ people: anthropology, archaeology, comparative politics, history, development, and economics. These fields remain largely intact except on some occasions when the marginal voices like Said’s (and those influenced by him) are raised, represented generally by younger scholars.

Let me interject here that Orientalized knowledge, although it was not called that, was crafted to serve specific purposes and interests. Those who constructed it (scholars, researchers, travelers, literary figures) transmitted it to their readers through teachers, faculty members, journalists, and some citizens. Their audience was expected to be members of their own nationality and race. “None of the Orientalists I write about seems ever to have intended an Oriental as a reader” (Said 1978: 336). Exigencies of time led colonial administrators, in the meantime, to make important decisions in the areas under their control. Being few in number in comparison with the Indian population, they needed our help in colonial administration. Furthermore, as a British colonial administrator, G. W. Leitner (2002), noticed we had strong traditions of seeking knowledge. As the Missionary schools (and schools that emphasized English language) were established in India, and as Indians on their own sought education in them in India and in public universities in Britain, we too acquired the same Orientalized knowledge. With some notable exceptions, we began to accept, or at least not to question, the basic assumptions of that knowledge; we were after all, doing so in an environment drenched in colonial trappings. Standing not too far behind them was the coercive apparatus – the well-equipped military and police. Performing well in a college in India, but particularly doing so in a college “back home,” held out the opportunity of a good job and moving in higher social circles required imitating British mannerisms and making fun of the simple-mindedness of our own people, who were viewed as the Indian “masses.” (It is a practice that continues, ignoring such readily available alternatives as ‘fellow citizens,’ “brothers and sisters,” “ladies and gentlemen” or “friends.”)

In contemporary environment, the same Orientalized practices are maintained through different means. Knowledge is now said to be globalized; it is not owned by any one; it is universal. But the power of the Orientalist discourse (see below), largely unchallenged so far, makes these claims sound hollow. To that should be added Pakistani scholars’ limited access to prestigious publishing houses and journals, as well as media channels, except when they are willing to contribute to Islam-bashing. For more than at least two centuries now, authority has been exercised over not only our material resources, states Smith, but also our “knowledges, languages, and cultures. This authority incorporated what Said refers to as alliances between the ideologies, clichés, general beliefs and understandings held about the Orient and the views of ‘science’ and philosophical theories” (Smith 1999/2002: 64).

In Pakistan, we tend either not to raise these questions in a serious manner or we raise them to largely reveal our unflinching faith in the superiority of Western knowledge – its books, journals, newspapers, credentials, and experience-based knowledge. When, on a rare occasion, it is viewed with suspicion, we assert our belief in the open and universal nature of globalized knowledge. These practices and assumptions maintain, as well as strengthen, the class divisions with an additional layer of cultural differentiation.

Institutions of learning, reputable universities, publishing houses, and prestigious journals are rare in Pakistan. Consequently, the students and faculty “want to come and sit at the feet of American Orientalists, and later to repeat to their local audiences the clichés” that Said states he has “been characterizing as Orientalist dogmas” (Said, 1978: 324). These are some of the foundations on which our Orientalized views are built and maintained, allowing both class configurations and knowledge circulation to unite harmoniously in a self-perpetuating motion.

The daily reminders of British influence – in imitating colonial architecture and frequent reliance on the English language, among the upper classes, and sipping tea and being passionate about cricket, among the middle class – reinforce and encourage the acquiring of such knowledge. Most Pakistanis – for that matter, most people in the former colonies – still live with Orientalized assumptions about both the West and themselves. One way that Said summarized them was to identify their dogmas, which are reproduced below. Another way to sum them up is to consider deficiency to be the *defining* characteristic of the people subjugated by the West, and to leave open for endless discussion its nature, variety, and degree.

Sometimes that deficiency is viewed as some form of depravity, lack or perversion; it is always conveniently available as a source of threat, the one excuse that is most frequently deployed by the strong to extend their control over the weak. The Native Americans were a security threat to the settlers at one time, as were the Aborigines in Australia and Maoris in New Zealand. Only genocide on a large scale against these indigenous peoples brought the perception of their “threat” to an end. Now “Islam-ofascism” serves the same purpose. What Orientalist knowledge substantiates is further reinforced by the media. News about the black, brown, yellow, and red people have mostly to do with hunger, disease, earthquakes or other disasters. There is violence, corruption, and mistreatment of women, on the one hand, and their devious minds that conceive of weird and irrational explanations – grievances are rarely mentioned as possible causes – for attacking the West, on the other.

In Said’s words,

At the heart of European culture during the many decades of imperial expansion lay an undeterred and unrelenting Eurocentrism. This accumulated experiences, territories, peoples, histories; it studied them, it classified them, it verified them, and ...above all, it subordinated them by banishing their identities, except as lower order of being... This [European] culture has to be seen as vital, informing, and invigorating counterpoint to

the economic and political machinery at the material center of imperialism.
(Said 1994, quoted in Seidman, 2008: 254).

To the extent that we have become educated which, as far as social sciences and humanities are concerned, means we have probably absorbed a great deal of the Orientalized knowledge that is fed to everyone without any clearly marked label or warning. No wonder our Orientalized identity can only produce pessimistic conclusions about ourselves. The greater our knowledge (and the sophistication that it is expected to provide), the more likely is it to infuse our perceptions with despondency. As someone has said, the way we look at things changes the things we look at. Our sense of deficiency and dependency generally rise in proportion to the knowledge we acquire. Thus we are created by the knowledge about us: deficient, flawed, lesser creatures, and invariably in need of Western help. Western cultural deployment consists in large part of keeping masked the fact that the need for that help is in itself the result of Western observation. And natives verifying such notions are fed information from the same sources, helping to neatly complete and perpetuate a feed back loop. That is how the circularity of this process is masked and the interests that are served either become invisible or benevolent.

Most sophisticated Pakistanis lament, as they emphasize, the fact that we are in important respects different from the Europeans (and North Americans). The fact that Lord Cromer felt exactly the same way is likely to be a source of some comfort to them. Said's reaction to Cromer, however, was quite different: "The crime was that the Oriental was an Oriental, and it is an accurate sign of how commonly accepted such a tautology was that it could be written without even an appeal to European logic or symmetry of mind" (Said 1978: 39). Not willing to forgive Pakistanis for being Pakistanis – or condemning them for not being Europeans or North Americans – is another manifestation of our Orientalized consciousness. Said's *Orientalism* "gave a serious answer back to a West that had never actually listened to or forgiven the Oriental for being an Oriental..." (p. 335). We, too, are often unwilling to forgive ourselves and others for being Pakistanis and unwilling also to question Orientalist assumptions.

Only very recently, after the publication of Said's *Orientalism*, and in large part because of it, have appeared on the academic horizon such fields of inquiry as cultural studies and post-colonial studies which have begun to interrogate the assumptions which facilitate our oppression. Their influence, however, is remarkably limited, and unfortunately has not taken root in Pakistan as well as it has in some other countries. Elsewhere difference is now beginning to be seen through less Eurocentric lens; to be different is no longer equivalent to being lesser or inferior. Orientalist forces, however, continue to put up a fierce cultural fight: since progress for them is linear and Western, difference to them conjures up only frightening images of illiberal practices or unacceptable customs. Since history has now allegedly ended, which means not only that the stages through which the Western history has progressed and the processes through which it has mediated its conflicts are adequate proxies for all human possibilities but also that they signal the absence of viable alternatives (as Francis Fukuyama [1992] claims), taking seriously

the notion of difference is to court disaster. It is along such lines that multiculturalism has also come under heavy attack. The tragedy of 9/11 has been fully exploited to denounce it, as well as the broader notion of diversity.

Discourse of Orientalism

As colonial expansion grew rapidly from the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, our identities, as natives, were constructed and remade in an Orientalized framework – that is, we were Orientalized. We did not actively participate in that process initially, except as objects of study, and often as collaborators. We often had no choice except to submit to such scrutiny – of our plants, soil, mountains, bodies, minds, character, personality, psychology, and culture (Cohn 1996). The knowledge then, as knowledge now, reflected largely the motivations and interests of the researchers, not those being researched. However, the researchers were then less likely than some are now to notice the obvious: that they were able to do their work because of a particular environment – colonial government ruling over subject populations – and that research sponsored or facilitated by such governments, it should have come as no surprise, did not generally question those governments' (benign) role.

Said provides a nuanced account of the development of Orientalism. Starting with the late eighteenth century, a pre-modern, Classical Orientalism emerged which remained dominant during the nineteenth century. Within it he noticed at least four different elements: “expansion, historical confrontation, sympathy, classification” (Said 1978: 120).

For long periods in history, the social environment of human life in general and specific ways links power with knowledge in such fundamental and obvious ways that it goes unnoticed. Said is able to identify the precise date when that link can be located in a visible and dramatic manner. For the first time in history, Napoleon in 1798 launched an attack on Egypt with ships that carried not only sailors, soldiers, and weapons but also scholars who were to study the newly acquired colony. With that event also began the period of modern Orientalism, which placed it “on a scientific and rational basis. This entailed not only their [i.e., modern Orientalists'] own exemplary work but also the creation of a vocabulary and ideas that could be used impersonally by anyone who wished to become an Orientalist” (:122). The knowledge constructed in Egypt was obviously going to be for the benefit primarily of the new (French) colonial rulers of Egypt. There were no corresponding studies undertaken, he pointedly remarks, of France by Egyptian scholars.

Furthermore, the study of colonial possessions was soon enough guided by expectations of getting one's research findings published; the prospects of those findings being praised and rewarded reinforced them. The scholars in the field began to communicate through a specialized vocabulary, continued the practice of carrying in their minds the conclusions reached by the reputable scholars of the past – that practice is now called “literature review” – and often reached similar conclusions. One's probability of getting hired and promoted, even completing one's advanced

degree, more or less depended on following those cues, using that vocabulary, not questioning the ontological commitments, and arriving at similar conclusions. In other words, the study of the subject-matter that was broadly defined as the Orient was fairly well regulated. These are the elements of what Said calls the discourse of Orientalism.

Orientalism held “so authoritative a position ... [as a discourse]... that I believe that no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking into account” the burdens that had been imposed on it. Consequently, Said wrote, “because of Orientalism, the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought and action” (Said 1978: 197).

Knowledge is almost never collected in a vacuum. Orientalist knowledge both encouraged and rewarded the seeking out of difference – in the natural phenomena as well as among humans, and Charles Darwin facilitated the view that the two may be merged. This was another way in which chaos could be eliminated and order imposed. In that process, justifications for colonialism and racism readily coalesced. One element that was invariably present was the conclusion that the West in diverse and not fully understood ways was superior when compared with the Orient. Stated endlessly and in a variety of forms, and backed up by the “knowledge” so readily becoming available, this conclusion was repeated until eventually it seemed self-evident, and that, in turn, provided both the justification for undertaking European colonialism and its continuation where it already existed. Such was the power of the discourse of Orientalism. Summarizing Said’s views, Seidman (2008: 255) states

After the eighteenth century, it became conventional wisdom in England, the United States, and across Europe that the West was rational, promoted individual freedom and democracy, and is the vehicle that powers social progress. By contrast, ... the Oriental was imagined as non-White and primitive, and/or associated with stereotypical feminine traits such as passivity, indecision, childlikeness, and the ornamental. Said calls the network of discourses, representations, knowledges, and folk beliefs that constructed this global symbolic division, “Orientalism.”

A dimension of that broad agreement about that knowledge created about us was the expectation that the differences between the Europeans and the rest – the Orientalized “others” – were both clear and important. It also facilitated the erecting of barriers on which were in part based notions of racial superiority, eugenics, “white man’s burden,” markers of rank and status, and so on. Ignored in this reading of history was a long period of interaction – which was sometimes antagonistic, sometimes collaborative, and other times varied between the two depending upon the period and power configurations – between the Occident and the Orient. Furthermore, Muslim rule over Spain for more than six centuries, for example, was a striking example of multi-ethnic cooperation that had no precedent in Europe and was followed by the Inquisition (Menocal 2002). After 9/11, however, such notions were swept aside as the demand for constructing Orientalist knowledge immediately expanded and some Muslim scholars unfortunately took full advantage of it (e.g., Ajami 1999; Warraq 2007).³

Said's notion of "textual attitude" may also be relevant here, since it reinforces this investment in widening difference. He described two situations. The first often arises when we rely on books or texts to help us understand something before we experience it. In the case of travel guides, for example, our satisfaction or disappointment with what we see in the place/s we visit is often dependent upon what the texts had expected us to find. For many of us that guide or text "acquires a greater authority and use than the actuality itself" (Said 1978: 93). And so did the Oriental texts.

Second, if a text notes one characteristic – e.g., crime, terrorism, abuse – of a group (defined by, let us say, race, religion, sex, or national origin), then its readers may start looking for only that characteristic when encountering that group or any member of it, and if we watch them carefully enough we are, indeed, likely to find what we were looking for, and as more books are produced about how to cope with that characteristic, we are also likely to convince ourselves that we notice an *increase* in the frequency of its occurrence, until we are completely certain that it "is what in essence we know or can *only* know about" that group (:94; emphasis in original). That kind of essentialism is also one of the characteristics of Orientalism. It often provides the basis for many arguments for stereotyping and profiling of "others."

The changes in the dominant modes for the exercise of power are recognizable in different periods of time. At one time it was slavery; then it became colonialism, and many believe new forms of it have now replaced it. Contemporary instruments of power are often characterized by mixing older and newer practices, including those that acquire fresh terminology as well as instruments of power. New vocabulary that is emerging often reveals and explains the emerging developments as much as it protects and masks them. For example, the foreign debt of the Global South has been leveraged by powerful interests to promote a particular kind of globalization through the creation or use of such organizations as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. These organizations conduct and publish their own research findings, hire consultants from different countries, and present conclusions that support their actions. These developments make challenging Orientalist knowledge more difficult, policies based on that knowledge easier to implement, and make class interests to an extent more international (Stiglitz 2002; Perkins 2004; Chang 2008).

Orientalists

Orientalism draws its strength from these and several other propositions, while building on some insights of post-modernism. But Said relied primarily on the works of the Orientalists themselves. Only a very brief summary view is presented here.

Common to most of the early modern Orientalists was the study of dead or lost languages. Such study "also meant the reconstructive precision, science, even imagination...[that prepared] the way for what armies, administrations, and bureaucracies would later do on the ground, in the Orient" (Said 1978: 123).

Silvestre de Sacy, “father of Orientalism,” set in place the tradition that others followed after him, of finding Oriental texts and bringing them to the attention of Europeans through selecting, translating, codifying, and commenting on them. This was done at a time when the range of French colonial control was considerable; it was also a time when Sacy was working for the French government. It was in that context that the Orient began to be constructed – i.e., decisions were made about which texts to include, how to classify them, and what comments and introductions to interject – all in the name of making it “knowable” by Europeans who had attained, in Sacy’s words, “a higher degree of civilization.” (quoted on :128).

Similarly, Ernest Renan, who followed Sacy, did not try to hide his racial prejudices, which were most pronounced in relation to the Semitic languages (Arabic and Hebrew) and people (Arabs and Jews). In comparison with the Indo-European languages, “Semitic is a phenomena of arrested development” (Renan quoted in Said: 145), he believed, incapable of regenerating itself. And the “Semitic race appears to be an incomplete race, by virtue of its simplicity,” stated Renan (quoted on: 149).

Others followed: Reinhart Dozy, William Muir, Thomas Carlyle, Karl Marx, Richard Lane, Constantin-Francois de Chassebouef Volney, Francois-Rene Chateaubriand, Gerard de Nerval, Sir Richard Burton. The differences in their perspectives were significant, but they also shared some themes and conclusions. Some beliefs of the philologists overlapped with those of the Orientalists: the learned Western scholar was expected to be “surveying as if from a peculiarly suited vantage point the passive, seminal, feminine, even silent and supine East, then going on to *articulate* the East, making the Orient deliver up its secrets” (:135-136, emphasis in original). European readers relied on the Orientalists’ texts, rather than their own observations or the literature produced by the natives, to understand the Orient’s reality. Sometimes the pendulum swung from acknowledging that the Orient was undervalued, only to be denounced soon afterward for its barbarism and anti-democratic and backward features. Discounting the value of the Orient was the overriding theme, as manifested by noting, among other things, despotic tendencies among the Orientals, denouncing Islam, basing generalizations about Muslims on the evidence provided by one or a few examples, understanding Oriental practices and their physical features only in reference to European experience (and in that context they often came up short except occasionally during the distant past when a glorious moment defied the lowly expectations associated with them).

Contemporary Orientalism

The influence of these writings was enormous, partly because the European readers had no alternative sources of information, and partly because official policy (and the language in which it was wrapped) often reinforced Orientalist views. And so did other events: colonial expansion itself (or the forcible installation of friendly governments); increased opportunities for travel in the “exotic” East; higher yield from foreign investments; reading of ever increasing number of books and maps that celebrated “discovery” of new lands and people; increasing sense of adventure and

excitement that accompanied visits to markets, shows, and fairs where colonial objects and people could be viewed; and observation of “strange” customs. All this was made possible by the safety and affluence that the exercise of power over colonized people yielded, although any reference to the exploitative nature of that relationship would have been considered unnecessary and uncomfortable, if not unpleasant and rude as well. Orientalist discourse masked such dimensions of colonial experience either through silence or by reference to the cruel practices of native cultures and customs. British novels of the 19th and 20th centuries illustrate this remarkably well (Said 1994).

What we now call Islam-bashing was an important element of Orientalist discourse. European empires rose to challenge and supplant the Muslim ones. Initially, it was the Muslims in Spain that “served as a foil for an emerging European consciousness,” states Anouar Majid ((2009: 65). He continues: “the term *Europe* was rarely used before fifteenth century, proving that the impetus for a European identity, traversed as it was by the growing national singularities, was expansionism and colonialism.”⁴

Consider the case of Simon Ockley, author in 1708 of *History of the Saracens*. Said points out that since that work gave Muslims credit for bringing to Europeans what they knew of philosophy, his readers were “shocked painfully.” He felt the need, however, to always make known his belief that Islam was “an outrageous heresy.” But William Whistone, who was Newton’s successor, was expelled from Cambridge for his Islamic enthusiasm a year later (Said 1978, :75-76). Such anti-Muslim and anti-Arab influence has been pervasive in Orientalist discourse, as is evident in such 20th century scholars that Said identified as H.A.R. Gibb, Gustave von Grunebaum, Morroe Berger, and Bernard Lewis. To these we should now add Niall Ferguson, Daniel Pipes (2002), Richard Perle and David Frum (2003), Fouad Ajami (1999), Michael Scheuer (2008), and Martin Amis (2008), among others.

Contemporary Orientalists share several assumptions and conclusions about the Orient, and their views have now been given a sense of heightened importance and urgency because of the security challenge that the “Orient” is now said to pose. Some of them tilt in the direction that Said identified as belonging to the hard school of Orientalist thought while others in the direction of the soft school. Both of the schools, however, held some similar beliefs that he called Orientalist dogmas. Here they are.

[T]he principal dogmas of Orientalism exist in their purest form today in studies of the Arabs and Islam. Let us recapitulate them here: one is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is the rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a “classical” Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. A third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and even scientifically “objective.” A fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the

brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible). (Said 1978, :300-301)

The dogmas are not a summative statement of Said's views. He noticed the changes in their development and emphases in different periods in European thought and practice, and identified, as indicated above, Orientalism's hard and soft schools.

Orientalism and Marx

So strong was the grip of Orientalist influences that even a scholar of Karl Marx's stature could not transcend it. That is the case despite the fact that he probed searchingly for historical contexts on which to ground his broad and sweeping conclusions about human potentialities, and, in addition to that, identified unquestionably with the vulnerable. His statements about India, which reveal a historically decontextualized narrative and an evaporation of any sympathy for the weak, are well-known.

England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan was actuated by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. (Quoted in Said: 153)

Marx's broad statement has monumental consequences for us, partly because of its rhetorical value, since it is put to use sometimes by individuals who want to silence others, even when they have no commitment to overall goals and values associated with Marx. Several parts of it deserve attention. First, why was India in need of a fundamental revolution in its social state? His perceptions of us reflect an unadulterated Orientalism, and one detects an odious stench of racism as well. Our living spaces, life experiences, and our way of organizing our lives are clearly disgusting to him:

we must not forget that these idyllic village communities [in India], inoffensive though they may appear, had *always* been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they have restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath the traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies... (quoted on :153; emphasis added)

In contemporary language, we would consider such a society as one that is stuck so deeply in cultural quagmire that outside help is the only remedy for it. For Marx, British colonialism was to provide that help, and drag us out of that quagmire. He did not mince words about what Britain had to do: "England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerative – the annihilation of the Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia" (quoted on :154). He captures here a major characteristic of modern Orientalism in a language that goes so far as to prescribe the destruction of a whole society's culture

and replacement of it by another society's far more preferable one. And it is stated in an authoritative voice that is expected to inspire compliance from those to be destroyed because that destruction is, of course, in their own best interest. Since Marx's statements, such words have become less harsh – the vocabulary having gone from development, modernization, globalization, to democracy – but the attempt to remake us in the West's image has only gained momentum with time.

Second, even if the Western linearity of progress is accepted as the only legitimate trajectory, were we really stuck in a quagmire? His representation of India stands in stark contrast with that of other countries. If Marx's attention to Indian history had been as close as it was to Britain's, for example, he would have come to very different conclusions. But then the uneven distribution of attention is, in itself, as appropriate a measure of value as any other. Hence the focus recently on the gaze: its direction, intensity, duration, and intention. Paradoxically, a conservative British historian who believes that colonialism has had a positive impact in the world, concedes that

In 1700 the population of India was twenty times that of the United Kingdom. India's share of total world output at that time has been estimated at 24 per cent – nearly a quarter; Britain's share at 3 per cent. (Ferguson 2004: 22)

That level of world's economic output – almost a quarter of it – does not materialize without a remarkably high level of economic dynamism and productivity. It is unlikely to have been achieved by people mired in superstition, despotism, and tradition, all of which were allegedly depriving us “of all grandeur and historical energies.” But that did not stop one of the most respected (and also critiqued) figures in Europe to authoritatively pronounce severely harsh judgment on people of another continent.

Third, if Marx has turned out to be at least an unreliable a source about the past, what can be said about the projections he made for the future? It was around 1700, it so happens, that the British colonial presence in India, initially embodied in the East India Company, began to be noticed. In the next 200 years, during which Britain consolidated its rule – through military operations, civilian bureaucracy, and cultural investments – it had ample opportunity to bring about a “fundamental revolution in the social state” by being the “unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.” Perhaps unconsciously, but more likely in a deliberate fashion, British colonial rule derived as much benefit as it could from us. The consequences of colonial rule over India for Britain were an increase in British capital accumulation, accelerated skill development, establishment of favourable trading patterns, granting British shipping lines a monopoly over the transportation of cargo, and colonial investments that yielded high rates of return. After a long period of colonial rule, the two successor states, Pakistan and India, found themselves in a state of arrested development. A tiny proportion of workers were employed in industries, education and literacy levels were abysmal, poverty was widespread, and an Orientalized elite that had mentally escaped to Britain exercised considerable power. Perhaps these conditions amounted to a “revolution” of sorts, but it is not the kind that Marx had in mind. Instead of getting us out of a non-existing quagmire, it would be more accurate to state that the British *raj* first created such a quagmire and then pushed us into it.

Orientalism in Pakistan

The notion of Orientalist discourse is so central, I believe, in understanding several dimensions of Pakistani culture that a couple of examples may be useful in further clarifying it. Many a conversation I have had in Pakistan could have served that purpose, but the printed word continues to enjoy its privileges. For that reason, I have selected the analyses offered by Anwar Syed (2006)⁵ of the “insurrection” in Baluchistan and that of Nasir Abbas Mirza (2009) on the Taliban’s move into Swat and Malakand.

Syed’s approach consists of providing his views on the “Baloch political culture” and Baluchistan’s history, particularly the period during which the British ruled that province, and then concluding with some policy recommendations. Mirza follows Syed’s example, paying close attention to a British colonial official’s views on Malakand. The influence of Orientalism’s dogmas on both of them is fairly consistent.

Dogma 1 (sharp distinction between the superior West and inferior Orient): Syed’s tone when writing about the people of Baluchistan is one that assumes that they are underdeveloped in their organizational abilities as well as in their political culture. When they are not indulging in the “wild drama of blood-letting,” he states, they are able to make progress very gradually; furthermore, conflict and plunder among them are frequent. Similarly, Mirza believes that “If ruthlessness is the order of the day, the best choice is the Taliban.” But, he suggests, that, fortunately, countervailing forces that curb such religiosity and ruthlessness are also at work. The “[Western?] world knows better. For them, it is a case of ‘been there, done that’...”

Dogma 2 (old texts preferable to contemporary realities): The political rules of the game – local autonomy granted to the tribal chiefs in return for loyalty to central government – were set by British colonial law of 1901, Syed states, and they still prevail. Another text relied on was completed in 1848 and written by a colonial war lord, Sir Charles Napier. (Here is an example of our understanding of who we are coming directly from a colonial source whose motivations and interests in knowing us – see below – are not hard to identify.) Also quoted is Justice Khuda Buksh Marri’s *Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan*, published in 1974, and there too Napier surfaces as a sound authority. There is no reference to recent reports by Pakistani journalists’ accounts or any op-ed pieces in newspapers by Baluchi or other Pakistani authors. Syed does note some changes, primarily the emergence of a few educational institutions, but dismisses their impact. Mirza follows suit. He identifies a “second lieutenant of a British cavalry regiment” who “ended up commanding a brigade tasked with subduing tribes in Malakand,” and he turns out to be none other than Winston Churchill, author of *The Story of the Malakand Field Force*. After quoting Churchill’s predictable observations concerning the people he had arrived to subdue, Mirza writes, “One hundred and twelve years later, nothing has changed.” While the views of Napier may not be well-known, there is no question about the unqualified contempt in which Churchill held Indians. Furthermore, neither Syed nor Mirza tell us on what evidence they base their startling conclusion that not much has changed in almost a century in these two areas of Pakistan.

Dogma 3 (the Orient is eternal and changes slowly; Western vocabulary is needed for understanding it): To deepen our understanding of the Baluch political culture, Syed turns to Western anthropological terminology. In Baluchistan, “tribes” – not ethnic, linguistic or provincial groups – are said to exist and they have universal and uniform traits. “It is usual for a tribe, wherever it may be...” writes Syed, to have certain characteristics, and Baluchi tribes are no exception. As tribes, they are clearly differentiated from the rest (presumably, non-tribal Pakistanis and Westerners). The pace of change, whether on account of Baluchi culture or Pakistani government’s neglect, suggests, he indicates, stability and continuity of a traditional order rather than change. It is uncanny how closely Mirza also follows this dogma. “[U]nderstanding [of jihadist and fundamentalist Islam] starts and ends with the study of tribalism. Be it tribes of Afghanistan, Waziristan, Africa or the Bedioun tribes of the Middle East, the nature of the tribe is the same.” Syed and Mirza do not mention the possibility of relating terrorism to any explanation (e.g., foreign occupation, as Pape [2006] suggests); for them, being tribal apparently tells you all there is to know.

Dogma 4 (the Orient is to be feared or controlled): The violent streak that Syed noticed among the Baluchis has already been mentioned. The Baluchi is to be feared additionally, he tells us, because, here Napier’s words are recalled, “To fight and plunder is his vocation. The Baloochee warrior loves his race, his tribe, not the general community which he regards but as a prey and a spoil.” Mirza recalls Churchill’s haunting descriptions of people living in Malakand who are suffering at the hands of the “rapacity and tyranny of numerous priesthoods...and a host of wandering Talib-ul-ilms... More than this, they enjoy a sort ‘*droit du seigneur*,’ and no man’s wife or daughter is safe from them.” These conditions, it will be recalled, Mirza claims have not changed since then. This is an amazing claim. Until the Taliban arrived in Swat and then extended their power over Malakand, these areas were no more under the “rapacity and tyranny of numerous priesthoods” than most other parts of the country. There have been no reports of anything even remotely resembling “*droit du seigneur*.”

It should not come as a surprise, then, that Syed endorses the same plan of action in Baluchistan, with slight modifications, as had been put in place in Sindh by Napier. The fact that Sindh differs markedly from Baluchistan need not detain us for too long, except to note the assumption often made by Westerners, now imitated by natives, that all non-white people are the same or similar. Mirza goes even further. He regrets “the world” has been discouraged from studying the countries that had recently won their freedom as primitive and tribal societies because such countries were offended by it. “So, in order to give politically correct ‘respect’ to the Third World countries, the study of tribes was shunned. The result is that today there is no study available to understand Muslim tribal violence. To understand what is happening in the world today, especially in Pakistan, we need to go back to studies conducted between 1875 and 1950.” Are there too many doubts about what are likely to be the findings of studies of human beings who have been pushed into categories with which primitivism is most frequently associated? And if the Pakistanis that emerge from such studies appear either as exotic or fearful, should we be surprised? Mirza does not identify the authors of studies who “researched” us between 1875 and 1950 the way

he perceives us: tribal people. Such authors were likely to be British administrators or anthropologists. That period, it so happens, was the time when collaboration between anthropology and colonialism was at its peak.

I hasten to add that Syed and Mirza are by no means unique in holding such Orientalist views. Frequently our attention is drawn to our unchanging backward nature, mind-set, character or ideology, on the one hand, and the references are made, by way of contrast, with the positive notions of modernization, Western influences, universal values, and so on, on the other (Qadeer, 2006). The memory of the millions of our ancestors who slowly died through avoidable famines does not disturb our belief that civilized and refined life, as well as notions of justice and equality, can be learned only through British tutelage.

Most upper class Pakistanis are aware of the disdain in which Winston Churchill held India and Indians. Unlike Mirza, they are likely to find his characterizations of Pakistani citizens suspect, if not hostile. Many Pakistanis are also likely to recall Napier's reliance on a pun when sending the one-word message of victory to London after the (in)famous battle of Sindh. It was a Latin word – *peccavi* – which means, "I have sinned." They are probably inclined, as Ardeshir Cowasjee (2000) is, to be grateful to him for moving the capital of Sindh from Hyderabad to Karachi, and for introducing police and military establishments, adequate water supply and sewage system for that small town which has now grown to be Pakistan's largest city. Neither Syed nor Cowasjee mention Napier's duplicity, his anti-Muslim feelings or his unscrupulous behavior.

Napier's personal venom against Muslims, in general, and against the Amirs of Sindh, in particular, was pronounced. Relying on an authority with such prejudices should give anyone – particularly those associated in some way with Pakistan – pause.⁶ Furthermore, Napier's honesty and judgment were questionable. He was praised for his valor and military strategy for the battle of Sindh, and for that he was honored by the British government. He did not make it widely known, however, that his triumph in Sindh had a lot more to do with duplicity than courage. Mirza Ali Akbar, who was originally from Iran, had a strategic position in the Sindh military establishment. Before Napier attacked Sindh, he had bribed Akbar handsomely. Akbar betrayed his employer, the Amir of Sindh, and persuaded his Sindhi soldiers to either fire high or to desert on the day of the Battle of Sindh. The slaughter of more than 4,000 Muslim soldiers that day and the defeat of the Sindhi army had a lot more to do with his treachery than Napier's personal courage for which he was decorated. In addition to that bribe, becoming a traitor had an additional pay-off for Akbar: he faithfully served as a *munshi* first to Richard Burton and later to Napier himself. And Napier did well for himself, too; he was appointed as governor of Sindh by the East India Company, and had to be formally addressed as His Excellency Lt. General Sir Charles Napier GCB. According to Cowasjee (2003), "Duke of Wellington described Napier's military performance in Sindh as 'One of the most curious and extraordinary of all military feats.'" (Cowasjee, incidentally, takes that statement at face value and waxes eloquent about how much Karachi owes Napier.)

But that is not all that can be said about Napier. He professed liberal, even progressive, ideas on some occasions, but acted, when paid to do so, in an entirely contradictory manner. “We have no right to seize Sind,” he said, “yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful and humane piece of rascality it will be.” For his conquest of Sindh, this mercenary soldier pocketed 60,000 British pounds (worth several hundred million dollars today) from the East India Company. His progressive political beliefs proved to be flexible on another occasion as well. Long before his arrival in India, he was asked to put down a working class movement in Britain called the Chartists. He promptly obliged.

Orientalized knowledge constructed for colonial purposes, and the policies that flowed from it, are the stuff that continue to generate habituated and thoughtless admiration. It is a legacy that should have become, more than half a century after independence, a source of our nightmares. Both the existence of this delusion and the explanation for it are provided by Orientalism. Our admiration for colonialism leads us directly to a trap within a trap: a perverse desire to save Pakistan from Pakistanis, and to trust, paradoxically, those who have revealed, through both deeds and words, their clear intentions to pursue their own interests often through racist methods.

Conclusion

It is unnecessary to try to summarize the above, since what has been provided is already a brief overview of Said’s views. Here I offer (a) some clarifying remarks before turning to (b) critiques of Said, (c) some further reflections on his relevance for Pakistan, and (d) some proposals for change.

Clarifications. It was not Said’s intention to silence or dismiss all negative comment about the Orient in view of the pervasiveness of Orientalist influences. He was a harsh critic of Middle Eastern kings, for example, who were maintained in power by American and European interests.

I believe it should not be difficult to identify a perspective that focuses on, first and foremost, the deficiencies of a society and notices only its defects in every nook and cranny. Such a perspective allows only the misery of an undifferentiated human formation – “the masses” – to be revealed, and that formation is thought to be condemned to live out its unfortunate life, without any potential to be realized or any value to be redeemed. That is what the accumulated investment in Orientalism often produces among the colonialists and the colonized: a corrosive effect that cheapens the value and debases the humanity of the Orientals. It sucks most of the confidence out of the Orientalists’ community. Nir Rosen (2006), for example, asked Cowasjee, a prominent Pakistani columnist, “what did he foresee” for Pakistan. “‘Doom,’ he smiled.”

The return on that cultural investment is steady and, over time, cumulative. Just as financial investments over a long period of time often grow at an accelerated rate, cultural damage (which Orientalism promotes), when inflicted over a long period, gathers speed and momentum. It is now well-established in Pakistan that the value of

a product or a person is perceived to grow in direct proportion to the distance from Pakistan. Considerable prestige is associated with maintaining a smug posture when discussing a variety of issues, particularly in the English newspapers and magazines – from the “dubious” genesis of Pakistan to the many possible ways of “putting it out of its misery.” In such an environment, bad news for Pakistan is good news for most analysts or columnists because they validate their gloomy forecast. Cowasjee is not saddened by the forecast to which he might have been reluctantly driven; he reveals no signs of anguish; instead, he smiles. Orientalism has shaped our identities in ways that cripple our energies and imaginations. It is not the memories of our triumphs of the past and our expectations of overcoming adversities in the future that are deeply satisfying; no, it is evidence of our failures and our hopes that our dismal predictions will come to pass that are highly comforting.

Fortunately, there are other ways of approaching these issues. One of them is to forthrightly acknowledge a variety of legitimate reasons for complaint by citizens, e.g., power shortages, unsafe drinking water, poor roads, corrupt officials, etc. Such a perspective would be broad enough to include many blessings as well: awareness that one’s country posed no threat to, or has not frequently attacked, other countries; one’s country is not in violation of significant number of United Nations directives; older members of the family and community are given respect and attention; there are no significant racial or cast barriers that limit social mobility; against heavy odds, domestically-produced atomic bomb has provided a modicum of national security; and an enterprising spirit among the people is so strong that remarkable success among many individuals has been achieved domestically and in *many* countries abroad. Such a perspective would not filter out the historical forces that gave rise to the present conditions (negative and positive), or their foreign or domestic origins. Here is one example. Why not insist on interrogating the assumption, repeated frequently, that it is the culture of Muslim immigrants in Europe that gets in the way of their integration on that continent, and suggest, instead, an equally plausible proposition that it is the European social barriers that impede their integration?

Critiques. Academic freedom exists, as has often been remarked, as long as it is not put to serious use. It will not come as a surprise that while Said’s challenge to the Western canon has acquired a small following, it has not gone unpunished.

Challenging the dominant cultural paradigm in any society is invariably met with a severe response. And no one gets away with a frontal attack on the reigning canons in a variety of academic disciplines without getting a lot of scholars upset. Many understandably feel the duty to defend the work that they have done most of their lives. There is also the sheer momentum of habit and tradition. And, perhaps the most important of all, there are powerful and well-entrenched interests that are not ready to abandon their power, benefits, and privileges. “Exercise the freedom of expression,” “question the prevailing premises,” “seek what is new,” and “challenge the existing paradigm” are fine slogans, but when they are actually acted upon, the consequences can be harsh.

Said has been attacked ferociously. At least four full-length books (Baruma and Margalit 2004; Irwin 2008; Varisco 2007; and Warraq 2007), and numerous articles,

have provided scathing critiques of his works on Orientalism with varying degrees of venom, thoroughness, and malice. It is obvious, however, that any author that gets that kind of attention must have made a remarkable contribution. Any body of work that provokes that intensity of scrutiny must have some salience. The vitriolic attacks and their frequency, in other words, speak to the significance, perhaps even the validation, of what is being attacked.

I believe that these attacks, and those that will surely follow, will largely fail because Said's analysis, despite minor flaws, is ultimately grounded in representations of the human condition that pull at the heart strings of too many individuals – in the North *and* South. While his language is sometimes dense, some of the building blocks of his analytical framework are so self-evident that they have become clichés: history is written by the victors, might makes right, the powerful try to legitimize their exploitative motives, vulnerable are often offered incentives to become collaborators in their own oppression, dominant ideas of a society are the ideas of the dominant groups. The critique of Orientalism taps into sensitivities that these feelings invoke. With time they will only grow, not because of political correctness or multiculturalism but because humanistic concerns once they start to grow are hard to shrink. Consequently, broad values associated with inclusiveness, for example, are likely to expand while those associated with exclusiveness becomes increasingly more difficult to defend.

Let us, for heuristic purposes, consider the possibility that Said's views are invalid. In that case, the contrary proposition will have to be taken, on the face of it, as equally plausible. But doing so would have to stretch the limits of credibility beyond all reasonable limits. Such a proposition would require us to lend credence to the following historical scenario: at a time when poverty and disease were widespread in Europe – during 17th and 18th centuries, that is – public and private resources on a significant scale began to be mobilized only to bring to people in distant lands order, good government, civilizational norms, and impartial or sympathetic European scholars. Furthermore, in such a historical dreamland the profits from some companies (chartered by the European monarchs) began to flow as an unintended happy coincidence, just as the genocide of natives on a few continents (North America and Australia) occurred either through poor communication or some misunderstandings!

What are the main objections to Said's work and where are they coming from?

First, the supporters of Israel have been ferocious – accusing him of anti-Semitism, fabricating both autobiographical and historical events, etc. (e.g., Pryce-Jones 2008). In view of his role as an activist in the Palestinian struggle and his numerous books and articles on the subject, that is not unexpected. None of their charges have turned out to be substantial or true, except his strongly felt and articulated conviction that Israeli policies in regard to Palestinians' rights, land, water, and displacement were both immoral and illegal. But this objection has less to do with his work on Orientalism than his writings on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Second, a number of scholarly objections premised on theoretical and empirical considerations have been raised (e.g., Young 2001 :389-392). One of them has to do

with Said's views on representations. Several dimensions of it can be identified. (a) He is alleged to have made sweeping statements about representations of Orientalism. How appropriate is it, it is asked, on the basis of "a restricted number of largely literary texts ... [to] ... proceed to make large historical generalizations" (:389)? (b) Closely related to this is the question of whether literary texts can be as authoritative a source of historical knowledge as other, often material, evidence that historians traditionally rely on? The validity of these objections, however, is questionable. The number of sources Said relied on were not only literary texts; and they were not few. In *Culture and Imperialism*, he (Said 1994) reviewed a whole range of prominent literary figures and found their narratives gratuitously containing elements of Orientalist dogmas. Furthermore, he did not rely on literary texts alone, as the very brief account of *Orientalism* above reveals. As for what constitutes historical knowledge, there is no firm consensus. Should oral histories of some groups be ignored, even if they are the only kind of histories they have? Should the works of fiction be excluded even when they were highly popular and their Orientalist values escaped any significant questioning by the critics at the time they were widely read? Incidentally, these kinds of objections are generally not raised when studies of American or British culture include excerpts from poems by T.S. Eliot or Walt Whitman, and novelists like Jane Austen or Ernest Hemingway.

Yet another objection concerning representation has been raised, however, and this one is more serious. It is alleged that since Said promises only representations, not truth, then how can he (or we) "know that anything has been misrepresented" (Young 2001 :391)? There is no doubt about Said's strong commitment to an anti-essentialist position, which requires flexible and variable understanding, in this case, of Orientalism. "West" and "East" are constructions created as much by geography as imagination, he insists. "Nowhere do I argue that Orientalism is evil, or sloppy, or uniformly the same in each Orientalist. But I do say that the guild of Orientalists has a specific history of complicity with imperial power, which it would be Panglossian to call irrelevant" (Said 1978 :341). He elaborates on this further.

As I suggest, European interest in Islam derived not from curiosity but from fear of monotheistic, culturally and militarily formidable competitor to Christianity. The earliest European scholars of Islam...were Medieval polemicists writing to ward off the threat of Muslim hordes and apostasy. In one way or another that combination of fear and hostility has persisted to the present day, both in scholarly and non-scholarly attention to an Orient – counterpoised imaginatively, geographically, and historically *against* Europe and the West. (:342-343; emphasis in original)

So, how do we know when something is being misrepresented? While a formulaic response is impossible, it may be suggested that representations that are, for example, consistently exclusionary, prejudicial, narrow or defamatory in character are likely to be misrepresentations. Similarly, it would seem plausible to state that misrepresentation exists when the influence of Oriental distortions or complicity with imperial powers are at work. Their markers are to be found in the features of Eurocentricism; several characteristics associated with Orientalism; its dogmas;

views of the defenders and apologists of colonialism; and a variety of views that try to legitimize, for a variety of reasons, rule or considerable influence of one country (or group of countries) over another.

Third, another dimension of representation focuses on a slightly different aspect of it. Said was attracted to definitions of Orientalism that were couched in a nuanced, complex, and even open-ended frameworks; that attraction stemmed from his horror of reifying constructed formations and essentializing their features. But they competed in his mind with giving the same discourse some overarching shape, definable contours, and identifiable markers, since without them *Orientalism* has no purpose. Here is an example. During his long and bitter feud with the best-known Orientalist in the United States, Bernard Lewis, Said stated that he (Lewis) revealed “his extraordinary ability of getting everything wrong.” And he continued, without a pause, “Of course these are familiar attributes of the Orientalists’ breed” (:342). Was Said being contradictory – taking an anti-essentialist position most of the time but abandoning it when it was convenient?

Said’s dilemma is understandable. There is no question that he poured a great deal of his energies into defining, documenting, and critiquing Orientalism through several historical and theoretical stages, as well as in identifying its contemporary manifestations. To the extent that something needed so much scrutiny, the existence of that something is undeniable. But that something was a construction maintained by a discourse, he emphasized over and over again. It had been made “real” to serve several purposes and interests. As long as it was doing that, its “reality” could not be avoided; it was, after all, supported by Orientalists (e.g., Lewis) and other cultural means. However, remembering that it was a construction and a discourse – without fixed concreteness, autonomous existence, or material reality – that kept it going gives us a different understanding of it. It makes it possible to undermine Orientalist discourse and imperial practices by unmasking the role of power behind knowledge and culture. It plants in our minds the profound notion that alternative constructions and discourses are possible.

Fourth, it has also been alleged that Said did not sufficiently periodize Orientalism’s development (Ahmad 1992). A close reading of *Orientalism* by most readers, however, would disabuse them of such a view. Said distinguished between the classical Orientalism (which, in turn, had several elements) and the modern one; the period between World War I and the early 1960s, when H.A.R. Gibb and Louis Massignon were the dominant Orientalists; latent and manifest Orientalism, and the hard and soft schools of Orientalism. It appears that this and other critical comments of Ahmad mask his unwillingness, as a dedicated Marxist, to forgive Said for making culture, instead of class, central to his understanding of colonial and post-colonial relationships. Irrespective of the nature of one’s ideological commitment, addressing the cultural divisions, particularly those that are based on colonial experience and class barriers, is crucial. Not doing so, leads not only to such epithets being hurled as “air-conditioned socialists” or “limousine liberals,” but they also leave intact another layer of differentiation (culture), in addition to class, and that makes the challenge for confronting oppression and inequality considerably more difficult.

Fifth, since Said emphasized the role of power, it may appear that he was suspicious about the privileged Western observers' ability to pursue research in a colonial setting. Young (2001 :392) states that Said "insists on the uniformity of the discursive regime of Orientalism...[which] no westerner can ever escape; but this assertion is somewhat undermined by his own analysis of the complexity and range of positions taken up by the writers whom he discusses." Said was actually against exclusionary practices. He felt that everyone had the potential to develop sufficient sensitivity and awareness in order to understand individuals and groups that were different from her or his own. Furthermore, the idea that reality or essence lurks somewhere beyond its various representations is one that he explicitly argued against.

The methodological failures of Orientalism cannot be accounted for either by saying that the *real* Orient is different from Orientalist portraits of it, or by saying that since the Orientalists are Westerners for the most part, they cannot be expected to have an inner sense of what the Orient is all about. Both of these propositions are false. (Said 1978 :322; emphasis in original)

He proceeded then to state, "I certainly do not believe the limited proposition that only a black can write about blacks, a Muslim about Muslims, and so forth" (:322). Specific Western scholars were cited – Clifford Geertz, Jacques Berque, Maxime Rodinson – as examples of those who were "capable of freeing themselves from the old ideological straitjacket" (:326).

Relevance for Pakistan. Several conclusions that flow from Said's reflections on Orientalism for Pakistan have been identified earlier. Some additional ones may be added here. Of these, some can be attributed directly to Said while others can be inferred from his general views.

First, it is unnecessary to invest our cultural resources in Occidentalism, that is, trying to do to the West what it did to us. "Above all, I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism" (Said, p. 328). Focusing on the West, whether doing so negatively or positively, also has the unfortunate effect of reifying categories that Said shows were constructed for serving imperial purposes.

Occidentalism is undesirable for additional reasons. Our cultural capital is limited and desperately needs to be replenished. Using some of it in this way would provide another way of "escaping Pakistan" and remaining focused on the West, even if it is in a negative light. We need to liberate ourselves from those apron strings. However, Occidentalism is distinguishable from responding to frequent attempts to demonize us, and such endeavors are entirely appropriate and, indeed, necessary.

Second, the reverse of the first is also true: we seem unable to let go of Western influences because of our perceptions of the promise they hold for our future.

Progressive thinkers refuse to step out of Eurocentric terrains because they fear that all social projects of emancipation – poverty eradication, human rights, fight against tyranny, exploitation and hierarchy, and secularism – would lose

the *ally of the oppressed*, namely, science and rationality that are the self-proclaimed virtues of European modernist thought. (Bhattacharya and Basole 2009 :98)

Many, perhaps most, educated Pakistanis contrast the potential the Western ideas hold for progress with the local alternatives with which they are either unfamiliar or have little or no respect for. Their preference for the Eurocentric project is also facilitated and reinforced by their life-style and socialization, on the one hand, and the contempt in which a variety of Pakistani traditions – both religious and secular – are held, on the other. The absence of progressive European practices is associated with European disasters: fascism, communism or war. And when looking beyond Europe, the example most likely to cross the mind is Talibanization, as practiced for a short period in Afghanistan. But Pakistan is not Europe, and its experience is unlikely to replicate European patterns. Given the same (or similar) period of time to flourish as Europe had, Pakistani ideas may produce similar or better results, however difficult such a possibility might be to entertain for Orientalized minds.

The liberal and radical European thought had, let us not forget, a checkered past and a remarkably slow rate of “progress.” All the major liberal thinkers of the 19th century, for example, not only did not hold progressive views, they supported colonialism (Mehta, 1999). Liberal democratic countries failed to extend full voting rights to all of their *own* adult citizens until the 1960s or later. Social and economic rights have yet to be extended to the American citizens. Europeans have yet to elect a person of color as the head of their government. So, is it too much to ask that “political emancipation projects that do not speak in the language of liberal and radical European thought ought not to be *automatically* suspect for that reason alone”(Bhattacharya and Basole 2009 :106)?

Some recent anthropologists are able to detect elements, emotions, community spirit, relationships, modes of thought, and practices in human beings living in even remote parts of the world that have redemptive value and are the sources of vitality and growth. Surely, if the fog of Oriental messages clears up sufficiently, we will detect the same capacity in us to survive and flourish, as all human groups do.

Third, if we do have the resources to study what “East/Orient” and “West/Occident” are, or the shape they have been given over time, our efforts should consist of unmasking their artificial and imaginary nature, as well as their origins and motivations in the *Pakistani* context. What is needed is attention to Pakistan. The “modern Orient,” Said noted, “participates in its own Orientalizing” (Said 1978 :325). It will take some effort, but Pakistanis should be able to transcend it.

Fourth, sooner or later – and it is already rather late – the Pakistani educated class must face the responsibility and consequences of having inherited a colonial cultural milieu that firmly established a valorization regime. In elevating a certain kind of life style, cultural productions, and scales of value, that class perpetuates a way of life and a world-view. It allows only certain kinds of representations of Pakistan to dominate. Its leadership role in society and regular participation in Orientalizing Pakistan is not in serious doubt. What can be said in its defence, however, is that similar classes are performing similar roles in other post-colonial settings also. The

perceptions of this class of Pakistanis, their culture, history, food, products, and future are as dismal as the predictable result: personal enrichment coupled with regularly announced concern for the masses. If the erosion of confidence in its leadership is to stop, some changes in its cultural choices will have to be made.

Fifth, Orientalized Pakistanis reveal their deep sense of inferiority by taking extraordinary measures – from using whitening creams to getting rid of Pakistani accents – in their desperate effort to pass for someone else in Pakistan and abroad. While indigenous families in the United States, Canada, and Australia have bitter memories of the forcible taking of their children to be Westernized in boarding schools during a painful stage in their histories, an increasing number of Pakistani families are taking somewhat similar steps voluntarily. Growing number of parents speak to their children only in English and select schools for them where an emphasis on the English language and British or American culture is strong. They frown on cultural productions and material goods originating from Pakistan. However, their commitment to “escaping Pakistan” – mentally migrating, that is – takes its toll. Pakistani elite denounces Pakistan and Pakistanis forcefully and often in an attempt to clearly distinguish itself from the ordinary and patriotic citizens. A mispronounced word, skin color getting too dark in the summer, a culturally inappropriate gesture – anyone of these (and other) actions can immediately undo all the previous efforts to demonstrate one’s comfort and familiarity with the Western culture. Hence the increasing efforts to “pass” are often equalled by the corresponding fear of slipping up. Other strategies that reflect Orientalized assumptions are also employed. All of them require constant vigilance. Unfortunately, they are trying to be something they are not, and they are attempting to do so at a time when their nationality serves as a marker that European and North American official agencies at a variety of checkpoints – some more visible than others – detect with remarkable accuracy. If it wasn’t so sad, it would be the stuff of hilarious comedy. A lot will be gained by Orientalized Pakistanis re-evaluating themselves by getting to accept themselves as they are (*desi*), which is likely to reduce their personal insecurities and dampen the desire to condemn other Pakistanis who cannot (or do not wish to) escape.

Sixth, the construction of Orientalized Pakistanis’ world-view and life style are based on imitation. Among many serious problems with this is the ever-present temptation to abandon those who are imitating the Westerners for the real Westerners when the opportunity presents itself. Why settle for an imitation when the real one becomes, on occasion, available? Such insecurities among the Orientalized Pakistanis are likely to increase as travel and business opportunities for them expand. And, in a negative sense, it displays an unreflexive disdain for all things non-Western, particularly Pakistani – products, service, people, history, culture, geography, government, and so on.

Taking Said Seriously. What, then, is to be done? A lot. If Said’s critique of Orientalism is largely valid, and that is increasingly difficult to deny it, it inevitably leads to a very different kind of re-examination of our lives, histories, and cultures than what is most often produced by many of the prestigious presses and authored by respectable scholars. That critique, when fully understood, leads to fuller awareness of how saturated our daily lives are with Orientalist influences and how frequently we actively participate on a daily basis in perpetuating and even

strengthening them. These influences, particularly for the Pakistani elite (and those who wish to belong to that class), are architectural, linguistic, sartorial, social, and cultural. Taking Said seriously poses a formidable challenge.

Frantz Fanon's (1963) answer to the question – what is to be done? – was based on a Biblical injunction: those that were last shall be first, and those that were first shall be last. My preference is a little different, but follows the same logic. Reverse the existing valorization regime, preferring what is Pakistani and discounting what is not. It is widely believed that value is created through some clearly determined utilitarian standards of performance. In many cases that is true. But in far more cases than we realize, value is created by the culturally encoded preferences we consumers bring to buy a product or pay for a cultural event. Those preferences are influenced only to a limited extent by the sophistication of the marketing techniques or the efficiency of the product; they also stem from cultural attachments to the people, area, country, and culture. Investment in that cultural attachment, instead of in Orientalization, if done well, is expected to be enormously consequential. It is not scientific evidence, but the valorization regime that helps answer the following question for the Pakistani elite: is the value of summer abroad (in North America or Europe) higher than spending that summer in the mountains of Nathiagala? At least millions of dollars of precious foreign exchange are at stake on the way that question is answered every year.

Furthermore, the use of a service by the Orientalized Pakistanis has almost immediate spill-over effects. When that class deserted the public schools and travel by trains, the quality of both deteriorated. Services for the poor become poor services. If at least some could be encouraged to send their children to public schools and travel by trains, not only would the quality of education and train service improve, Pakistan would save foreign exchange in fees sent to Britain for O- and A-level examinations and the expensive oil used to fly the airplanes. And the improvement of service in some schools and trains would have a demonstration effect in other areas as well.

The alternative to Orientalized Pakistan, it should be clear, is not a hermetically sealed country. It does consist, to provide another example, of making a distinction between learning English as a means of communication (in which capacity it will remain important) and as a carrier of culture (wa Thiongo 1986). In Pakistan, the two are either confused or English is eagerly accepted more as a carrier of culture. It also means having to not only accept but celebrate the fact that we are *desis*, not Europeans or North Americans, temporarily stuck in an unfortunate space. If only we could divert the resources directed toward “escaping” (mentally or physically) or “passing” and invest them instead in accepting who we are, many of Pakistan's significant goals would suddenly be within its reach. The reverse is probably just as likely: denouncing the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis can shrink national horizons and fulfill a self-generated prophecy (i.e., the conviction that our deficiencies are so overwhelming they will always defeat our goals).

But can we be sure of who we are? I am aware that identities are not rigid, they are not determined at birth or by nationality, and that we should all have the freedom to transform ourselves with time. Such notions of fluidity, hybridity, and contingency

have often been noted. One issue that such formulations give rise to obviously is, how freely is that freedom structured? A dark-skinned Pakistani is more likely to try to pass for an American – and probably not succeed because the persistent question that will follow her/him will be, where are you *really* from? Also, if what Pakistanis were exercising was really freedom, then the outcomes would have revealed randomly selected choices. Good taste among men would not invariably lead to acquiring Harris Tweed jackets or jeans, and among women it would not so often produce lightening of their hair. And a third issue that it raises is the highly uneven playing-field of freedom in which resources are committed to reward those who put us down. Few can ignore the awards tantalizingly held out for the writers of the Global South who will defy Said's advice and denounce their own people. Prime examples are V.S. Naipaul (Nobel Prize in Literature), whose Indian family settled in the West Indies and who has vicious things to say about India, people of color, and particularly Islam and Muslims; and Salman Rushdie (knighted by the British government), who went to Britain on a Pakistani passport but now claims to be an Indian. After the tragedy of a death threat issued by an Iranian Ayotallah, he has not stopped warning the West of the danger that Islam represents; more recently it has taken the form of the fear that, he states, (Islamic) theocracy poses to the world. In addition to the above, the recent events (9/11 and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan) and governmental practices (hurriedly-passed legislation that diminishes liberties of citizens) have to a large extent trumped most of the thinking and writing that were poured into challenging the rigidities of categories, binaries, and difference.

The challenge that Said confronts us with is serious. We tend to want to avoid it because it disturbs our lives and questions the assumptions on which they are based. But the price for not confronting that challenge is continuing to mount.

We are left with a painful choice: will inertia and the existing rewards that the Orientalized Pakistan dispenses prevail, or can Said inspire us to go in a different direction?

Notes

¹ I find the metaphor of the three-legged stool helpful although Said did not use it.

² In addition to all that, he was a major academic and political figure in the Palestinian struggle. Homi Babha believes that he shifted the focus from the Left Bank (of Seine) to the West Bank (of Palestine). He is the author of several books on different aspects of the Palestinian struggle (Said 1980, 1986, 1995, 1996, 2001). And his interest in Western classical music was serious enough to lead to the publication of a book on the subject (Said 1991). He clearly cast a large shadow. His death induced in many a feeling of being intellectually orphaned; he was mourned widely and elicited eulogies of remarkable depth and feeling.

³ Ibn Warraq is no ordinary Islam-bashing pundit; his obsessive hatred of Islam is manifested in his other books: *Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out* (2003), and *Why I am not a Muslim* (1995). In *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said's Orientalism*, he attributed only to the West three tutelary guiding lights: rationalism, universalism, and the capacity for self-criticism. For a convincing and thorough rebuttal of his claims, see Bala (2009).

⁴ Majid provides ample evidence to support Said's major arguments – by references to slanderous writings on Muslims as well as the brutalities that were visited upon them (:1-85) – but then paradoxically turns around and makes critical comments about him. "Said was too selective and

polemical,” he writes, “to have given us a good sense of the vexed history of East and West” (:8). On the other hand, he praises and quotes Bernard Lewis, who is probably the best known Orientalist now.

⁵ No disrespect is intended toward Dr. Anwar Syed. I have been his student and have benefitted greatly from his scholarship in many significant ways. I hold him in high regard.

⁶ Information for this and the following paragraph is based on Edward Rice, “General Charles Napier and the Conquest of Sindh,” <http://www.victorianweb.org/history/empire/napier.html>

* This is a revised chapter of a book on Pakistan that the author is working on. All rights are reserved by the author.

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MUNEER AHMAD

SOCIAL PROFILE OF HIGHER BUREAUCRACY IN PAKISTAN

Abstract

In this paper an attempt has been made to delineate the characteristic social background of a typical civil servant in Pakistan. For this purpose the data on social background of the civil servants of the first twenty-five CTPs (Common Training Programmes) (1973-98) has been used. The analysis has been undertaken in three parts. First, the social background of the CSS officers (Central Superior Services) has been examined. It covers all the officers, men and women, belonging to any one of the twelve occupation groups (see Annexure I) who entered the CSS through the annual competitive examination conducted by the FPSC (Federal Public Service Commission). In the second part, the social background of officers of a single occupation group, DMG (District Management Group), reputedly the elite group of all has been studied. In each of these two categories, the social background of officers has been analyzed separately for men and women. The third part focuses on officers who were inducted into the civil service not through the competitive examination under the FPSC but by nomination from the Armed Forces.

Social Background of CSS Officers

In order to study the social background of the CSS officers all the CSS officers of six CTPs were selected for scrutiny. The CTPs selected are CTP number One, Five, Eight, Seventeen, Twenty and Twenty-Five. (see Annexure III). These CTPs represent different political environments in the country (Annexure II). The CSS officers of the First CTP were selected and trained under the government led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. They were the first batch to be selected and trained following the introduction of radical administrative reforms in 1973. CTP Five represents the CSS officers selected and trained under the Martial Law regime of Zia-ul-Haq in 1978. CTP Eight reflects the circumstances following the installation of the first civilian government under General Zia-ul-Haq drawn from different political parties opposed to Pakistan Peoples Party. The CSS officers of the Seventeenth CTP reflect the political climate in the country following the induction of an elected civilian national government under Benazir Bhutto in 1988. CTP Twenty symbolizes political environment under the first term of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. CTP Twenty-Five is the last of the twenty five CTPs selected by us for study. It reflects political circumstances in the country during the second prime ministerial term of Nawaz Sharif.

The total number of CSS officers in the First CTP was 205. Five of them were women. No one was inducted into CTP that year from the Armed Forces. These

Officers were given training at the Academy of Administrative Training (later renamed as Civil Services Academy) from December 1973 to September 1974. These CSS officers had been selected by the Federal Public Services Commission through the competitive examination held in 1972. In other words, the CSS officers of the First CTP may be viewed as representing the typical young men and women who tended to opt for a civil service career before the introduction of the Administrative Reforms of 1973. (see Annexures II and III)

The total number of CSS officers in the Fifth CTP was 111. Six of them were women. No one was inducted from the Armed Forces. These officers were trained at the Academy of Administrative Training from March 1978 to September 1978. They had appeared in the competitive examination in 1976. These CSS Officers represent the young men and women who chose to join the civil service four years after the introduction of the 1973 Administrative Reforms and they were the first batch of CSS officers to be trained under the Martial Law regime of Zia ul Haq.

The total number of CSS officers in the Eighth CTP was 137. Nine of them were women and nine were inducted from the Armed Forces. (The policy to induct into CTP around 10 per cent of CSS officers – mainly in the DMG, Police and Foreign Service – from the Armed Forces was initiated from 1980). For the purpose of this paper the background of Armed Forces inductees has been analyzed separately from those CSS officers who entered civil service through the competitive examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). These CSS officers attended the Eighth Common Training Programme from December 1980 to April 1981. They had appeared in the competitive examination in 1979. These young men and women had opted to enter the civil service eight years after the introduction of the Administrative Reforms. By 1980, the military government of General Zia-ul-Haq, which had overthrown the civilian government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977, had consolidated itself and had repealed some of the changes introduced under the Administrative Reforms. At this time, a new civilian government drawn from selected political parties was also installed in place of military officers.

The total number of CSS officers in the Seventeenth CTP was 150. Nine of them were women and nine were inducted from the Armed Forces. These CSS officers attended the Seventeenth Common Training Programme from November 1989 to July 1990. They had appeared in the competitive examination held in 1988. This period coincides with the exit of the military government of General Zia-ul-Haq and the ushering in of the elected civilian government of Benazir Bhutto.

The total number of the CSS officers of the Twentieth CTP was 126. Eight of them were women and eight were inducted from the Armed Forces. These CSS officers attended the Twentieth Common Training Programme from October 1992 to June 1993. They had appeared in the competitive examination held in 1991. This period coincides with the elected civilian government of Mian Nawaz Sharif in quick succession to its political rival Benazir's government.

The total number of CSS officers of the Twenty-fifth CTP was 168. Twenty-two of them were women and six had been inducted from the Armed Forces. These CSS officers attended the Twenty-fifth Common Training Programme from July 1998 to March 1999. They had appeared in the competitive examination in 1998. This period coincides with the second government of Mian Nawaz Sharif.

Close to two-third of the CSS officers came from families with urban origin. (Table I). This proportion is far higher for women CSS officers. Whereas 64 per cent of the male CSS officers had an urban background 84 per cent of the female CSS officers had an urban origin (Tables 3 and 2, see also Chart 1).

45.7 per cent of the male CSS officers had studied up to MA/M Sc level. Another 9 per cent had studied up to MA LLB or M Ed or double MA level. Only 1.2 per cent (10 out of 806) had studied for MPA degree (Master in Public Administration) and only 2.4 per cent (19 out of 806) had studied for MBA degree. If all these categories are combined, near 58 per cent of male CSS Officers had MA/M Sc level education. A much higher proportion of female CSS officers (76 per cent) fall in this category (Chart I and Table-5). 21 per cent of the male and 18 per cent of the female CSS officers had a BA/B Sc level education. Quite a substantial proportion of male CSS officers had an engineering degree (10 per cent) and MBBS degree (9 per cent). None of the female CSS officers had an engineering degree and only 3 per cent had MBBS degree (Chart 1).

Only two fifths of the CSS officers are First Divisioners (Table-6). 39 per cent of the female and 42 per cent of the male CSS officers fall in this category (Tables-7, 8 and Chart I). Near 56 per cent of the female and near 49 per cent of the male CSS officers passed their last examination in the Second Division. Only three out of 59 or 5 per cent of the female CSS officers but 66 out of 806 or 8 per cent of the male CSS officers are Third Divisioners (Tables-7 and 8).

Two thirds of the male CSS officers (67.4 per cent) attended ordinary schools. Relatively a smaller proportion of female CSS officers (37 per cent) attended ordinary schools (Table 9 and 10). Most of the female CSS officers (40 per cent) attended missionary schools. A far smaller proportion of male CSS officers (8.6 per cent) attended missionary schools. Only 68 or 8 per cent of the male CSS officers attended an elite school – Aitchison or equivalent. Similarly, only 44 or 5.5 per cent of the male CSS officers attended a cadet school. (Chart I).

Nearly half of the male CSS officers (46 per cent) are the sons of salaried employees in managerial or non-managerial positions in the public or private sector (Table-11 and Chart I). Two thirds or 67.8 per cent of the female CSS officers are the daughters of salaried employees (Table-12). Most of these employees occupied managerial positions. More of the female CSS officers' fathers (17 per cent) are pursuing an independent profession than the fathers of male CSS officers (7 per cent). Far more of the male CSS officers are the sons of farmers (21 per cent) and businessmen (16 per cent) than female CSS officers, 5 per cent and 8 per cent respectively (Chart 1).

According to father's annual income the male and female CSS officers have a similar background yet female officers tend to have relatively higher father's annual income. Around 12 per cent of the male CSS officers and 7.6 per cent of the female CSS officers have father's annual income of rupees thirty thousand or less (Tables-13 and 14). Around 10 per cent of the male CSS officers but 20 per cent of the female CSS officers have a father's annual income of more than rupees 120,000 but less than rupees 200,000. Similarly, 16 per cent of the male CSS officers and 25 per cent of the female CSS officers have father's annual income above rupees 200,000 (Chart 1). If the last two income categories are combined 26 per cent of the male CSS officers and 45 per cent of the female CSS officers are the off springs of well to do fathers.

Social Profile of DMG Officers

In the above paras we have described the social background of CSS officers – both men and women – belonging to any one of the twelve occupation groups (Annexure-1) who got selected through the competitive examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). In the following part of the paper, the social background of officers of a single occupation group, the so called elite group namely DMG is presented. This analysis excludes DMG officers inducted from the Armed Forces. It covers 493 DMG officers- i.e. all the DMG officers, both men and women, in each of the first 25 CIPs who entered the civil service through the competitive examination conducted by the FPSC. (Annexure IV)

Similar to the CSS officers, the DMG officers come largely from urban family background. 69 per cent of the male DMG officers (Table-15), and 82 per cent of the female DMG officers (Table-21) have an urban background. The corresponding figures for male CSS officers are 64 per cent and for female CSS officers 85 per cent (Chart 1).

54 per cent of the male DMG officers had studied up to MA/M Sc level including MA LLB, Double MA, MPA and MBA (Table-16). 70 per cent of the female DMG officers had received education to that level (Table-22). 58 per cent of the male CSS officers and 76 per cent of the female CSS officers had studied up to that level (Chart-1). More or less an equal proportion (18 to 21 per cent) of DMG and CSS officers of either gender had studied up to BA, B Sc and BA LLB level. 12 per cent of the male DMG officers and 6 per cent of the female DMG officers had MBBS degree. 9 per cent of the male CSS officers and 3 per cent of the female CSS officers had MBBS degree. In other words more male than female MBBS graduates seek job in the civil service and their proportion is relatively higher in the DMG than in the CSS, in general. Similarly, mainly the male engineering graduates seek job in the civil service including the DMG (Chart-1).

Near 71 per cent of the female DMG officers had First Division in their last examination (Table-23). Around 52 per cent of the male DMG officers were First Divisioners (Table-17). Relatively, lower proportion of female and male CSS officers were First Divisioners – 39 per cent and 42 per cent respectively (Tables- 7 and 8)

29 per cent of the female DMG officers were Second Divisioners and none Third Divisioner (Table-23). 42 per cent of male DMG officers were Second Divisioner and 4 per cent Third Divisioner. 56 per cent of the female and 49 per cent of the male CSS officers were Second Divisioner. 5 per cent of female and 8 per cent of the male CSS officers were Third Divisioner (Chart-1).

47 per cent of the female DMG officers attended Missionary schools; 35 per cent had attended ordinary schools (Table-24). 60 per cent of the male DMG officers were educated at ordinary schools; 12 per cent at the Aitchison or equivalent schools, 11 per cent at Missionary schools and 8 per cent in Cadet schools (table-18). 67 per cent of the male CSS officers went to ordinary schools. The school background of female CSS and female DMG officers appears to be similar. 41 per cent of the former attended Missionary schools followed by 37 per cent going to ordinary schools. The school background of male DMG officers also is more or less similar to that of male CSS officers. Whereas 60 per cent of the former had attended ordinary schools 67 per cent of the latter did so. The remaining officers had attended missionary, elitist and cadet schools in that order (Chart-1).

The fathers of 40 per cent of the male DMG offices were salaried employees in the public or private sector in managerial positions, 14 percent were working in non-managerial positions, 19 per cent were farmers, 16 per cent were businessmen, and 8 per cent were in an independent profession (Table-19). The fathers of 62 per cent of female DMG officers were working in managerial positions in public or private sector; 21 per cent were engaged in business and 12 per cent were pursuing some independent profession (Table-25). The proportion of non-managerial employees and farmers among fathers of female DMG officers was negligible. Fathers of 29 per cent of the male CSS officers were occupying managerial positions in public or private sector, 21 per cent were farmers, 17 per cent were holding non-managerial positions, 16 per cent were businessmen (Table-11). The fathers of 58 per cent of female CSS officers were managerial level employees, 17 per cent were pursuing an independent profession, 10 per cent were non-managerial employees, 8 per cent were businessmen and 5 per cent were farmers (Table-12 and Chart I).

The father's annual income of 19 per cent of the male DMG officers was more than rupees 120,000 but less than rupees 200,000. Around 23 per cent of the male DMG officers' fathers' annual income was over 200,000 rupees (Table-20). If we combine these two categories around 41 per cent of male DMG officers may be considered to be sons of well-to-do fathers. The father's annual income of 8 per cent of the male DMG officers was 30,000 rupees or less. The annual income of another 14 per cent of the male DMG officers' fathers was 60,000 rupees or less. Combining the two categories one may say that around 22 per cent of the male DMG officers were the sons of fathers of modest means.

The father's annual income of around 13 per cent of the female DMG officers was more than 120,000 rupees but less than 200,000 rupees (Table-26). Around 33 per cent of the female DMG officers' fathers' annual income was over 200,000 rupees. In

other words 46 per cent of the female DMG officers may be considered to belong to the well-to-do class. None of the female DMG officers falls in the category of officers whose father's annual income was rupees 30,000 or less. Around 27 per cent of the female DMG officers' fathers' annual income is 60,000 rupees or less. Thus 27 per cent of the female DMG officers, as compared to 22 per cent of the male DMG officers happen to be the children of fathers of relative modest means.

Around 11 per cent of the male CSS officers' father's annual income is more than 120,000 rupees but less than 200,000 rupees. The father's annual income of around 16 per cent of the male CSS officers is over 200,000 rupees. Thus about 27 per cent of the male CSS officers may be described as sons of well-to-do fathers (as compared to 42 per cent of the male DMG officers 46 per cent of the female DMG officers and 46 per cent of the female CSS officers). The father's annual income of 12 per cent of male CSS officers is 30,000 rupees or less and that of 20 per cent 60,000 rupees or less. Thus 32 per cent of the male CSS officers, are the sons of fathers of modest means. This proportion is relatively higher as compared to male DMG officers (22 per cent), female DMG officers (27 per cent) female CSS officers (25 per cent) (Chart-1). It seems the daughters and sons of relatively better off fathers are more likely to get selected in to elite occupation groups like the DMG.

Social Background of Armed Forces Inductees into CSS

All the Armed Forces inductees into CSS are male. Around 62 per cent of them come from urban families (Table-27). This proportion is slightly less than the male CSS officers, 64 per cent of whom have an urban background and far lower as compared to female CSS officers (84 per cent) and female DMG officers (82 per cent) (Chart-1). The proportion of Armed Forces inductees with rural background (38 per cent) is relatively higher than male DMG officers of rural background (31 per cent) and male CSS officers of rural background (36 per cent). (Tables- 27, 15 and 3)

On the basis of the level of education, the Armed Forces inductees are distinct in the sense that a large majority of them (89 per cent) have studied up to BA/B Sc level (Table-28). Just 6 per cent of them had studied up to MA/M Sc level. Only four Armed Forces inductees (2.7 per cent) had an engineering degree and only two or 1.3 per cent had MBBS degree. Armed Forces officers enter military service after passing the Intermediate examination for FA or F Sc. They receive graduate degrees of BA or B Sc on completion of their military training. This explains the presence of a large proportion of BA/B Sc level officers among the Armed Forces inductees. As compared to them the proportion of BA/B Sc level officers is much lower and that of MA/M Sc level officers much higher among CSS officers and DMG officers both male and female (Chart-1).

58 per cent of the Armed Forces inductees went to ordinary schools for schooling (Table-30). 67 per cent of male CSS officers and 60 percent of the male DMG officers attended ordinary schools. Relatively much lower proportion of female CSS Officers

(37 per cent) and female DMG officers (35 per cent) attended ordinary schools (Chart-1). Large proportions of them (41 and 47 per cent respectively) received their early schooling at missionary schools. Only 9 per cent of the Armed Forces (AF) inductees had attended cadet schools which is not a high percentage as compared to male CSS officers (6 per cent) and male DMG officers (8 per cent) (Chart-1).

38 per cent of the Armed Forces inductees are the sons of managerial level employees in the public or private sector (Table-31). 12 per cent are the sons of non-managerial employees. The corresponding figures for male CSS officers are 29 and 17 per cent. 40 per cent of the male DMG officers are the sons of managerial level employees and 14 per cent the sons of non-managerial level employees. In general, women more than men, tend to be children of managerial level employees. Similarly, AF inductees and DMG officers more than male CSS officers are the children of managerial employees (Chart-1).

Father's annual income of 16 per cent of the Armed Forces inductees is 30,000 rupees or less (Table-32). The proportion of male CSS officers and male DMG officers in this category is relatively smaller – 12 per cent and 8 per cent respectively (Chart-1). The proportion of female CSS officers in this category is further smaller (8 per cent). Not a single female DMG officer falls in this category. (Table-26). 19 per cent of the AF inductees' fathers' annual income is more than 30,000 rupees but less than 60,000 rupees (Table-32). More or less the same proportion of male CSS officers but a lower proportion of male DMG officers fall in this category (20 per cent and 14 per cent respectively). Combining the two lowest levels of father's annual income, around one third of AF inductees and one third of male CSS officers are the sons of fathers of modest means. Around one quarter of female CSS officers, female DMG officers and male DMG officers have such a background.

If we combine the two highest levels of father's annual income, around one quarter of AF inductees and one quarter of male CSS officers fall in this category which may be described as well-to-do fathers. The proportion of well-to-do fathers is far higher among male DMG officers, 41 per cent of whom have an annual income of not less than 120,000 rupees and in many cases exceeding 200,000 rupees. The proportion of such officers among women officers is even higher. 46 per cent of female CSS officers and 47 per cent of female DMG officers fall in the category of well-to-do families.

Conclusion

In general, most of the top civil servants come from families of urban background. Among the three categories of officers (CSS, DMG and AF inductees) the proportion of urban origin officers among the AF inductees is relatively the lowest (62 per cent). Far higher proportion of female CSS officers (85 per cent) and female DMG officers (82 per cent) are drawn from families of urban origin.

Only 6 per cent of the AF inductees have studied up to MA/M Sc level. Over four-fifths of them have attained only BA/B Sc level education. A majority of CSS

officers and DMG officers possess a post-graduate degree. The proportion of post-graduates among women is even higher. 76 per cent of female CSS officers and 71 per cent of the female DMG officers happen to be postgraduates. Significant proportions of male CSS officers (9 per cent) and male DMG officers (12 per cent) happen to be trained as medical doctors. The representation of MPA/MBA's is modest. Around 4 per cent of the male CSS officers, 5 per cent of female CSS officers, 4 per cent of the male DMG officers and 12 per cent of the female DMG officers have MPA/MBA level of education.

Most of the top bureaucrats tend to have their early schooling in ordinary schools than in elite schools, missionary schools or cadet schools. The proportion of such persons is the highest among male CSS officers (67 per cent), followed by male DMG officers (60 per cent). The proportion of such officers among AF inductees is 58 per cent. Female officers tend more to have attended missionary schools than other type of schools. 41 per cent of the female CSS offices and 47 per cent of the female DMG officers had attended missionary schools.

The academic achievement of women officers in examinations is relatively better than that of men. 71 per cent of the female DMG officers were First Divisioners. None of the female DMG officers was placed in the Third Division. Third Divisioners were 4 per cent among male DMG officers, 8 per cent of male CSS officers, 5 per cent of female CSS officers and 18 per cent of AF inductees. The proportion of First Divisioners among the AF inductees was the lowest of the three categories of officers i.e. 20 per cent. (Chart I)

Most of the top civil servants are the children of managerial or non-managerial employees in the public or private sector. Relatively a high proportion of female DMG officers (62 per cent) are the daughters of managerial level employees.

A high proportion of female CSS officers (58 per cent) also are the off springs of managerial level employees. The proportion of such officers is relatively much lower among male DMG officers (40 per cent), AF inductees (38 per cent) and male CSS officers (29 per cent). Only 3 per cent of the female DMG officers and 5 per cent of the female CSS officers are the daughters of farmers. 21 per cent of the female DMG officers are the daughters of businessmen. 12 per cent of them are the daughters of men pursuing independent professions. 22 per cent of the AF inductees are the sons of farmers, 12 per cent the sons of businessmen and only 5 per cent the sons of fathers from independent professions (Chart-1).

A substantial proportion of top civil servants are the children of fathers of modest financial income. Around one third of the male CSS officers and the same proportion of AF inductees fall in this category. Around one quarter of the female DMG officers, male DMG officers and female CSS officers belong to this category. A high proportion of female DMG officers (47 per cent) are the daughters of relatively well-to-do fathers. An equal proportion of female CSS officers belong to this category. A far smaller proportion of male CSS officers (26 per cent) and AF inductees (25 per cent) are the sons of well-to-do fathers.

Chart 1: Social Background of CSS Officers, DMG Officers and AF Inductees 1973-98

Background		CSS		AF	DMG	
		Male	Female	Inductees	Male	Female
Rural Urban Origin	Urban Origin	64.1	84.7	61.7	69.1	82.4
Level of Education	MA MSc	58.4	76.3	6	55.1	70.5
	BA BSc	21.2	18.6	88.6	22.6	23.5
	MBBS	9.4	3.4	1.3	12.2	5.9
	BSc Engineering	10.2	–	2.7	10.5	–
Type of School	Ordinary School	67.4	37.3	58.4	59.7	35.3
	Missionary School	8.6	40.7	10.1	11.1	47.1
	Aitchison/Equivalent	8.4	1.7	8.7	11.6	–
	Cadet School	5.5	–	8.7	7.8	–
Division in Exam	First Division	41.8	38.9	20.1	51.6	70.6
	Second Division	48.6	55.9	61.7	42.2	29.4
	Third Division	8.2	5.1	18.1	4.1	–
Occupation of Father	Service (Managerial)	28.8	57.6	37.6	39.5	61.8
	Service (Non-Managerial)	17.4	10.2	13.4	13.5	2.9
	Agriculture	21.2	5.1	21.5	19.4	2.9
	Business	16.5	8.5	12.1	15.7	20.6
	Independent Profession	7.4	16.9	5.4	8.1	11.8
Father's Annual Income	Upto 30,000	12.3	7.6	15.9	8.3	–
	Upto 60,000	20.2	17.9	18.8	13.5	26.7
	Upto120,000	27.5	28.2	27.5	24	26.7
	Upto200,000	10.5	20.5	14.5	18.8	13.3
	Over 200,000	15.7	25.6	10.1	22.5	33.3

Annexure I

Occupation Groups in the Central Superior Services of Pakistan

Commerce and Trade Group (CTG)
Customs and Excise Group (CEG)
District Management Group (DMG)
Foreign Service of Pakistan (FSP)
Income Tax Group (ITG)
Information Group (IG)
Military Land and Cantonment Group (MLCG)
Office Management Group (OMG)
Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service (PAAS)
Police Service of Pakistan (PSP)
Postal Group (PG)
Railways (Commercial and Transportation) Group (RG)

Annexure II

Year of Examination and Year of Training of Selected CTPs (1973-98)

CTP	Examination year	Year of Training	Head of Government
1	1972	Dec 1973 – Sep 1974	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
5	1976	Mar 1978 – Sep 1978	Gen. Zia-ul-Haq
8	1979	Dec 1980 – Apr 1981	Military Council replaced by civilian government
17	1988	Nov 1989 – Jul 1990	Benazir Bhutto
20	1991	Oct 1992 – Jun 1993	Nawaz Sharif
25	1998	Jul 1998 – Mar 1999	Nawaz Sharif

Annexure III

Number of CSS Officers in Six Selected CTPs (1973-98)


CTP	Women	Men	Total
1	5	200	205
5	6	105	111
8	9	119	128
17	9	132	141
20	8	110	118
25	22	140	162
Total	59	806	865

Annexure IV


CTP-wise Number of DMG Officers 1973-98

CTP	Men	Women	Total
1	32	1	33
2	20	1	21
3	19	1	20
4	12	0	12
5	10	2	12
6	14	1	15
7	18	2	20
8	27	2	29
9	25	2	27
10	26	2	28
11	33	0	33
12	19	1	20
13	27	2	29
14	16	2	18
15	28	0	28
16	17	0	17
17	12	0	12
18	19	1	20
19	7	5	12
20	14	0	14
21	12	0	12
22	8	3	11
23	15	1	16
24	17	2	19
25	12	3	15
Total	459	34	493


Urban Origin




MA MSc Level of Education




Ordinary Type of School




First Division



Third Division



Managerial Level of Employment of Father



Over 200,000 Annual Income of Father




Table 1: Rural -Urban Background of CSS Officers for selected CTPs

Background/ CTP	1	5	8	17	20	25	Total
Rural	55 26.8	38	35	42	57	71	298 34.5
Urban	150 73.1	73	93	99	61	91	567 65.5
Total	205	111	128	141	118	162	865 100.0

Table 2: Rural – Urban Background of Female CSS Officers for selected CTPs

Background/ CTP	1	5	8	17	20	25	Total
Rural	–	–	–	–	2 25.0	7 31.8	9 15.3
Urban	5 100.0	6 100.0	9 100.0	9 100.0	6 75.0	15 68.1	50 84.7
Total	5	6	9	9	8	22	59 100.0

Table 3: Rural – Urban Background of Male CSS Officers for selected CTPs

Background/ CTP	1	5	8	17	20	25	Total
Rural	55 27.5	38 36.2	35 29.4	42 31.8	55 50.0	64 45.7	289 35.9
Urban	145 72.5	67 63.8	84 70.6	90 68.2	55 50.0	76 54.3	517 64.1
Total	200	105	119	132	110	140	806 100.0

Table 4: Level of Education of Male CSS Officers for selected CTPs

Education Level/CTP	1	%	3	4	5	%	7	8	%	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	%	19	20	%	22	23	24	25	%	27	Total	%	
MA M Sc	112	56.0			65	61.9		69	57.9								41	31.0		33	30.0				48	34.3		368	45.7	
MA LLB	24	12.0			10	9.5		7	5.8								3	2.2		3	2.7				–	–		47	5.8	
M Ed																														
Double MA	9	4.5			2	1.9		9	7.6								3	2.2		4	3.6				–	–		27	3.4	
MPA	2	1.0			3	2.9		3	2.5								1	0.7		–	–				1	0.7		10	1.2	
MBA	1	0.5			1	0.95		1	0.8								5	3.8		6	5.5				5	3.5		19	2.4	
BA B Sc	25	12.5			13	12.4		19	15.9								24	18.2		19	17.3				21	15.0		121	15.0	
BA LLB																														
B Ed	18	9.0			8	7.6		8	6.7								6	4.5		3	2.7				7	5.0		50	6.2	
B Sc (Engg)	8	4.0			3	2.9		1	0.8								8	6.0		18	16.4				44	31.4		82	10.2	
MBBS	–	–			–	–		–	–								40	30.3		22	20.0				14	9.9		76	9.4	
Other Professional	1	0.5			–	–		1	0.8								1	0.7		2	1.8				–	–		5	0.6	
Not specified	–	–			–	–		1	0.8								–	–		–	–				–	–		1	0.1	
Total	200				105			119									132			110					140			806		

Table 5: Level of Education of Female CSS Officers for selected CTPs

Education Level/CTP	1	%	3	4	5	%	7	8	%	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	%	19	20	%	22	23	24	25	%	27	Total	%	
MA MSc	4	80.0			5	83.3		7	77.8								6	66.7		6	75.0				14	63.6		42	71.2	
MA LLB																														
M Ed																														
Double MA																														
MPA																														
MBA																				1	12.5					2	9.0		3	5.1
BA BSc	1	20.0			1	16.7		2	22.2								2	22.2		1	12.5				3	13.6		10	16.9	
BA LLB																									1	4.5		1	1.7	
B Ed																														
BSc (Engg)																														
MBBS																	1	11.1							1	4.5		2	3.4	
Other Professional																									1	4.5		1	1.7	
Not specified																												–	–	
Total	5				6			9									9			8					22			59	100	

Table 6: Division of CSS Officers in Last Examination in selected CTPs

Division/ CTP	1	5	8	17	20	25	Total
I	56 27.3	32	34	68	65	105	360 41.6
II	131 63.9	64	74	59	44	53	425 49.1
III	18 8.8	15	19	7	6	4	69 7.9
Not specified	–	–	1	7	3	–	11 1.3
Total	205	111	128	141	118	162	865 100.0

Table 7: Division of Women CSS Officers in Last Examination in selected CTPs

Division/ CTP	1	5	8	17	20	25	Total
I	–	4 66.7	3 33.3	5 55.6	2 25.0	9 40.9	23 38.9
II	5	2 33.3	5 55.6	4 44.4	5 62.5	12 54.5	33 55.9
III	–	–	1 11.1	–	1 12.5	1 4.5	3 5.1
Total	5	6	9	9	8	22	59 100.0

Table 8: Division of Male CSS Officers in Last Examination in selected CTPs

Division/ CTP	1	5	8	17	20	25	Total
I	56 28.0	28 26.7	31 26.0	63 47.7	63 57.3	96 68.6	337 41.8
II	126 63.0	62 59.0	69 57.9	55 41.7	39 35.5	41 29.3	392 48.6
III	18 9.0	15 14.3	18 15.1	7 5.3	5 4.5	3 2.1	66 8.2
Not specified	–	–	1 0.8	7 5.3	3 2.7	–	11 1.4
Total	200	105	119	132	110	140	806

Table 9: Type of School attended by Male CSS Officers in selected CTPs

School Type/ CTP	1	5	8	17	20	25	Total
Ordinary	142	81	98	77	78	67	543
	71.0	77.1	82.3	58.3	70.9	47.8	67.4
Missionary	18	13	7	14	4	13	69
	9.0	12.4	5.8	10.6	3.6	9.3	8.6
Aitchsion/ Equivalent	15	3	5	15	11	19	68
	7.5	2.8	4.2	11.4	10.0	13.6	8.4
Cadet	6	1	4	17	5	11	44
	3.0	0.9	3.4	12.9	4.5	7.9	5.5
Model	13	4	2	8	9	23	59
	6.5	3.8	1.7	6.1	8.2	16.4	7.3
Private/ Unknown	6	3	3	1	3	7	23
	3.0	2.8	2.5	0.8	2.7	5.0	2.8
Total	200	105	119	132	110	140	806
							100

Table 10: Type of School attended by Women CSS Officers

School Type/ CTP	1	5	8	17	20	25	Total
Ordinary	1	1	5	7	4	4	22
	20.0	16.7	55.6	77.8	50.0	18.2	37.3
Missionary	3	4	3	2	3	9	24
	60.0	66.7	33.3	22.2	37.5	40.9	40.7
Aitchsion/ Equivalent	–	–	–	–	–	1	1
						4.5	1.7
Cadet	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Model	1	–	1	–	1	7	10
	20.0		11.1		12.5	31.8	16.9
Private/ Unknown	–	1	–	–		1	2
		16.7				4.5	3.4
Total	5	6	9	9	8	22	59
							100.0

Table 11: Father's Occupation of Male CSS Officers for selected CTPs

Occupation/ CTP	1	5	8	17	20	25	Total
Service (Managerial)	50	18	23	44	39	58	232
	25.0	17.1	19.3	33.3	35.5	41.4	28.8
Service (Non-Managerial)	37	19	24	20	26	14	140
	18.5	18.1	20.2	15.1	23.6	10.0	17.4
Agriculture	37	32	25	33	18	26	171
	18.5	30.5	21.0	25.0	16.4	18.6	21.2
Business	35	19	19	21	13	26	133
	17.5	18.1	15.9	15.9	11.8	18.6	16.5
Independent Profession	15	6	9	7	10	13	60
	7.5	5.7	7.6	5.3	9.1	9.3	7.4
Occupation (not specified)	10	8	14	2	–	3	37
	5.0	7.6	11.8	1.5		2.1	4.6
Service (not specified)	16	3	5	3	2	–	29
	8.0	2.8	4.2	2.3	1.8		3.6
Overseas employee	–	–	–	2	2	–	4
				1.5	1.8		0.5
Total	200	105	119	132	110	140	806
							100.0

Table 12: Father's Occupation of Women CSS Officers for selected CTPs

Occupation/ CTP	1	5	8	17	20	25	Total
Service (Managerial)	2	5	7	5	3	12	34
	40.0	83.3	77.8	55.6	37.5	54.5	57.6
Service (Non-Managerial)	1	–	2	1	2	–	6
	20.0		22.2	11.1	25.0	1	10.2
Agriculture	1	–	–	–	1	4.5	3
	20.0				12.5	4	5.1
Business	–	–	–	1	–	18.2	5
				11.1		5	8.5
Independent Profession	1	1	–	1	2	22.7	10
	20.0	16.7		11.1	25.0		16.9
Occupation (not specified)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Service (not specified)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Overseas employee	–	–	–	1	–	–	1
				11.1			1.7
Total	5	6	9	9	8	22	59
							100.0

Table 13: Father's Annual Income of Male CSS Officers for selected CTPs

CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	%	19	20	%	22	23	24	25	%	27	Total	%
No Income/ Not specified																	31	23.5	15	13.6					7	5.0		53	13.8
Up to 30,000																	22	16.7	12	10.9					13	9.3		47	12.3
Up to 60,000																	33	25.0	25	22.7					19	13.6		77	20.2
Up to 120,000																	28	21.2	31	28.2					46	32.8		105	27.5
Up to 200,000																	6	4.5	14	12.7					20	14.3		40	10.5
Above 200,000																	12	9.1	13	11.8					35	25.0		60	15.7
Total																	132	100	110	100					140			382	100

Note: Information on father's annual income is available only from 16th CTP.

Table 14: Father's Annual Income of Women CSS Officers for selected CTPs

CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	%	19	20	%	22	23	24	25	%	27	Total	%	
No Income/ Not specified																	-			-									-	
Upto 30,000																	1	11.1							2	9.1		3	7.6	
Upto 60,000																	1	11.1	3	37.5					3	13.6		7	17.9	
Upto 120,000																	4	44.4	3	37.5					4	18.2		11	28.2	
Upto 200,000																	3	33.3	1	12.5					4	18.2		8	20.2	
Above 200,000																	-		1	12.5					9	40.9		10	25.6	
Total																	9	100	8	100					22			39	100	

Table 15: Rural – Urban Background of Male DMG Officers 1973-98

Back-ground/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total	
Rural	9	4	7	2	4	1	10	5	7	11	11	4	8	5	10	4	5	8	1	4	3	4	8	3	4	142	
%age																										30.9	
Urban		23	16	12	10	6	13	8	22	18	15	22	15	19	11	18	13	7	11	6	10	9	4	7	14	8	317
%age																										69.1	
Total:		32	20	19	12	10	14	18	27	25	26	33	19	27	16	28	17	12	19	7	14	12	8	15	17	12	459

Table 16: Level of Education of Male DMG Officers 1973-1998

Level of Education/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total	%	
MA, M Sc	19	16	12	9	8	6	12	16	12	15	11	5	9	3	14		5	1	1	2	2	3	2	3	1	187	40.7	
MA LLB, M Ed	5	2	3		1	4	4	1	2	1	4	2	2					1		1						33	7.2	
Double MA	1					2		2	2			1				1										9	1.9	
MPA								1			2		2	1							1			1		8	1.7	
MBA								1			1	1		1	1	2		2	1	1			1			12	2.6	
BA, B Sc	4	1	3	1	1			3	5	5	9	5	5	3	1	2	2	4	2	4	3			4	2	3	72	15.7
BA LLB, B Ed	1	1		2		2	1	1	4	3	5	1	4	2	1	1	1								1	1	32	6.9
B Sc (Engg)	2		1				1	1		1	1	2	1	2	2			3	1	3	3	3	7	7	7	48	10.5	
MBBS										1		2	4	4	9	11	4	8	2	1	4	1	2	3			56	12.2
Other Professional																				1							0.22	
Not specified								1																		1	0.22	
Total:	32	20	19	12	10	14	18	27	25	26	33	19	27	16	28	17	12	19	7	14	12	8	15	17	12	459	100.0	

Table 17: Division in which last examination passed by Male DMG Officers 1973-1998

Division/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total	
First	10	8	7	4	4	5	6	8	11	10	16	10	10	12	13	14	9	11	5	10	11	6	15	12	10	237	
%age	31.2	40.0	36.8	33.3	40.0	35.7	33.3	29.6	44.0	38.5	48.5	52.6	37.0	75.0	46.4	82.3	75.0	57.8	71.4	71.4	91.6	75.0	100	70.5	83.3	51.6	
Second	22	12	11	8	4	8	9	15	13	15	12	8	14	3	15	3	1	6	2	4	1	2	0	4	2	194	
%age	68.7	60	57.8	66.7	40.0	57.1	50.0	55.6	52.0	57.7	36.4	42.1	51.8	18.7	53.6	17.6	8.3	31.6	28.6	28.6	8.3	25.0		23.5	16.7	42.3	
Third	0	0	1	0	2	1	3	3	1	1	4	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	19
%age			5.3		20.0	7.1	16.7	11.1	4.0	3.8	12.1		3.7				8.3								5.9	4.1	
Not Given	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	
%age								3.7			3.0	5.3	7.4	6.2			8.3	10.5								1.9	
Total:	32	20	19	12	10	14	18	27	25	26	33	19	27	16	28	17	12	19	7	14	12	8	15	17	12	459	

Table 18: Type of School attended by Male DMG Officers (1973-1998)

Type of School/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total
Aitchison or equivalent	2	1	1	4	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	7	0	4	5	2	2	4	2	53
%age	6.2	5.0	5.2	33.33	0	0	5.5	7.4	8.0	7.7	6.06	10.5	7.4	6.2	7.14	5.88	16.6	36.8	0	28.6	41.67	25.0	13.3	23.5	16.7	11.6
Ordinary	24	15	12	6	7	10	14	18	18	20	22	9	16	11	16	11	5	7	4	6	3	4	6	7	3	274
%age	75.0	75.0	63.1	50.0	70.0	71.4	77.8	66.7	72.0	76.9	66.67	47.4	59.3	68.8	57.14	64.71	41.6	36.8	57.1	42.8	25.0	50.0	40.0	41.2	25.0	59.7
Missionary	2	1	4	1	3	2	1	4	2	2	5	3	5	1	2	3	2	2	0	1	1	0	2	0	2	51
%age	6.2	5.0	21.0	8.33	30.0	14.3	5.5	14.8	8.0	7.7	15.15	15.8	18.5	6.2	7.14	17.65	16.6	10.5	0.0	7.14	8.33	0	13.3	0	16.7	11.1
Cadet School	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	1	2	2	3	4	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	3	36
%age	6.2	0	5.2	0	0	7.1	0	7.4	4.0	0	3.03	10.5	7.4	18.8	14.29	5.88	8.3	10.5	28.5	7.14	8.33	25.0	12.5	11.8	25.0	7.8
'Model' School	1	3	0	1	0	0	2	0	2	2	3	3	1	0	3	1	2	1	1	1	2	0	3	4	2	38
%age	3.1	15.0	0	8.33	0	0	11.1	0	8.0	7.7	9.09	15.8	3.7	0	10.71	5.88	16.6	5.7	14.3	7.14	16.67	0	20.0	23.5	16.7	8.3
Not specified	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	7
%age	3.0	0	5.2	0	0	7.1	0	3.7	0	0	0	0	3.7	0	3.57	0	0	0	0	7.14	0	0	0	0	0	1.5
Total:	32	20	19	12	10	14	18	27	25	26	33	19	27	16	28	17	12	19	7	14	12	8	15	17	12	459

Table 19: Father's Occupation of Male DMG Officers 1973-1998

Occupation/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total	%
Service (managerial)	8	9	4	3	1	2	6	8	6	6	12	5	11	7	8	9	3	9	3	10	11	6	12	16	7	182	39.6
Service (Non-Managerial)	6	4	2	4	3		3	3	5	8	4	2	3		5	2	3		1			1	2		1	62	13.5
Independent Profession	4	1	2	1		3	1	5		3	1	3	3		3	2	1			2					2	37	8.1
Business	5	3	7	2	3	7	2	2	4	4	3	4	4	7	3	3	1	4	1			1		1	1	72	15.7
Agriculture	9	3	3	1	2	2	6	7	6	5	10	4	4	2	7	1	4	6	2	2	1		1		1	89	19.4
Not specified			1	1	1			2	4		3	1	2		2											17	3.7
Total:	32	20	19	12	10	14	18	27	25	26	33	19	27	16	28	17	12	19	7	14	12	8	15	17	12	459	100.0

Table 20: Father's Annual Income of Male DMG Officers 1988-1998

Income/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total	%
No Income																3	3	3	1		1		1			12	9.0
Income not specified																				1				4		5	3.7
Upto 30,000																2	3	1		3		1			1	11	8.3
Upto 60,000																3	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	2	1	18	13.5
Upto 120,000																5	4	6	3	3	3	2	1	1	4	32	24.0
Upto 200,000																3		2		2	5	1	5	6	1	25	18.8
Over 200,000																1	1	5	1	2	2	3	6	4	5	30	22.5
Total:																17	12	19	7	14	12	8	15	17	12	133	100.0

Table 21: Rural – Urban Background of Female DMG Officers 1973-98

Back-ground/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total
Rural						1	1			2			1						1							6
%age																										17.6
Urban	1	1	1		2		1	2	2			1	1	2					1	4		3	1	2	3	28
%age																										82.4
Total:	1	1	1		2	1	2	2	2	2		1	2	2					1	5		3	1	2	3	34

Table 22: Level of Education of Female DMG Officers 1973-1998

Level of Education/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total	%
MA, MSc		1	1		2		2	2	2	2		1	1	1				1	1			2			1	20	58.8
MPA													1													1	2.9
MBA																			1					1	1	3	8.8
BA, BSc	1													1						2		1	1		1	7	20.6
BA LLB, BA B Ed						1																				1	2.9
MBBS																			1					1		2	5.9
Total:	1	1	1		2	1	2	2	2	2		1	2	2					1	5		3	1	2	3	34	

Table 23: Division in which last examination passed by Female DMG Officers 1973-1998

Division/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total
First					2		2	1	2	1		1	1	1					1	4		2	1	2	3	24
%age																										70.6
Second	1	1	1			1		1		1			1	1						1		1				10
%age																										29.4
Total:	1	1	1		2	1	2	2	2	2		1	2	2					1	5		3	1	2	3	34

Table 24: Type of School attended by Female DMG Officers (1973-1998)

Type of School/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total
Ordinary		1				1	2	2	1	1										2		1			1	12
%age																										35.3
Missionary	1		1		2				1	1		1	2	2					1	3					1	16
%age																										47.1
'Model' School																						2	1	2	1	6
%age																										17.6
Total:	1	1	1		2	1	2	2	2	2		1	2	2					1	5		3	1	2	3	34

Table 25: Father's Occupation of Female DMG Officers 1973-1998

Occupation/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total	%
Service (managerial)					2	1	1	2	2	1		1	1	1					2			2	1	2	2	21	61.8
Service (Non-Managerial)																			1							1	2.9
Independent Profession	1	1	1																			1				4	11.8
Business						1	1						1	1				1	2						1	7	20.6
Agriculture										1																1	2.9
Not specified																											
Total:	1	1	1		2	1	2	2	2	2		1	2	2				1	5			3	1	2	3	34	100.0

Table 26: Father's Annual Income of Women DMG Officers 1988-1998

Income/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total	%
No Income																											
Income not specified																											
Up to 30,000																											
Up to 60,000																			2			1			1	4	26.7
Up to 120,000																			2				1	1		4	26.7
Up to 200,000																			1			1				2	13.3
Over 200,000																		1			1			1	2	5	33.3
Total:																		1	5			3	1	2	3	15	100.0

Note: Information on father's annual income is available only from 16th CTP. No woman was selected in DMG in CTP 16, 17, 20 and 21.

Table 27: Rural – Urban Background of Armed Forces Inductees into CSS* 1980-98

Back-ground/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total
Rural								4	6	2	2	5	3	4	6	1	4	5	1	3	0	2	7	1	1	57
%age								44.4	37.5	25.0	25.0	55.5	30.0	40.0	60.0	20.0	44.4	45.4	25.0	37.5	0	50.0	70.0	16.7	16.7	38.3
Urban								5	10	6	6	4	7	6	4	4	5	6	3	5	6	2	3	5	5	92
%age								55.5	62.5	75	75	44.4	70	60	40	80	55.5	54.5	75	62.5	100	50	30	83.3	83.3	61.7
Total:								9	16	8	8	9	10	10	10	5	9	11	4	8	6	4	10	6	6	149

*Induction of Armed Forces officers into CSS under the Common Training Programme started from the 8th CTP in 1980. This analysis is made on the basis of background data of all the Armed Forces Inductees of 8th to 25th CTP.

Table 28: Level of Education of Armed Forces Inductees into CSS 1980-98

Level of Education/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total
BA/B.Sc. or equivalent								7	16	7	8	9	10	9	8	4	6	8	4	8	5	4	8	5	6	132
%age								77.7	100	87.5	100	100	100	90	80	80	66.7	72.7	100	100	83.3	100	80	83.3	100	88.6
MA/M.Sc.								1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	9
%age								11.1	0	12.5	0	0	0	0	20	0	22.2	9.1	0	0	16.7	0	0	16.7	0	6.0
B.Sc. Engineering								0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4
%age								0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	2.7
MBBS								0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
%age								0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.3
BA LL.B								1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
%age								11.1	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.3
Total:								9	16	8	8	9	10	10	10	5	9	11	4	8	6	4	10	6	6	149

Table 29: Division in which last examination passed by Armed Forces Inductees 1980-98

Division/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total
1 st								1	2	0	1	2	1	1	0	3	2	4	0	2	3	0	3	2	3	30
%age								11.1	12.5	0	12.5	22.2	10.0	10.0	0	60.0	22.2	36.4	0	25.0	50.0	0	30.0	33.3	50.0	20.0
2 nd								7	8	3	4	4	8	6	7	2	7	7	4	6	1	4	7	4	3	92
%age								77.8	50.0	37.5	50.0	44.4	80.0	60.0	70.0	40.0	77.8	63.6	100.0	75.0	16.7	100.0	70.0	66.7	50.0	61.7
3 rd								1	6	5	3	3	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	27
%age								11.1	37.5	62.5	37.5	33.3	10.0	30.0	30.0	-	-	-	-	-	33.3	-	-	-	-	18.1
Total:								9	16	8	8	9	10	10	10	5	9	11	4	8	6	4	10	6	6	149

Table 30: Type of School attended by Armed Forces Inductees into CSS 1980-98

Type of School/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total
Aitcheson or equivalent								0	2	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	1	2	13
%age								0	12.5	0	12.5	0	0	20	10	0	0	9.1	0	0	16.7	0	20	16.7	33.3	8.7
Ordinary								8	9	6	4	5	6	7	6	5	6	8	1	3	2	1	5	4	1	87
%age								88.9	56.2	75	50	55.5	60	70	60	100	66.7	72.7	25	37.5	33.3	25	50	66.7	16.7	58.4
Missionary								0	3	1	0	1	1	1	2	0	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	15
%age								0	18.7	12.5	0	11.1	10	10	20	0	22.2	9.1	25	0	16.7	0	0	0	16.7	10.1
Cadet School								1	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	13
%age								11.1	12.5	12.5	25	11.1	10	0	0	0	11.1	0	0	25	0	0	10	16.7	0	8.7
Model School								0	0	0	1	2	2	0	1	0	0	1	2	3	2	3	2	0	2	21
%age								0	0	0	12.5	22.2	20	0	10	0	9.1	50	37.5	33.3	75	20	0	33.3	14.1	
Total:								9	16	8	8	9	10	10	10	5	9	11	4	8	6	4	10	6	6	149

Table 31: Father's Occupation of Armed Forces Inductees into CSS 1980-98

Occupation/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total
Service (Managerial)								2	5	5	4	2	5	4	1	1	3	2	3	4	1	3	4	2	5	56
%age								22.2	31.2	62.5	50	22.2	50	40	10	20	33.3	18.2	75	50	16.7	75	40	33.3	83.3	37.6
Service (Non-Managerial)								3	3	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	3	1	2	0	0	20
%age								33.3	18.7	12.5	0	11.1	10	10	10	40	0	9.1	0	0	50	25	20	0	0	13.4
Independent Profession								1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	8
%age								11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11.1	18.2	0	12.5	0	0	10	16.7	16.7	5.4
Business								0	0	1	2	1	1	0	1	1	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	0	18
%age								0	0	12.5	25	11.1	10	0	10	20	22.2	18.2	0	25	33.3	0	10	33.3	0	12.1
Agriculture								1	6	0	1	2	1	4	4	1	3	4	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	32
%age								11.1	37.5	0	12.5	22.2	10	40	40	20	33.3	36.4	25	12.5	0	0	20	16.7	0	21.5
Not specified								2	2	1	1	3	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15
%age								22.2	12.5	12.5	12.5	33.3	20	10	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10.1
Total:								9	16	8	8	9	10	10	10	5	9	11	4	8	6	4	10	6	6	149

Table 32: Father's Annual Income of Armed Forces Inductees 1980-98

Income/ CTP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total	%
No Income																1		1							1	3	4.3
Income not specified																	2	1				3				6	8.7
Upto 30,000																2	2	3				2	1		1	11	15.9
Upto 60,000																1	1	2		1			4	2	2	13	18.8
Upto 120,000																	3	4	4	2	1	2	3			19	27.5
Upto 200,000																1	1				3		1	1	3	10	14.5
Over 200,000																				2			2	1	2	7	10.1
Total:																5	9	11	4	8	6	4	10	6	6	69	100.0

MOHAMMAD A. QADEER

CULTURAL SEGMENTATION OF PAKISTANI WOMEN

Abstract

Social change is a ubiquitous process. The post-colonial societies have attempted to accelerate the process of social change through the project of national development. This often results in the increased social differentiation and the widening of cultural divides in a society. This is what has happened in Pakistan. While the forces of modernization and development are well known as the drivers of cultural change, what is not commonly recognized is that Islamization has also contributed to the cultural segmentation of Pakistani society. This article examines the cultural segmentation of Pakistan through the lens of women's narratives, beliefs and practices. They are divided in three cultural segments linked together by family, class, and clan institutions. The article further explores the factors that have contributed to the segmentation of women along cultural lines.

Introduction

Social change is a permanent condition of human societies. All societies change, sometimes gradually and at other times rapidly, but change they do most of the time. The post-colonial societies have deliberately sought social change through development as a nation building project. They have pursued development as a deliberate policy of social change by promoting economic growth and the restructuring of institutions.

Furthermore social change is not only a process of change in social organizations and institutions, but also a matter of cultural transformation. New beliefs, norms and values emerge to guide relations and behaviours of people. Established ideas are challenged and modified, all a part of the process of social change. Pakistani society has also undergone wide ranging social and cultural transformations in the past six decades (Qadeer 2006). The primary driving force of social change has been the economic development and transformation of the material base, complemented by the population explosion. Yet Islamization as a social movement has emerged as a competing force of socio-cultural change. How have these two processes, development and Islamization, reorganized the social structure and cultural systems of Pakistan? This question is explored in the present article using women as a site for observing the effects of these two processes.

Conceptual Framework

Before proceeding with the analysis of socio-cultural transformations of Pakistani women as an expression of broader social changes, we need to lay out the conceptual framework. Development is a term whose scope and meaning have evolved over time. In its early formulations, it was conceived as a linear process of transformation of the productive capacity of an economy through organized investment and technological advancement (Rostow 1959). This view was soon expanded to include the goal of raising the standard of living of people, bringing in the notion of rising incomes and a fair distribution of the fruits of production. Gerald Meier after reviewing the various strands of the concept, summed up economic development as “the process whereby the real per capita income of a country increases over a period of time- subject to the stipulation thatthe distribution of income does not become more unequal” (Meier 1984:6). The notion of economic development turned into the concept of development as a generic process involving institutional reforms, democracy, good governance and human rights, bringing the process of cultural change within the ambit of development. Amartya Sen., a nobel laureate, has redefined development as “a process of expanding real freedoms” namely freedom from deprivation and entitlement to education, health, and human rights (Sen 1999:3). These rights and freedoms are bearers of wide ranging cultural changes, merging development with the process of modernization.

Modernization emerged early as a description of the norms, values and institutions that both inspire and sustain the process of development. Gunnar Myrdal in his magisterial study of economic development and cultural change in South Asia, including Pakistan, laid down the “modernization ideals” that should guide development in the region (Myrdal 1964). Among these ideals are economic goals such as raising productivity and levels of living, equalization as well as cultural-institutional values of efficiency, rationality, diligence, orderliness, frugality, entrepreneurship, punctuality. Others have emphasized division of labour, specialized roles, mobility, impersonalization of dealings etc as the necessary conditions for development (Lerner 1966). Regardless of what various theorists have said about modernization, the essential point for our discussion is that cultural change and realignment of social institutions are inextricably woven into the process of development.

The popular notion of modernization treats it as synonymous with westernization. This is the result of western packaging of the modernization’s institutions and values. For example, modern medicine is institutionalized in hospitals, laboratories, patient-doctor ethics etc. The diffusion of these institutions and practices in a Third World country appears to be manifestations of westernization, but in fact they stand for universal forms of modern medicine. The same is true for industries, infrastructure, modern laws of labour relations and other material and non-material changes in the landscape of a country. Thus economic development both depends on and results in cultural change and the combination of the two processes falls

under the rubric of modernization. Pakistani society has been modernizing under the influence of planned economic development as well as the diffusion of global ideas and practices.

One more point needs to be clarified before concluding the discussion of modernization. It is the alleged dichotomy of tradition and modernity. Defined as human practices, beliefs, institutions and artefacts that are handed from the past to the present and that have been the blueprint for social life, tradition is often regarded as an antonym of modernity. Tradition also changes, though slowly and imperceptibly whereas modernism is a process of rapid change. Yet both tradition and modernization can be the bases for social change. Particularly the invention of tradition by reference to some idealistic or mythical past can serve as the justification to reorganize existing social institutions and cultural systems. This is what is Islamization, a process of restructuring beliefs, behaviours and narratives in conformity with the conceived 'purist' traditions and divine edicts of Islam, casting off the supposed cultural accretions of the recent past. It has become a strong force of social change in Pakistani society, particularly since General Zia's coup of 1977. It aims at suffusing all social institutions with Islamic values and norms. It has found a place in the state ideology and policies. The two processes, modernization and Islamization, run on parallel tracks in Pakistani society, each spawning groups and subcultures of its provenance. What narratives do they give rise to and how do they segmentalize society along cultural lines are the questions addressed through the lived experiences of women in Pakistan. Why are women the site for observing socio-cultural change in Pakistan?

Cultural Segmentation of Society and Women

Societies are organized in classes, ethnicities, life style communities and religious groups. Social change affects these components of societies in different ways. For example, modernization sweeps up urban, middle and upper classes and spawns social disparities. Similarly Islamization may affect some regions and groups more than others. What is being witnessed in Pakistan is the appearance of cultural fissures within social classes and ethnic as well as moral communities. Distinct cultural segments have emerged that cut across social classes, occupational and ethnic-regional groups.

This is the process of cultural segmentation that splits coherent social formations into groups of different life styles, ideologies, moral and ethical orders, values and orientations.(Qadeer 2006:263). Pakistani society is culturally splitting into three broad groups, Modern, Traditional and Islamists. Each of these represents a distinct cultural ethos, rooted in respective narratives and epistemology. Social classes are breaking into cultural segments and rural-urban as well as regional-ethnic groups are being divided into life style and moral-ideological communities. This process is being played out strikingly on the terrain of femininity and women's status and role in society.

Coming to the question of why do we focus on women's status and role as the arena to observe the segmentation of society along cultural and ideological lines, the

primary reason is that gender is a defining element of the moral order envisioned by respective narratives of national development. Modernization and development theories and strategies hold women's education and participation as critical factors in economic growth and social progress. Traditionalist ideologies in Pakistan peg the moral order on notions of sexuality, patriarchy and primacy of women as the bearer of family honour and solidarity. Islamist narratives, particularly the revivalist, envisage segregated but activist participation of women in the public life. Their promised social order is also anchored in sexuality, holding women as the custodians of morality. Thus gender is at the centre of the processes of social change (Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987, Khan, Saigol and Zia 1995). It is a mirror of what the envisaged social and cultural order may look like. One objective of this article is to hold up this mirror to show what Pakistani society is beginning to look like under the influence of the competing paradigms of socio-cultural development.

In order to analyze the cultural divisions among women, I will begin by sketching three models of femininity emerging from the dialectics of modernity and Islamization acting on the traditional roles of women. Modernity and tradition are widely recognised as the polarising force of social change. What is not acknowledged in the literature of social change is the infusion of religious revival as another driving force of realigning social structure and cultural system. Together these three forces are spawning distinct cultural segments in Pakistan and probably in other countries.

Tirpartition of Social Structure

Religiosity is on the rise all across the world, but among Muslims it spawns a distinct lifestyle. I am alluding to the emergence of orthodox or literalist communities which subscribe to the view that Islam provides a complete code of life, with divine prescriptions for marriage, family, education, dress and every act of daily life. Such communities split social structure and introduce another basis of social differentiation by religious beliefs and life style, over and above class and ethnicity. New social configurations emerge dividing people by beliefs, life styles and narratives over and above classes and ethnicity. This splitting of social structure complements the cultural and social divisions arising from the on-going processes of modernization, economic development and indigenisation. Thus cultural fissures have come to divide Pakistani society and culture into three distinct subcultures or life styles of traditional, modern and Islamic provenance¹. This is the tripartiton of social structure, which in turn divides women in three broad cultural segments.

The three models of femininity are, of course, overlapping not in their ideologies and practices but in family, clan (Biradari), economic organization and other social institutions, giving rise to hybrid categories and diffused borders. They may be viewed more as processes rather than as structures.

In elaborating these three segments of Muslim women, I will focus on their respective sub- cultures in Pakistan in all its fluidity and dynamism. With almost 3-4 million Pakistanis living in the Middle East, Europe, North America, Africa and

even Japan, the Diaspora has become a significant part of the Global Pakistani society and culture Pakistani women in the Diaspora are both influenced by the discourse of femininity in Pakistan and they also feedback ideas and practices into women's life styles in the homeland. Thus a study of the evolving femininity of Pakistani women is an investigation in the global currents of social change. What do these three models of femininity mean and how has this differentiation of beliefs and practices come about? This question is pursued below.

Profiles of Femininity

Pakistani women can be divided in three broad segments by their values, beliefs and practices, namely i) traditional, ii) modern and iii) Islamist. Of course, all three categories are rooted in the common ground of the national/ regional cultures, languages and religion. In the same family, the mother may be traditional in her life style, while the daughter may be modern and the daughter-in-law may be Islamist. The point is that these ideological-cultural categories do not separate women by space, status or education or occupation. Yet they separate them by ideology, interests and symbols. Following are brief descriptions of each type.

Traditional

She is a woman of customary beliefs and behaviour, for whom domesticity and family are the locus of her life, yet she is not without material aspirations. She subscribes to a mixture of religious precepts, values, customs and folk beliefs of her sect and clan in her personal life. She is observant but pragmatic and worldly in outlook. She has her share of responsibilities in fields or workshops, as a part of the household economy, and increasingly takes on remunerative jobs outside the home (Weiss 2002). Yet she has little presence in the public space. She could be a college graduate and employed professional or an illiterate stay-at-home. She could be of any class. In the Diaspora, she may be compelled to work in factories or stores to support her immigrant father or husband, or she may stay at home to raise a family. What distinguishes her is her modest, conventional but self-assured comportment. She is religious in her personal beliefs but not assertive or demonstrative about them. Religious practices are woven into her daily life, but she is not ideological about it. She has very little presence in the public space and discourses. Only a small minority of traditional women wear a veil or cover their face, though most dress modestly.

An overwhelming majority of Pakistani women, both at home and in the Diaspora, are traditional. Yet their traditionalism is not static. It changes with changing times.

Modern

A modern woman has a liberal, secular and relatively individualistic outlook. She combines her domestic and family commitments with desires of a job, career or public participation (Hafeez 1981). Her values and beliefs combine liberal traditions of religion with contemporary popular ideologies. She is not irreligious but usually

not demonstratively religious. She could be observant in her personal life, yet conducts her life with little religious symbolism.. She assumes a fair degree of personal freedom and entertains notions of equality of men and women. She is present in the public space and shows some degree of independence. She could volunteer in a community organization, participate in politics or hold a job. Yet she is devoted to family, while holding ambitions of occupational and material advancement. She is modern but not necessarily Western. She dons a shawl (duppatta) as an upper body cover and may occasionally draw it over her head. Yet she does not wear the head scarf (Hijab) or face veil (Niqab).

Islamist

To this category belong women who have modelled their lives according to the ideologies of Islamic revivalism. Such a woman imbibes puritanical values and beliefs. She observes Purdah, wearing Burqa, Niqab, or Hijab, and follows Islamic obligations. She not only follows Islamic precepts but also would like to see an Islamic way of life for the community at large. For her, Islam is a liberating creed for the contemporary times.

An Islamist woman negotiates the public space on her own terms. She may be a member of the Islamic students association at the school or college or a participant in women's *Dars* (the *Qur'an* reading circle). She may take a job and participate in public affairs, while wearing a Niqab or Hijab. There are many Islamists who are members of the national parliament. They take part in parliamentary discussions, lead parades, appear on television, always clad in a Niqab. Islamists are not home – bound. They are in the public space, shopping, working, politicking or sermonizing. Some fringe groups may be extremists and militant in their views, but they are not in the mainstream of Islamists I am talking about.

These born–again Muslims could be usually college- educated women of middle and upper class bearings or those from the working class or rural backgrounds who initially found their ideology through student organizations and Islamic groups in schools, colleges and *madrasahs*. From these beginnings, they build communities, circles and associations of like-minded women. Islamists emerged in large numbers in 1980s and now form a distinct segment of women.

Emergence of the Three Cultural Segments

The process of cultural tripartition of Pakistani women courses back and forth between the home country and the Diaspora. The two sites are interconnected, each influencing the other in a circular way. International events and global forces also affect both. Yet the differentiation of the three models began slowly at home and gained momentum as the state and society evolved through successive stages of economic and political development. It was carried from the homeland to the Diaspora, though many practices forged in the Diaspora feed back into the communities at home.

The differentiation between the traditional and modern life styles has a long history. It began with the British rule in India and accelerated after Independence (1947), which itself was an expression of Muslim nationalism and the national aspirations for development. For women, the development meant stepping out of the home to pursue education, employment and public life. Gradually the momentum for modern life built up, propelled by rising expectations and economic compulsions. An increasing proportion of young women enrolled in schools and colleges, particularly in cities, and many adopted modern values and practices.

In the early years of Pakistan, young girls could be seen riding bicycles in Lahore, Karachi or Rawalpindi. The Burqa evolved from an all enveloping coverall in the 1940s and early 1950s to a two piece fitted garment worn over clothes with a thin face veil by the late 1950s and by the late 1960s it disappeared altogether for all practical purposes.² Even the traditional beliefs and practices evolved to incorporate ambitions of material well being, relaxing marriage customs to allow a prospective couple to see each other as well as promoting mobility for studies, jobs, travel and migration. This cracking of the casing of tradition laid the ground for the emigration of labour to Britain and the sojourn of workers in Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in the 50s and 60s. Thus began the trickle that built up the Diaspora.

Initially, mostly men went abroad in search of fortunes leaving their families behind, thus linking the 'foreign' with the home. Gradually this trickle swelled into a stream, sweeping families along with men. By the end of the decade of the 1960s, the contours of the traditional and modern femininity had been well etched into Pakistan's cultural landscape and transposed in the Diaspora.

Through a period of populist socialism in Pakistan, the first half of the decade of the 1970s witnessed the emergence of Islamists as a distinct segment in Pakistani society, popularly known as *Jamaatis*, named after the political party of Maulana Maudoodi, *Jama'at-e-Islami* (Islamic Party). Islamic discourse has always been a current in Pakistan. Its foundations were laid by the Pakistan movement but consolidated in the Objectives Resolution of 1949. Being unsuccessful in electoral politics, *Jama'at-e-Islami* and its student wing, *Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba* (Islamic students organization), invested their energies on educational and welfare institutions, steadily cultivating a crop of indoctrinated youth schooled in Islamic ideologies and disdainful of what they called 'immoral Westernism'. They demanded an Islamic state and a society based on Islamic moral order. Yesterday's students became today's professionals bringing with them their Islamist ideologies in workplaces and civil society; thus building up communities of Islamists in all sectors of society. Gradually other groups also emerged promoting Islamic ways of life, prominent among them are *Tableeghi Jamaat* (Missionary society), *Jamiat –Ulema-e-Islam* (Party of Islamic scholars) and in the 1990s militant and even Jihadist groups based in *madrassabs* (Islamic seminaries).

By the second half of the 1970s, Islamic ideologies were in ascendance, rising on the wave of popular disenchantment with Bhutto's authoritarian ways and socialist

rhetoric. The military coup of General Zia (1977) came in the wake of a popular agitation for Nizam-e-Mustafa (the Prophet's social order). Islamization of the society became the slogan of the military government of General Zia. Thus began the era of Islamism in Pakistan that is now deeply entrenched in the state and society, across years of elected governments of (1988-98) and later another round of guided democracy under the military rule of General Musharraf (1998- 2008).

Although Islamic provisions are by now incorporated in the constitution and the civil as well as criminal laws of the country, yet there are always demands for further Islamization of the society. Mullahs, Islamic parties and militants continually agitate for the enactment of more *Sharia* laws of their preferences. There is always a version of Islamic order that is to the right of what prevails.³ For our purposes, the point is that Islamists as a political force and as a social segment are now an integral part of Pakistani society.

The cultural differentiation of the society into three segments is reflected in the parallel division of women's norms, values and behaviours. This division is observable in the subtle differences among the three types of women in their dress, work, participation in the public space, gender relations, identity and ideology. These are the sites of cultural differentiation among Pakistani women.

Interestingly, the simple act of wearing a shawl (*Duppatta*) has become a symbol of women's identity and ideology. A traditional woman may wear it loosely over her head leaving strands of hair visible, a modern woman may not even put a *Duppatta* over the head but merely drapes it around her shoulders, while an Islamist may tightly bind it around the head and upper body, almost like a *Hijab*. The politics of head covering plays out on the television. In periods of Islam-inclined governments, General Zia and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's rules, women news casters wore their *Duppattas* (shawls) over their heads, while in the periods of Benazir Bhutto and General Musharraf's rule⁴ *Duppattas* came down on the shoulders.

It is obvious that the three models of women's ideas and behaviours are part of the broader ideological divisions in Pakistani society. Yet each of these models has been also evolving in parallel with the social and economic changes that the Pakistani society has been undergoing. Furthermore the three models are not walled off from each other, but each is affected by the changes of others. How does this dynamics play out? Let us examine this question.

Dynamics of the Tripartition of Femininity

Whether traditional, modern or Islamists, Pakistani women, by and large, have a lot in common as members of the same society. Their sub-cultures grow out of common roots. The pervasive societal trends weave through each sub-culture, producing some structural similarities but cultivating variations of meanings and symbols. Two such societal trends particularly weave through each of the three models. One is the increasing religiosity, particularly after 1977, and the second is

the advancement of the material culture and the spread of new technologies. The three types of women embrace both of these trends though they invest them with different meanings and functions.

Pakistani society has witnessed a surge in religiosity in the last 25 years for both men and women. A common manifestation of religiosity is the upsurge in observing the Islamic prescriptions of prayers, fasting and Hajj. Mosques are full of young men, not just the old men as in the past, and on Fridays women also. The obligatory fasting in the month of Ramadan is more widely observed than in the 1950s and 60s. The Quran reading circles (*Khatam-i-Quran*) and sermons (*Dars*), nightly meditations and visits to saints tombs have proliferated.⁵ Television and radio devote many hours everyday to Islamic programmes.⁶ All in all, there is strikingly more piety and religious observance in everyday life. Women who have been generally more attuned to the religious beliefs are now observant and pietistic in their daily life. Yet there are some subtle differences among them.

Traditional women are marginally more observant, particularly young women, but their behaviour essentially remains ritualistic and limited to personal piety. Even among poor and working class women, who have been historically more devoted to saints and spiritual healing, a conservative and puritanical (*Deobandi*) strain of religious behaviour has taken hold after the Islamisation of the 1980s.⁷ Practices such as holding group prayers in the middle of a family party, *Khatam-i-Qurans* on regular basis, visiting saints tombs and other rituals of respective sects have become a regular feature of life. Yet the traditional women keep these practices to themselves. They do not make them the central theme of their daily life.

Modern women have been unexpectedly affected by the wave of religiosity. They have particularly taken to attending *Darses*, sometimes organizing such gatherings at their homes or sometimes in five-star hotels, supporting religious charities and pursuing spiritual quest through Hajj, Umra prayers and other rituals of their respective sector spiritual order. Like the traditional women their religiosity is personal and liberal. Benazir Bhutto typified a modern Pakistani woman. She carried prayer beads, consulted seers for her personal and political decisions, yet led a modern life living comfortably in London, Dubai and New York.

A typical Pakistani woman of modern inclinations is not secular or indifferent to religion. Her faith has been also awakened by the international events that target Islam and Islamic societies. She finds comfort in her identity as a Muslim though is exasperated by the militancy or zeal of fundamentalists.

Islamist women have drawn further strength from the religiosity beginning in the 1970s. They find in it a vindication of their beliefs and the promise of the forthcoming Islamic social order. They are assertive of their identity and ideology in the public space. Wearing *Hijab* or *Niqab* (small number), Islamist young women have a noticeable presence in offices, schools and universities. They are the vanguard of the Islamic movement. They are not only observant of religious

obligations in their personal life, but also are enthusiastic about expressing it in the public sphere, particularly among other Muslims.

In the Diaspora, Islamists express their religiosity in various ways, by taking pains to eat only *Halal* food, seeking accommodations for their beliefs in the mainstream institutions. Their religiosity is communal and not just personal, expressed in Muslim women's associations and informal networks. They emulate the western community practices by organizing Bazaars and fund raising dinners at mosques, forming study circles (*Halqas*) and guidance networks. Yet they are attached to the puritanical and revivalist strains of their respective sects. These are expressions of Muslim feminism. Modernity is accommodated in the Islamic discourse through chaperoned meetings of prospective mates and Islamic match making web sites, for example. These are practices that are almost non-existent in homelands of Pakistan, Egypt, Somalia etc.

The second socio-cultural trend that has swept Pakistan is the material culture outpacing the non-material beliefs, values and moral order. New consumer products and modern technologies spread very rapidly, but the norms and moral precepts that regulate their use lag behind. For example, motor bikes, TV, air travel, hamburgers, Coca Cola and recently cell phones have been extensively diffused in Pakistan, spreading in all classes and subcultures within the parameters of affordability. A similar embracing of the modern materialism is evident among Islamists in the Diaspora. What brings income, convenience and prestige is readily adopted by almost everybody, Islamist being no exception.

Yes, there are some symbolic differences. Traditional women, like men, look upon material goods as items of prestige that elevate their social status.⁸ For the modern women, they are symbols of progress and social advancement. Their proliferation in the society is a source of pride for them, affirming their modernity. Islamists accept them as the fulfillment of God's blessing to the believers, not unlike Weber's thesis of Protestantism and the rise of capitalism. Yet they have some reservations about the social message that these goods convey. For them, TV is a medium of spreading Islamic knowledge, but it is also a source of subversion of the Islamic values and purveyor of obscenity and vulgarity.⁹ Islamists argue about the virtues of Islamic banking and ills of the interest based economy, yet not many have resisted opportunities to make money, advance socially or work or study in Western countries. Material interests outweigh their scruples¹⁰ What is more striking than on matters of social ills, such as corruption, disregard of citizenship responsibilities, rule of law etc Islamists are not much different than other two cultural segments, despite their claims of moral uprightness.

Overall, the three segments of Pakistani women both at home and in the Diaspora have remained rooted in the evolving national culture, in form and structure, though differing in the meanings and functions that they associate with its institutions. Their sub-cultures have evolved by continually borrowing beliefs and practices from each other.

At this juncture, the question that arises is why has this tripartition of the culture and femininity occurred? What factors underlie it?

Social Bases of the Tripartition

In periods of rapid social change, the segmentation of society is inevitable, because different groups change in different ways resulting in wide variations of beliefs and practices. One type of segmentation has been long recognised, namely between groups that continue to stick close to the traditional ways and those who adopt new, albeit modern, modes of living. This is the well-known division of the traditional and modern.

As a society goes through the successive stages of economic development, its stock of roles expands and correspondingly new norms and values emerge, ushering a process of modernization. Yet the traditions do not roll over. They play an active part in determining the direction and pace of social change.¹¹ This interplay of the tradition and modernity results in drawing a fissure through the social structure dividing it broadly in groups of relatively more modern versus more traditional value-orientations. This dialectic is well known and extensively discussed in the literature.¹² I can add little to what is already known.

It is the Islamic resurgence that rounds off the process of tripartition, which is a peculiar factor in the segmentation of Pakistani society and femininity. Our discussion of the reasons for the tripartition will largely focus on this factor. With this clarification, let us turn to the reasons for tripartition. They can be viewed in terms of both the structure and agency of the division.

- 1) Pakistan has undergone a striking structural change. Its per capita income in constant terms has increased 2.6 times since 1960. It is now a semi-industrialised country, the share of industry in the GDP increasing from 8% in 1949-50 to 25% in 2001. The share of agriculture in its GDP has dropped from 53% in 1949-50 to 25% in 2001, despite the “Green Revolution” of the 1970s. Male literacy (10 years and older) has increased from 16% to 65% and female literacy increased from less than 5% to 40% between 1960s and 2004-05. Despite remaining one of the low-income countries, Pakistan has undergone considerable development. Material changes are striking. In 2005, there were estimated 18 million cell phones and their number was increasing rapidly including millions of illegal connections held by cell phone owners. Of course, Pakistan could have done better on Human Development indicators and reduced the poverty gap, yet it has made some steady progress. The point of these figures is that development has been deliberately promoted in Pakistan and with it not only a modern segment has emerged, but also the traditional groups have evolved by adopting at least the new material culture.

- 2) Islam has always been at the core of Pakistan's national culture and ideology. Yet a distinct Islamic segment crystallized in the 1970s. As communities of shared creed, Islamic groups first emerged in colleges, universities, political parties and of course in *madrassabs*. The strategy for Islamisation has been based on politically 'capturing' (lately the extremists are not hesitant to use force) the government and using its authority to Islamise the society. Thus political Islam fostered a social segment. It was consolidated in the Islamic rule of General Zia with his project of Islamising the society through laws and programmes.
- 3) The vanguard of the Islamic segment among women was the members of the Islamic student organizations in colleges and universities, with the female students of *madrassabs* serving as the foot soldiers. These women have carved out a social niche in professions, workplaces and communities, bringing their beliefs and life style, including *Hijab* and *Niqab*, in the public space. This process has gradually gained momentum to the point that now an Islamic woman is an identifiable part of the social structure. It may be noted that the formation of Islamic segment among women in Pakistan parallels what has happened in Egypt, Malaysia and other Islamic countries. It is a part of the global Islamic movement.
- 4) During time of rapid social change, the need for a new ideology and vision of life is precipitated. Modernization per se does not offer inspiring ideals, though it promises material progress and comfortable living. These structural conditions prepare the ground for the emergence of new ideologies. Up to the 1970s, socialism was an inspiring ideology that attracted the emerging urban-middle classes in Pakistan. It was a strong alternative to the orthodox Islamic beliefs. People's disillusionment with Bhutto's populist but authoritarian socialism left the field open for the fledgling Islamic movement in the late 1970s. The Afghan Jihad of the 1980s and rising frustration with the plight of Muslims in many parts of the world further strengthened Islamists' claims for as an alternative vision of life. All in all, the Islamic way of life came to be an alternative vision to the materialism of modernity. Thus large number of youth began to be drawn to Islamic ideologies in search of a purpose and meaning to their life. The international events of the 1990s and 2000s have further legitimized the discourse of Islamists. The Islamic social vision has carved another fissure in the cultural system of Pakistan. Islamic femininity is an expression of this division.
- 5) The Diaspora recreates the cultural segments of the homeland, but it is also influenced by the global Islamic revivalism. The Pakistani Diaspora has spawned a strong Islamic segment with blueprints brought from home and borrowed from the Muslim co-migrants from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India and Somalia etc. Yet this has not been a one-way transfer. The Diaspora has contributed culturally and materially to the strengthening of the Islamic segment in Pakistan. Pakistani workers and their families' sojourn in Saudi

Arabia and the Gulf states has infused them with puritanical beliefs and practices. For example, *Niqab* and *Hijab* are two practices that have been introduced in Pakistan from the Diaspora. *Burqa* has been the conventional way for women to cover themselves in Pakistan. *Niqab* that has eyes peering through the face veil is a new addition to the repertoire of women's dress in public. It came from the Middle East and North America. Yet the Islamic cultural segment should not be confused with extremists and Jihadists who are a small and fringe group.

All in all, tripartition of femininity recapitulates the cultural segmentation that Pakistani society has undergone both at home and in the Diaspora. It is a dynamic process that emerges from economic development and social change. It encapsulates social ideologies by which people align their life styles and give meaning to their life.

The cultural segmentation has given rise to parallel national narratives and an erosion of the national consensus. Pakistan is a divided country, culturally and ideologically. A conscious policy effort needs to be made to build a common ground of mutual tolerance and peaceful public decision-making. The current insurrection by extremists and Taliban is a symptom of the breakdown of peaceful processes of negotiating diverse discourses and bridging cultural divides. The cultural segmentation is not going to disappear overnight. The policy thrust should be towards channelling differences into orderly modes of resolving ideological differences by building democratic institutions.

Notes

¹ For a detailed analysis of socio-cultural change in Pakistan see Qadeer 2006

² A brief history of the evolution of *Burqa* is given in Qadeer 1999.

³ The incident of women students of the seminary, *Jamia Hafsa*, occupying the public children's library and demanding the enforcement of *Sharia* is an example of the unending agenda for the Islamisation. See Farooq 2007.

⁴ Conservatism of General Zia and Nawaz Sharif's governments is affirmed by Rashid, 2006, pp134-140,147-152.

⁵ The rising tide of religiosity can be witnessed in the recent popularity of the practice of *Aitkaff*, weeklong meditation in the month of Ramadan. Thousands sit in *Aitkaff* during Ramadan, An *Aitkaff* city was set up by a religious leader in Lahore in 2003. In the 1960s and even 70s, relatively few, usually old men and women, sat for *Aitkaf*. The News 2003

⁶ On the one hand religious groups rail against television for spreading 'western vulgarity', on the other their leaders regularly appear on TV engaging in discussions and offering hours of sermons and recitations. See Yusuf 2007

⁷ Rashid 2006, p.250

⁸ In newly prospering rural households, refrigerators or TV sets occupy pride of the place in living rooms even if those cannot be used for lack of electricity in villages. Modern appliances are prestige goods.

⁹ The provincial government of the NWFP in 2002-07, led by Islamic parties, banned hoardings and advertisements that show women's faces or bodies. This policy was a part of its campaign to eliminate obscenity and vulgarity from the society.

¹⁰ Islamists migrate to the Western countries as often as modernists in pursuit of careers and good living. Yet they rationalize their migration as an act of bringing the message of Islam to the West.

¹¹ Traditions do not 'pass away' with modernization, but act as a conduit to selectively diffuse new technologies, mores and values. Modernization and tradition are not always antagonistic. Modernization of the Third world is a process of blending traditions with modern elements, See Khalaf 2001.

¹² There is an extensive literature on modernization and cultural change. See for example Etzioni and Etzioni-Halevy 1973, Gusfield 1973, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Castells 1997.

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FAYYAZ BAQIR

CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT AND AID EFFECTIVENESS

Abstract

Civil society¹ has played a very important role in Pakistan's transition from elitist to participatory development culture. This transition has called in to question the assumptions about the role of government in promoting social development. A critical review of government-led development reveals that government's major challenge is not paucity of resources but effective and efficient use of resources. The absence of state development departments – at the local level – necessitates participatory decision making on local development problems. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have taken the lead in introducing this paradigm shift and creating the hope for achieving sustainable human development. This paper discusses some innovative models developed by the CSOs in Pakistan for dealing with local issues within the constraints of existing political system and a narrow resource base.

Introduction

During 1980s CSOs emerged as important players on Pakistan's social landscape. Due to NGO activism generated by Afghan War, enhanced corporate interest in development philanthropy and gradual strengthening of middle class a new breed of CSOs emerged in Pakistan. It included human rights and advocacy organizations, urban and rural development programmes, service delivery organizations, research institutions and think-tanks. (Pasha, Jamal and Iqbal 2002:12). Despite an exaggerated image these CSOs receive a small share (DAD, November 23, 2007)² of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Table 1: Non Profit Sector in Pakistan

Major Activities	(%)
Education and Research	46
Civil Rights and Advocacy	18
Social Services	8
Development and Housing	7
Health	6
Culture and Recreation	6
Managing religious events	5
Business and Professional Associations	4
Number of Organizations	45,000
Full time paid staff	264,250

Source: The Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project SPDC Working Paper No. 1.

There were 54.6 per cent NGOs operating at local community level, 5 per cent at national level and 0.3 per cent at International level in 1991(UNDP, 1991: 36). Of these 46 per cent were working on education and research, 18 per cent on civil rights and advocacy, 8 per cent on social service, 7 per cent on development and housing, 6 per cent on health, 6 per cent on culture and recreation, 5 per cent for managing religious events and 4 per cent as business and professional associations. (See Table 1). Analysis of a select group of CSOs by PCP in January 2007 revealed that 93% CSOs were working for achievement of MDGs. (See Table 2)

Table 2: NGOs working on MDGs

MDG	%age of NGOs
HIV/AIDS	42
Maternal Health	22
Child Health	23
Education	46
Gender	34
Poverty	23

Source: PCP internal Report 2007

Note: Each NGO works in more than one field, therefore the table shows the percentage according to different MDGs.

Functions of CSOs engaged in service delivery can be divided in 5 major categories; community organizations, service delivery, provision of support services to community groups and local specialists, grant making and research and advocacy organizations (Baqir 2007: 4). Most of the community organizations are local action groups formed to solve some urgent local issues. They become dormant after the issue is solved or the group leader moves out. These organizations have limited technical and management capacity and depend on charity or member contributions

for survival. Only the organizations led by Support Organizations in social mobilization and finding technical solutions have greater chance of survival. Large networks of these community organizations provide good “receiving mechanism” for donor and government development funds due to internally built effective accountability mechanism. Effective use of Development Assistance depends to a large extent on linking with these two partners; COs for improving service delivery and Support Organizations for guidance and support of COs.

Development, Dependence and Sustainability

Realizing the need for institutional sustainability many CSOs in Pakistan are struggling to make transition from donor dependence to financial independence. This is shown clearly by their source of funding shown in Table 3. While credit management can become sustainable in many cases, research, training and guidance work of support organizations needs to be supported by the donors until such time that they are able to recover their costs from COs on the basis of rising incomes and large scale demand. During this transition donors may make best use of their resources by investing in institutional development of CSOs to expand the receiving mechanism for achieving MDGs and creating a countervailing power to create a level playing field between government and citizens.

Table: 3 Cash Revenue Structure of Non-Profit Sector

Cash Revenue	(%)
Fee and user charges	50
Private indigenous philanthropy	37
Private foreign philanthropy	7
Public sector payments	6

Source: The John Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project SPDC Working Paper No. I, 2002

Government and Civil Society

Government of Pakistan (GoP) realized the importance of the role of CSOs in making effective use of development funds soon after independence. In 1952 a social welfare section was created as a permanent section of the Planning Board which was later renamed as National Planning Commission. In 1956 the National Social Welfare Council and subsequently provincial Social Welfare Councils were formed. The Second and the third Five Year Plans promoted community development by reaching out to people and involving them in development tasks. (UNDP 1991:2-7). In 1954 Government started a community development programme called Village AID (Village Agricultural and Industrial Development). The Programme was led by Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (PARA) Comilla and was supported by the Harvard Advisory Group, the Michigan State University, the Ford Foundation, the Planning Commission and the World Bank. The programme spread to 50% thanas

(lowest unit of administration with direct outreach to villages) of former East Pakistan and was internationally acknowledged for its outstanding performance. (NRSP 2000:45). Comilla experience was repeated by PARD Peshawar in Daudzai Thana of NWFP in 1972 and produced impressive results (Khan 1980 36:46). Subsequently Government provided endowments for rural support programmes, established grant funds for NGOs and gave tax exemption to NGOs following sound management practices. Government commitment to support NGOs for achieving national development objectives has continued to date.

According to a UNDP report “GoP now accepts the principle that bilateral funds can be given to NGOs for development work. The GoP has also undertaken loans from multilateral donors and given them to NGOs (e.g. SRSC) as grants. Further, GoP has contributed its own funds to projects supporting NGO development.” National Rural Support Programme was supported with an initial grant of Rs. 500 million by GOP in 1993. DTCE, HDF, SRSO, PRSP, BRSP were subsequently given grants worth millions of dollars for the same purpose. In 1988-89 Federal Budget Rs. 100 million were provided by the Ministry of Finance for the establishment of Trust for Voluntary Organisations (TVO) to manage grant funds for NGOs. GOP agreed to allow Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to provide direct funding to newly created Strengthening Participatory Organisations (SPO). The Ghazi Barotha Tarakiyati Idara (GBTI) was established in 1995 by WAPDA with Rs. 100 million. Recognizing the importance of Civil Society as a key player in social development the Prime Minister (PM) took a personal decision to make US\$ 120 million available for community mobilization during 2007 (EDC 1996:11-19).

Government and Governance of CSOs

Government support to CSOs was accompanied by the concern for their standards of governance. In 1996 government proposed a law on registration and regulation of NGOs which was perceived as an attempt to control non profit sector. In response Pakistan NGO Forum (PNF) and four provincial apex bodies were created by NGO community to articulate and represent their position to government. Government concerns were not unfounded. A UNDP report assessing the internal governance practices of NGOs mentioned that while 76 per cent of NGOs reported to be operating under executive councils it was common for many NGOs to operate under one or two activists who took all the key decisions (UNDP. 1991:39-40) Similar concerns were expressed by Kamal in her study on code of conduct for NGOs and Donors (Kamal, 1996:10). Government nevertheless, considers accountability of CSOs a public good as it promotes philanthropy, good governance and transparency in the nonprofit sector working for public benefit. (PCP, 2007:2)

The point of difference between NGOs and government is not on the need for accountability but on the most appropriate means to achieve this objective. This requires clear understanding of existing assumptions about the relations between Government and CSOs.

Conventional Assumptions on Government Civil Society Relations

Views on CSO accountability and their role in social development are determined by some very important assumptions about the government. A close examination of these assumptions is the first step in deciding about the nature of future engagement with CSOs. Some of the key assumptions about the government and their critique is given below.

Assumption 1: Government has Insufficient Resources

Donor assistance has flowed to CSOs in Pakistan due to three key assumptions about the government: i) Government does not have sufficient resources, ii) Government does not have the technical capacity and iii) Government does not have the political will. High level of underutilization of social sector budget belies the first assumption. Budget allocations for social sector in Pakistan are much lower in comparison with the countries at the same level of income. Due to weak management capacity even low budget allocations for social sector cannot be fully utilized. Table 4 gives a comparison of government allocations and expenses on various categories in the social sector during the past 4 financial years.

Table 4: PSDP allocations and expenses on social sector *

Allocation – expenditure/year	(in million Rupees)			
	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	2006-2007
Environment	3114.20	11678.70	13499.81	24299.92
	1882.00	908.00	3236.04	1773.19
	(60%)	(7.7%)	(23.97%)	(7.29%)
Education	26375.4	106661.9	51668.27	44179.10
	6060.3	9048.1	9140.53	11602.46
	(22.97%)	(8.48%)	(17.6%)	(26.26%)
Women	5522.6	5328.1	5921.66	5786.14
	2271.4	2226.9	1773.83	1945.49
	(41.1%)	(41.8%)	(30%)	(33.60%)
Health	36833.3	57211	100523.12	95544.41
	7499.8	8927.9	11547.14	23701.62
	(20.3%)	(15.6%)	(11.5%)	(24.8%)
Population	21385.9	21826.3	21030.48	21345.05
	2349	4684.6	7472.12	10623.38
	(11.0%)	(21.5%)	(35.5%)	(49.8%)
LG/Rural Development	5015.1	150.0	5142.05	228.27
	4743.0	0.00	0.00	50.10
	(94.6%)	(0%)	(0%)	(21.9%)

Source: Public Sector Development Programme, Environment Division. For each sector allocation for each year is given on the top, expenditure underneath and expenditure as percentage of allocations at the bottom

During financial years 2003-04 to 2006-07 expenditure as part of allocation ranged between 7.29 per cent to 60 per cent for environment, 8.48 per cent to 26.26 per cent for education, 30 per cent to 41.8 per cent for women development, social welfare and special education, 11 per cent to 49.8 per cent for population welfare and zero per cent to 94.6 per cent (perhaps due to very small size of allocation) for local government and rural development. This expenditure pattern depicts that inadequate capacity to manage resources and not the lack of resources is the major constraint in development of social indicators in Pakistan. William Easterly pointed out that while Pakistan received \$58 billion in foreign aid from 1950-99, it systematically underperformed on most of the social and political indicators. If it had invested all the ODA during this period at a real rate of 6 per cent it would have a stock of assets equal to \$239 billion in 1998, many times the current external debt (Easterly 2001:3).

A World Bank Report “Poverty in Pakistan, vulnerabilities, social gaps, and rural dynamics” stated that the relative insulation of social spending from downward pressures during 1993-98 was largely due to an infusion of \$2 billion in support of the Social Action Programme (SAP). The report regretted that there was a serious problem of governance in Pakistan. Resources that were allocated to social spending over the past decade were largely used inefficiently, and failed to have a significant impact on a dollar per dollar basis. Pakistan in fact exhibited persistent problems in most dimensions of governance that are relevant for sound public spending. The report added that there were leakages, difficulties with bureaucratic structure and quality, weaknesses in the rule of law, and opacity in government decision-making.³

Assumption 2: Government has Insufficient Technical Capacity

It is important to note here that weak capacity does not mean general lack of capacity. Experience of various civil society organizations has shown that government’s effectiveness suffers due to weak capacity in three specific areas; capacity to deliver at household level, capacity to coordinate between different government departments (Hasan 1997:86) and plan from the point of view of poor (Siddiqui 2004:18-19; Khan 1996:62-65) at micro level. This capacity gap has arisen because law and order colonial administration inherited from the British has not been transformed into a Development Administration (DA). In Pakistan political infrastructure has been recently devolved, to Union Council level where socio-economic administrative structures do not exist. This structural vacuum and gradual erosion of feudal administrative authority to command unpaid labour for building and maintaining public works in rural areas has further eroded the capacity to deliver at local level (Hasan 2002:9-12).

Assumption 3: Government has Insufficient Political Will.

Government of Pakistan has continuously supported community based development since 1954. As mentioned in part 3 above government have provided ample resources to strengthen and support a wide range of CSOs during the past 5 decades. Latest example of government’s commitment to strengthen civil society is support provided

under MTDF for a nation-wide social mobilization action plan to cover all poor households in all 5,375 rural union councils in 115 districts of the country. By 2010, Government resources invested in organized poor communities will result in a cadre of 2,365 million trained activists/service providers, who will assist villages in taking their development agenda forward. (GoP 2005:1). Government's will to improve livelihood of the people is amply demonstrated by its consistent policy decisions in this regard since 1950s and its financial support to CSOs mentioned above.

Ground Reality and Alternative Assumptions:

Assumption 1: Government's Challenge is not Lack of Resources but Effective Management

Supplement to MTDF on rural poverty reduction clearly conforms to this assumption by stating that "Resources that are available for the public are not being used according to people's priorities in an efficient, effective and transparent manner" (GoP 2005). A review of multi-donor supported Social Action Programme (SAP) by SPDC noted that "Expenditures on the social sector over the four year period (1993/4 to 1996/7) aggregated to over Rs. 163 billion. Starting from a level of Rs. 27.7 billion in 1993/4 they have grown rapidly at the rate of 25 per cent per annum". During the same period however, the gross enrolment rate in primary education remained the same, full immunization of children doubled from 25 to 54 per cent, and contraceptive prevalence rate increased from 7 to 14 per cent. A survey of selected villages during the same period undertaken by Strengthening Participatory Organizations (SPO) reported that Basic Health Units (BHUs) and Rural Health Units (RHUs) were found in 33 per cent of the communities surveyed, schools and BHUs were generally found in poor condition, only 48 per cent of the male doctors were present and 18 per cent of the Lady Health Workers (LHWs) were found to be living in the communities surveyed. Inoperative water supply schemes were 40-50 per cent of the total schemes. The SPDC review related this low performance to weak management, lack of community participation and abuse of discretionary power by government authorities (SPDC undated: VI).

Assumption 2: Lack of Capacity Means Unused, Unguided and Uncoordinated Capacity

Daudzai project undertaken by Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (PARAD) in 1972 and OPP's partnership with government agencies for community based sanitation in Sukkur, Hyderabad and Karachi from 1982 onwards have offered valuable insights about the hurdles in the way of effective performance of government. Review and Evaluation of these projects has shown that it is not lack of capacity but existence of unguided, unused and uncoordinated capacity that explains poor delivery in low income urban and rural settlements. (Khan 1980:20-24; Hasan 1997:86).

Assumption 3: Lack of Capacity to Plan and Deliver at Micro Level.

Supplement to MTDF notes that “The government has limited outreach to the rural areas and its institutional mechanisms and resources are limited. In order to focus development in rural areas it is essential to decentralize the planning and implementation of services to the local level and to encourage local communities and non-state sector.” It further added that “organized communities provide the mechanism to overcome many of the governance problems faced today - from local level planning, to management and implementation, to monitoring”. Hasan has also noted that formal sector professionals don't have the capacity to plan from the point of view of the poor and that leads to failure of many government and donor supported projects for community development (Hasan 1997:12-17).

These three assumptions bring home the point that donor assistance can play a critical role not as a source of extra funds for service delivery but for activating the government by expanding social infrastructure and introducing technical innovations. Mainstreaming civil society innovations on social mobilization, service delivery and technical designs offers the best way for demand driven donor assistance. Some important innovations made by CSOs are described below.

CSO Innovations on Sustainable Human Development

CSOs in Pakistan have developed some very innovative models for achieving sustainability by working within the system and living within the means. These models used an entrepreneurial vision for achieving sustainable human development.⁴ These innovations broadly fall in the categories of social and technical guidance. These models have expanded on large scale with government assistance due to their sound financial designs and understanding of the socio-economic reality of low income people as well as the system of government. Some of the noteworthy innovations which have been nationally and internationally acknowledged for their effectiveness are mentioned below.

Social mobilization:

In 1982 Mr. Shoaib Sultan Khan pioneered participatory approach for rural development through Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) in Northern Areas of Pakistan. The main tool of this approach was the Diagnostic Dialogue. The Diagnostic Survey started with a visit by the Management Group to a village whose residents agreed to meet with AKRSP staff. Villagers were told that AKRSP would provide a grant for the project identified by the community on the condition that they agreed to: i) form a village organization (VO), ii) elect their office bearers by consensus, iii) meet and save regularly. Communities were asked to choose leaders who could be easily brought under check by them in case of disagreement with the community. AKRSP provided skill training to the members of VO as well. The identification of a project was followed by the second series of dialogues to prepare a feasibility survey of the proposed scheme in consultation with the villagers. The finalized scheme was taken

to the villagers by the Management Group in the third dialogue, in which AKRSP and the residents of the village explored the TERMS OF PARTNERSHIP that would characterise the relationship between the two entities. This way AKRSP's funding served the purpose of building both the physical and social capital.

This offered a new way of working to the government: use of government development funds as investment in social capital; guidance to communities for human, social and financial capital formation; and provision of grant as entry point for building trust with communities. (Baqir 2007:113; Husain 1992 xiii). This approach facilitated engagement of men and women in decision making about their lives. AKRSP was the first CSO to start organizing rural women for development initiatives in Pakistan. In 2000 AKRSP along with other rural support programmes formed Rural Support Programme Network (RSPN). By 2005 RSPN had formed 31,306 Women Organizations (WOs) 65,804 male Village Organizations (VOs) and 3,614 mixed organizations. Due to the success of participatory rural development in Pakistan UNDP decided to introduce this approach to other countries in South Asia through South Asia Poverty Alleviation Programme (SAPAP). Union Government of India is expanding it to all Indian states under Eleventh Five Year Plan and Government of Pakistan has allocated funds to expand this model to all rural Union Councils of Pakistan under MTDF. This programme needs a serious review as an excellent practice to be followed both from gender and right based point of view. (Government of Pakistan Supplement to MTDF 2005-2010:1)

Sanitation

In 1982 Dr Akhtar Hamid Khan initiated an urban poverty alleviation programme in Orangi- one of the largest urban slums of Karachi. As Director of Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) he mobilized residents of Orangi to provide sanitation coverage to the entire settlement with their own financial contributions, supervision and management. Dr. Khan identified four barriers to community based development in urban areas: psychological barrier - the belief that government is responsible for everything; social barrier - lack of cooperation between the community members; technical barrier - lack of sound technical solutions and economic barriers - lack of low cost solutions for low-income people. He searched for solutions to cross these barriers. (Khan 1996:62-65)

Through his keen observation he was able to distinguish between the poor and the destitute. Poor people have the capacity to pay for most of the services they need. The barrier is the expensive solution designed by the professional who does not understand the economic and social condition of the poor. Under his guidance OPP trained local youth, masons and activists to perform the technical tasks needed to establish the sewerage system. This included training in mapping, level survey, preparing cost estimates and connecting home toilets to sewerage lines. Self work by local communities eliminated the need for contractors and middlemen. Committees selected by residents of each lane purchased materials. Communities were asked to pay only for the home and lane components of sanitation system. Government had to take care of the Trunk line and disposal unit. In Orangi lane sewers were

connected to nullahs serving as open drains in the absence of Karachi Municipal Corporation's (KMC) trunk lines. This reduced the cost of providing sanitation facility to each household to one time investment of Rs. 500 i.e. \$20.

During first six years sewerage lines in 5000 lanes were laid with the technical assistance and social guidance of OPP. It benefited 70,000 household (Hasan, 1997:10). By 2007 the network of OPP's partners expanded to 331 cities, towns, settlements and villages outside Orangi with an investment of Rs. 100.26 millions by the community members. The National Sanitation Policy approved by the Government in September 2006 includes the OPP's model for adoption.

Shelter

In 1977 Government of Pakistan established Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) with a view to start regularization and upgradation of urban squatter settlements and coordinating the process of issuing leases to the dwellers. During the five years period after its creation not a single lease was issued. Things changed when Mr. Tasneem Siddiqui took charge as Director General, Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority (SKAA) in 1993. On the basis of his experience he discovered that the basic issue in Katchi Abadis (squatter settlements) is of tenure. People live here without ownership title and provision of services. Development and delivery method adopted by government agencies had some basic flaws. For example 200,000 plots reserved for low income communities in Sindh were lying unused. Purchasers were required to make 25 % down payment and pay another 25% in next 6 months. Given the price and payment schedule low-income people could not purchase these plots. There was also no time limit to complete construction. It therefore offered good opportunities to the speculators to invest in these plots while the Katchi Abadis kept growing

Tasneem Siddiqui saw that while government schemes remained ineffective low income families were living in large numbers in settlements created by land grabbers. He observed that Government interventions did not succeed because: i) the plots were sold by balloting, therefore only a small fraction of people could avail the opportunity to buy, ii) Government sold fully developed land which increased the cost of land for low-income groups. Under Apna Ghar scheme, for example, the cost of a small plot was Rs. 700,000 - way beyond the purchasing power of low income residents. This method did not allow for meeting the housing needs. The alternative was: i) to sell undeveloped land at affordable price in easy to pay installments, ii) to create an easy entry system by doing away the balloting and , iii) undertake incremental development so that development expenses could be paid by the residents in easy installments. iv) to give possession to only those buyers who settle down in the housing scheme.

Tasneem Siddiqui revised Standard Operating Procedures of SKAA on these lines and regularized almost 50% of Katchi Abadis in Sindh during his tenure. He learned from the land grabbers and implemented his plans both through the Government and the NGOs. By December 1997 SKAA was operating lease camps in 190 Katchi Abadis throughout Sindh and by June 2003 had granted 22,429 leases in 1157 Katchi Abadis.

SKAA met its overhead costs by recovering the lease charges and by June 1994 became financially self-sufficient. (Zaidi 2001:65; UNDP 2003:8; Ismail 2004:106).

Education

A number of promising approaches to education emerged in 1990s including that of community-based schools promoted in OPP, where local entrepreneurs serve the poor and recover their costs, while donor support is provided for improving the quality of education. A variety of models with low cost budget, increased community participation and focus on low income and working children and adults are functioning at present. Although materials and methods of teaching used here are old or have been imported from the formal sector and teachers here have little or no training yet these models offer the possibility of financial sustainability and replication on a large scale. Home schools for children in low income areas and male and female adult literacy centers in rural areas are run in teacher's home. Such schools initially sprung up in Karachi, Gujranwala, Hafizabad and Lahore.

In Balochistan a USAID survey in 1980s revealed that there were 100 primary schools for girls and 500 schools for boys but girls were attending all the 500 primary schools. This showed that it was not gender insensitivity but lack of access which explained the low level of female participation in schools. In many cases in Balochistan and elsewhere selection of site and appointment of teacher on the recommendation of local influentials led to closure of schools. In most of the cases selected sites were used as guest house or donkey stable for the local village chief and teachers considered their job to please him, not to teach the kids. An alternative approach was to build one room, one teacher schools with a view to turn them into formal schools through incremental development and make them a part of the mainstream. This approach was followed by The Society for Community Support for Primary Education (SCSPEB). The Society (SCSPEB) promoted government-community partnerships by establishing female schools with community participation. Under this approach community would donate land, agree to send girls to the school and initially one teacher would be appointed to start teaching. After regular functioning of school for a specific period it will be handed over to the Government.⁵

The Book Group (TBG) in Karachi took over and improved the management of a school through a notification of the Government. The success of The Book Group in one school has persuaded the Government to hand over more schools for the introduction of better management. TBG as well as Teacher's Resource Centre (TRC) produced new reading materials for children and training programmes for school teachers in line with the age and cognitive development of children. This made reading a very joyful and creative activity for children. TBG's reading materials are being used in schools ranging from Balqis Edhi Schools to Karachi Grammar School and Beacon House School System.

National Commission for Human Development (NCHD) made an interesting innovation in improving enrolment and retention of children in primary schools. NCHD's Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme targets the out-of-school children, by carrying out data collection of each and every household through door to

door survey, with the help of village volunteers and teachers of schools, thus ensuring wider community participation through broad based community meetings. Once the lists of out of school children are prepared from the data collected, names of out-of-school children are handed over to the village volunteers for visiting the homes of out-of-school children, for motivating the parents for in time enrolment, and ensuring their enrolment in nearest schools. Where there are no schools within commuting distance, NCHD opens formal community primary based schools, and thus ensures access to schooling. In formal schools, where the number of students increased because of intensive enrolment campaign, NCHD has provided additional teachers to cater for the learning needs of new students. A system of dropout prevention was devised, which hinged upon private-public partnership; the teacher and the community volunteers followed up a persuasion strategy, following up on students absent without intimation. UPE program is implemented through capacity building of the District Education Department. A field team is attached with Education Department for capacity building and assistance in social mobilization and monitoring to increase enrolment and prevent dropout. The overriding concern remains provision of quality education, which is affected through rigorous teachers training and intensive monitoring of learning achievements of the students.

Health

Association of Pakistani Physicians of North America (APPNA) started a community health initiative APPNA SEHAT (AS) in 1990s. Programme's innovation consisted in focusing on prevention rather than treatment. APPNA SEHAT promoted preventive health through health and hygiene education among low income communities in Pakistan. Their community health workers educated female members of the household on preparation of homemade oral rehydration solution (ORS) by mixing salt and sugar in water, on administering ORS and on identification of signs of dehydration. Due to these simple interventions in their project areas, the diarrheal deaths among children are virtually non-existent (0.36% of the total under five mortality rate). Mothers' ability to prepare home-made ORS increased from 1.5 to 85%, whereas in the corresponding control villages it is just 2%. Whenever children had diarrhea prior to APPNA SEHAT, only 33% of them were given ORS. Whereas, after being included in the project, 98% of them are receiving ORS. The ability to administer oral rehydration therapy is also increased from 2.8 to 88%.

NGOs like HAND, SGA and others focusing on access to treatment introduced the concept of home clinics run by trained paramedics with referral to hospitals for complicated problems; Friday clinics for bringing doctors to the village at least one day a week and medical camps for specialized treatment. Two programmes tested management innovations to create access to professional medical help for low income patients through changing hospital management practices in government owned health units and hospitals. They are known as Rahim Yar Khan pilot project of Punjab Rural Support Programme (PRSP) and Gujrat Pilot Projects of NCHD. Both projects have been expanded on a large scale with the financial assistance of Government of Punjab. Last but not the least is consumer education on rational use of drugs by The Network for Consumer Protection (NCP).

Micro Finance

History of micro finance in Pakistan goes back to cooperative movement during the British rule. Various innovations in microfinance sector emerged during 1980s and 90s. AKRSP introduced the concept of using CO savings as collateral for opening credit line with formal sector banks. AKRSP further facilitated provision of micro credit by becoming co-signatory for bank loan with COs and using COs for receiving and paying bank loans. This reduced the loan administration cost as well as the risk of the bank. ORIX leasing Company in Karachi introduced the concept of micro leasing to micro enterprises and RSPs the concept of micro insurance in Pakistan. Microfinance has provided financial services such as savings, credit and insurance to low income households not serviced by formal financial markets and exploited by informal sector. Microfinance reaches the poor - by providing financial services which are scaled to their needs and abilities. Microfinance in Pakistan is dominated by the provision of credit through some 100 NGO-based programmes scattered across the country. The Microfinance Group (MFG), a small association of microfinance practitioners and sponsors is dedicated to improving the outreach and sustainability of their activities and of the sector in general. Sustainability of micro finance services is a major challenge to micro credit organizations. An interesting response to this challenge is introduction of Islamic Microfinance by a Punjab based NGO Akhuwat.

Akhuwat charges borrowers an administration fee of five per cent of their loans, irrespective of the timing of the repayment. This administration fee, however, is exempted on loans for less than Rs 4000. Starting in 2003 Akhuwat employed six people, and its pool of funds increased to four million rupees, or approximately \$40,000. They had lent out almost six million rupees (\$100,000) to a total of 900 men and women in about forty groups, by recycling the funds. There had been no defaults. By June, 2007 Akhuwat was lending Rs. 220 million to over 21,000 clients. Akhuwat instituted a policy of lending to households. Wives and husbands are required to sign loan agreements, or mothers and sons, or fathers and daughters, and the loans are known as family loans. In case of death or permanent disability, outstanding loan balances are waived, and needy families receive a 5,000 rupee cash payment as well as a stipend of 3,000 rupees a month for three months. The balance of half of one per cent is treated as the fee for managing the insurance operation.

It is Akhuwat's policy, however, to recruit staff from the same communities as their borrowers and not to hire highly qualified professionals. This reduces costs money, and it also ensures that staff turnover is much lower than in other microfinance institutions. Another important way in which costs are reduced and the general spirit of Akhuwat is supported is the use of local mosques as meeting places for loan disbursement and as avenues for imparting social guidance and capacity building. It builds and strengthens the links between Akhuwat and the local communities. Akhuwat has also made use of a local church in the same way to serve its Christian clients. Akhuwat deliberately avoids grants from official foreign donors or other similar sources.

Environment

UNDP's small grants supported innovative projects ranging from eco-tourism and trophy hunting to fuel efficient stove and energy efficient houses for the poor.

SGP's (Small Grants Programme) intervention for protection of Indus Blind Dolphin has consisted of support to eco-tourism project at Taunsa. In this project Adventure Foundation (AF) taught boatmen to renovate boats, build new boats, guided local crafts people for making souvenirs, trained local guides on handling tourists and sought permission from local government to allow boatmen to serve tourists. Society for Torghar Environmental Protection (STEP) established in 1985 generated finances by limited trophy hunt on sustainable basis by scientifically determining the off-take of the species based on intensive surveys and population estimates carried out by international experts sponsored by US Fish and Wildlife Service. The proceeds from the trophy hunt are utilised to protect the wildlife of the area, improve the basic infrastructure and to provide limited medical assistance to the people of the area. In 1996 the chairman of the STEP was made "Knight in the order of Golden Ark" by His Excellency Prince Bernhard of Netherlands.

A Lahore based NGO Escorts Foundation introduced the Fuel-efficient Stove in numerous villages in Kasur district of Punjab. The key characteristics of the stove are that it is fuel-efficient, time-efficient, cost effective, energy saving and environment friendly. To date 1893 women have been trained to construct the Smokeless Stove in training workshops conducted in 48 villages. 7986 stoves have been constructed in 48 villages where 14.6 kt wood is saved annually with carbon reductions of 7.3 kt C. The entire cost of the project is the equivalent of just three dollars for each household it services. The project received Ashden Award in 2004.

The Building and Construction Improvement Programme (BACIP) is a project of the Aga Khan Planning and Building Services, Pakistan (AKPBS-P). The project has developed and tested 40 home improvement products. Most of the products relate directly to fuel and thermal efficiency and help alleviate conditions of women. Impact studies indicate an average saving of 60 per cent of fuel wood per household annually – 2.8 tonnes of fuel wood per year. The roof hatch window in Gilgit can be cited as one of the most efficient technologies that has lowered firewood and heating expenses. Lesser smoke, improved ventilation and lighting, lesser blackening of walls and reduction in dust, smoke and soot are some of the positive impacts on the community. The project reduced the cost of fuel wood for cooking and heating purposes, reduced expenditure on health due to a 50 per cent reduction in illnesses and reduced recurrent costs of repair and maintenance of houses. Income generation has increased by training and small enterprise development, increased working capacity and productivity. AKPBS-P received Alcan Award in 2005 for this and another SGP supported programme.

Working with the Government

Dr. Nasim Ashraf innovated the way the NGOs may partner with the Government. He registered an NGO Human Development Foundation (HDF) to raise funds for

his development work in the education and health sector. Then he got NCHD notified from President of Pakistan to implement his initiative through an official body. This gives him freedom and flexibility of an NGO and influence and authority of government to work for his social development objective. By keeping financial resources with HDF he has the freedom to move out of NCHD if adverse political changes create hurdles in his work.

Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (DTCE) is facilitating the formation of CCBs, with the support of Union Councils and their Monitoring Committees. The strategy comprises of clear, simple information and operational systems in a consultative and participatory manner. Operations are built around the concept of campaigns to increase motivational levels and goal achievement. This energizes local social capital through public-private sector partnerships that gives impetus to the CCB movement. DTCE has created a networked movement by outsourcing capacity building activities to partner organizations. Within first 15 months of its inception the number of DTCE's CCB partners increased to 20,000.

The struggle of housewives living in Karachi Administrative Employees Housing Society (KAEHS) offers the most interesting and successful case of activating local government by a CBO. Experience of KAEHS can be summed up in seven cardinal principles. i) You can only be effective if you act as a group. Go unannounced in a big group to visit government officers if you want to have maximum impact ii) Information is power. Government employees work as mafia and hide information from you to protect each other. However brokers and go betweens in these offices have access to all the necessary documents and officers and have full knowledge of the functions of various departments. Activist groups should also collect and keep information like these groups. iii) Members of Provincial Assembly (MPAs) and Ministers do nothing other than signing the documents. Don't waste time with them. Go straight to the concerned officers and try to influence them. iv) If government officers don't respond go for public interest litigation. Collect sound information to mobilize the court. Taking action on the complaint submitted by KAEHS, local judge summoned Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) officers to the court and told them that he will allow the petitioners to stop paying taxes if the government does not deliver service. It worked and KMC delivered. v) Submit application to concerned official only. Keep a signed copy of the application in your records. The copy should be signed by the receiving authority and indicate date and time of receipt. You will need it for follow-up as it may disappear from the office during your next visit. vi) Only the people affected by a problem will actively join you. Don't expect more than words of sympathy from others. vii) A local activist plays the key role in bringing people together (Fernandes 2002:93-98).

UNDP's LIFE programme motivated local government authorities to function like a CSO in Islamabad and Lodhran. In Islamabad LIFE provided a modest grant to Capital Development Authority (CDA) for preparing digital maps of 13 squatter settlements, marking and allotting numbers to squatter households, verifying numbers through a transparent community dialogue, regularization of 10 settlements and relocation of the rest. This process helped resolve a problem which was pending for the past 30 years (UNDP-LIFE 2003).

In Lodhran LIFE introduced the concept of component-sharing to District Government through a CSO Lodhran Pilot Project (LPP). According to this concept development work consists of 2 components-internal and external. Internal development is the responsibility of the people and includes the construction and maintenance of sanitary latrines, underground sewerage lines with manholes and house connections in the lane and collector drains- with their own resources, and under their own management. External development is the responsibility of government and includes the main drains (trunk sewers) and the disposal stations and sewerage water treatment plants. Under this approach a CSOs establishes a working partnership with local government to undertake comprehensive master planning process and complete documentation of city. It eliminates supervisory costs through self supervision and transfers of O&M responsibility to the communities. Adherence to local market rates for procurement; on-site supervision and technical assistance provided during excavation and construction, and division of tasks in a well defined manner further reduces government's implementation cost.

LPP developed standard technical guidelines and work instructions for project execution, level marking, layout, excavation for pipe laying, excavation for manhole, excavation for bed level, preparation of manhole covers, central alignment of the sewer line, laying and sloping of pipes, preparation of concrete, jointing of pipes, construction of manholes, shuttering for manholes, concrete filling of manholes and curing. LPP is not working as a substitute for the government but as a support organization that strengthens the existing capacity of the local government to modify cumbersome and rigid policies, complicated procedures, bureaucratic hurdles, financial constraints, lack of maintenance and repair budget, inadequate human resource management and complete lack of community participation. (UNDP 2002:2-7)

In Karachi OPP was able to muster the support and cooperation of local government by using mapping and documentation as a tool for advocacy on improvement of urban services. OPP's sanitation mapping is part of a wider process of scaling up people's initiatives. The purpose of mapping is twofold. First, to document what already exists on the ground (in terms of sanitation infrastructure); and second, to influence the government to align its investments with what already exists rather than to ignore it – which it has done thus far. Documenting *keatchi abadis* has highlighted people's involvement and investment in sanitation development. As a result, planning agencies and local government are forced to respond to the need to support people's efforts rather than duplicating them. This helps reduce costs (of laying pipelines) by developing low-cost designs that link up with peoples' own work at the lane and neighbourhood level. The mapping process has also allowed community members to acquire skills and knowledge which allows them to engage in a more informed manner with government agencies.

An important part of OPPs principles is the idea of 'social preparation'. The general principles of OPPs social preparation, which is a continuous on-going process, are as follows: i) Survey and document what exists ii) Create a support organization consisting of technicians and social organizers to support the community.

Technicians develop the package of advice and social organizers extend it. Social organizers need to be from the community as this resolves any issues related to travel, language, culture, and rapport with the community which might arise. Technicians, however, can be from outside the community. Use of conventionally trained professionals such as engineers and architects for field implementation and interaction with communities is not advisable unless they subscribe to and/or have been initiated into a development approach which views communities as teachers and partners rather than passive recipients of funds, ideas and technologies. iii) Support local activists. There are some people in the community who are aware of the problems, think about them, try to solve them, and are open to suggestions of others. There is a need to identify such people in the earliest stage of scoping work possibilities in a community. These early adopters are key to extension of the programme and in fostering community ownership and identification with the programme. iv) Develop a conceptual plan. v) Create manageable local social organizational unit. vi) Treat local communities as repositories of knowledge. vii) Document and disseminate experiences and programmes viii) Monitor, communicate and ask for constant feedback and transparency. ix) Relate local issues and realities to wider urban realities. x) Avoid aiming for quick results. Attention to these details in the process of dialogue with communities and government has enabled OPP to build a strong bond with government and transform the way that government deals with development challenges (Hasan 2007:22).

Knowledge based advocacy-saying no to non-performing loans

Urban Resource Centre (URC) and a coalition of citizen's organizations blazed the trail for knowledge based advocacy leading to the cancellation of an ADB loan for Karachi sewerage master plan. In 1997, the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB) was offered a big loan by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to implement a plan under which the sewerage and waste disposal systems of one area of the city were to be improved. The total cost of the project was estimated at almost a hundred million dollars. When the local NGOs discovered this plan, they thought of coming up with a solution that was technically and economically sound. According to the alternative plan, the government would only undertake 'external development' which would consist of main disposals, nullah and treatment plants, while the neighbourhood level infrastructure would be developed by the communities. This meant that the maintenance of these smaller sewers would be the community responsibility, which was already happening. A detailed proposal based on this approach and relevant data, well researched design and technical specifications was put before the NGOs and the communities, which backed it to the fullest, rejecting the KWSB and ADB proposal. By this time the public and the press uproar had attracted the attention of the provincial government, which invited the KWSB and members of the NGO network to a meeting in April 1999. The alternative plan was placed before the Governor of Sindh who accepted it, rejecting the ADB loan. Soon the Governor was changed and NGOs realising that the deal might still be carried through, started campaigning more vigorously against it. In July 1999, a signed petition was sent to the ADB voicing the strong opposition of the

citizens of Karachi. Finally, in September 1999, the ADB responded to the public pressure and cancelled the loan (Habib, 2002:187).

Crime Control

In Karachi, citizens persuaded the Government to notify the transfer of police station Ferozabad to a citizens' group that has managed to reform it and plans to replicate this effort in other police stations. In the late 80's and early 90's, as the law and order situation deteriorated in Karachi with theft, hold-ups and kidnapping for ransom at an all-time high, and the police failing to come to the help of the citizens, the well-to-do started putting barricades in their neighbourhood roads and keeping armed security guards in their houses. A group of citizens living in the PECHS in the Ferozabad Police Station jurisdiction took a different approach. They organized the CPLC-Neighbourhood Care (NC) with a view to utilize the government system itself, and not to by-pass it. Initially, a select group of concerned citizens from the PECHS area started contributing Rs 3,000 per month per household. A few months later, as the number of contributing households increased, the contribution was reduced to Rs 1,000 per month per household. In case of widows and retired people the charges were only Rs 500 per month per household. A small but well-equipped office was established in the annex of a house given free of cost by one of the residents. The office had a 24-hour hotline staffed by attendants who were in constant contact with the police mobiles through the radio.

CSO Engagement for Aid Effectiveness

Our system of government has not yet made transition from a law and order administration to development administration. Whereas police and revenue administration goes all the way down to Thana level there is a vacuum in terms of line departments below the district level. Communities can access services from line departments only if they are organized. At the same time our administrative culture is characterized by rigidity, lack of innovation and inflexibility. This has created a strong government and weak governance structure for development. Government's strength lies in inertia and weakness in inefficient service delivery. Government's performance below its existing potential provides the entry point for Civil Society. Organized and well trained communities can strengthen governance and improve delivery of services through the politics of engagement.

Our conventional planners do not understand socio-economic reality of the poor. Their technical specifications for service delivery and infrastructure development in low income areas are not in sync with the economic condition of the poor. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of government departments are cumbersome and obsolete. Their implementation is done by contractors and considerably increases the cost of delivery. There is little understanding among the conventional professionals on how ordinary citizens and political workers can help improve performance in the social sector. These practices in tandem with the mindset which values "secretiveness" in the use of public funds, discretion in the use of rules and indignation over people's

participation in decision making, financing and managing local development supports and sustains inertia in social sector. Gaps in delivery of services by government can be filled and economic assistance can be effectively used with proper training of community activists to engage and activate the government.

Notes

¹ Civil Society “Refers to the associations of citizens (outside their families, friends and businesses) entered into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas and ideologies. The term does not include profit-making activity (the private sector) or governing (the public sector). See UN *Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations entitled “We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and Global Governance”*. New York, June 2004

² Donors committed US\$ 1.5 billion out of total ODA of \$23.3 billion to CSOs 2007. This amount is exceptionally high as a big chunk of this money has been provided for earthquake relief and recovery.

³ For details see, World Bank, 2002

⁴ See Chambers (1997) and Bernstein (2004) for a detailed account of community based development and entrepreneurship in relation to sustainable development.

⁵ For a detailed account of other innovative approaches on education see Baqir 1998.

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THE ENVIRONMENTAL CASE OF SINDH

Abstract

This study documents the deteriorating riverine environment of Sindh. Previous studies have also highlighted this issue but the referencing and documentation is generally fragmentary. The environmental case of Sindh is contested by the federal government so for the purposes of this study we have decided to use predominantly official data, officially authorized field studies, or such authentic sources as the World Bank to prove the point. The data and studies prove beyond doubt that the environment of Sindh has suffered greatly due to the drastic decline in the flow of the river Indus due to upstream construction of storage for irrigation. Of course, Sindh has also benefitted from increased irrigation made possible by the storage and irrigation network but there is need to realize that Sindh is different from Punjab and that, for Sindh, human intervention in the water cycle has already been greatly overdone. Every new canal and irrigation related upstream storage facility now causes more damage than it provides benefit. Technical solutions to problems created by irrigation have invariably solved one problem only to give rise to another.

Introduction

This is not an empirical paper. It uses the available data to understand the environmental problems related to and created by a decline in the flow of the river Indus downstream of Kotri. The study concludes that the decline in the flow of the Indus, an issue related to the upstream construction of irrigation dams and diversion of water, has damaged the riparian environment and continues to do so, especially downstream of Kotri Barrage. It has affected floodplain cultivation, riverine forests, estuarine salinity and related vegetation, the deltaic environment, and pollution levels in the river and related lakes. All this, in turn, affects the habitat of agriculture, biodiversity, hydrology, and the human population that is supported by a certain ecological balance.

Understanding the real water problem

It is interesting to note that, after all these years, most people in Punjab are still not clear as to the real nature of the water issue. Water has been a major bone of contention especially between Sindh on one side and Punjab and the federation on the other. Yet, our understanding of the problem is very limited. It is therefore the first thing we should try to unravel. Although farmers in Sindh want more water, as do farmers in Punjab, the dispute is not so much over the apportionment of water as over the decline of outflow in the Indus as it passes through Sindh. This decline in outflow is not only caused by the storage and irrigation system upstream, which

Sindh is opposed to, but also by the canal network emanating from the Sukkur, Guddu, and Kotri barrages in Sindh. Sindh's case is that a decline in the flow of the Indus is directly related to environmental degradation in Sindh. Why do farmers then want more irrigation if irrigation both in Punjab and Sindh together is the cause of environmental degradation? More water in the canals or more water in the river? This dilemma is between short-term and long-term gains, and between individual and community benefits.

The different physiography and agriculture of Sindh

We should realize that there are important differences between the physiography and agriculture of Punjab and Sindh. Sindh is the lower riparian adjacent to the sea. Its land slopes are gentle and therefore drainage is poor compared to that in Punjab. It has many wetlands, some of international renown, declared Ramsar sites. There are also hundreds of kilometers of long, narrow (on average 4-km-wide) strips of flood plain comprising both arable plains as well as riverine forests and grazing grounds. Finally, there is the delta in which the Indus used to deposit 400 tones of nutrient-rich soil every year, supporting a rich crop of rice. The mangrove forests in the coastal region constituted a special environmental region and were a source of protection and livelihood.

Fisher-folk comprise a significant proportion of Sindh's population. Fish and shrimp in the estuaries, coastal region, and in some thousands of wetlands in the delta and on the flood plain have comprised an important part of the local diet as well as being a source of income.

There is a climatic difference too: Sindh has a more arid climate. The annual average rainfall in Sindh varies between 4 and 12 inches as against 20 and 40 inches in most of Punjab.

Finally, Punjab has a huge reserve of sweet groundwater while nearly 70 per cent of Sindh's groundwater is brackish or saline. Thirty per cent of Punjab's land is afflicted by water-logging and salinity compared to 50 per cent in Sindh.

Environmental degradation: nature's reaction to human excesses

Environmental degradation has a wide spectrum and is almost universally the result of development in the agricultural sector since the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Water-related degradation of the lower Indus Basin, now the province of Sindh, started in the nineteenth century with the development of a modern irrigation system. The first major canal was built in Punjab under the British in 1859 and many more gradually followed. What is now known as the canal colonization of Punjab took place toward the turn of the century. Today, the Indus Basin boasts the largest contiguous irrigation system in the world comprising 3 water reservoirs, 19 barrages, 61,000 km of canal, and 43 main canals systems with 48 off-takes and over 100,000 water courses transporting water to the fields. Three water storages were built and 12 link canals were added to transfer the waters of the three western rivers

to the eastern rivers, when Pakistan sold the waters of the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas to India under the Indus Basin Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960 under the aegis of the World Bank. The development of new canals and water storage continues.

Nature has reacted to this major intervention with the natural ecosystem. Prior to the construction of the modern irrigation system, more than 150 MAF of water annually passed through the Indus and a natural equilibrium always ensured efficient drainage. Today, more than 50 per cent of arable land in Sindh is affected by the environmental woes of water-logging and salinity and is the direct consequence of the construction of the canal network. Other water-related woes of Sindh stem from the resulting overall decrease in the outflow of water in the system affecting pollutions levels and biodiversity.

A common perception of development

Everyone has heard the argument that development requires more storage and more water for irrigation. The development lobby wants to build more and new storage facilities upstream, while environmentalists contest this. This is how the issue of building new storage facilities upstream and of the flow requirement downstream of Kotri became highly contentious. The federal government and its supporters consider the current 35 MAF average annual outflows below Kotri a big waste that must be controlled and harnessed at the earliest through further dams and used for expanding cultivation for a growing population. The smaller provinces, especially Sindh, consider this flow already too little, and a lifeline for the ecological balance surrounding the Indus in Sindh.

Apart from Sindh's contention that there is no net availability of water in the system (Ghazanfar 2008) for further upstream storage on the Indus, Sindh has a very strong environmental case against further decline in river outflow. Obviously, environmental protection does not rank high on the agenda of the state, which has a tendency to give much higher priority to immediate and tangible benefits rather than to the future common and relatively intangible degradation of the environment. However, environmental degradation is no longer very distant or so intangible. A lot of damage has already taken place.

Perhaps, more interesting than the environmental case of Sindh is how the media has obscured rather than illuminated a particular dispute. There has never been a more debated construction issue in Pakistan than Kalabagh dam. It would have been built before Tarbela dam had the three smaller provinces not put up a resolute resistance to the project. Strangely, the continuing debate over many years has failed to make the basic issue clear to the millions of people in Punjab. The issue is why Sindh opposes the construction of more reservoirs to store water and expand irrigation. Sindh's case is made up of (i) the net availability of water for further storage facilities, and (ii) the environmental havoc played in Sindh by the decline in the flow of the Indus with the quality of groundwater, soil, riverine and delta cultivation, and vegetation, especially the mangroves forest, fish, shrimp and other biodiversity that has played an important role in the livelihood and economy of the region.

In the words of the environmental concerns study carried out downstream of Kotri, and sponsored and published by the federal government, “Exploitation of water resources upstream and recent drought periods resulted in reduction of flow levels below Kotri barrage from 170 MAF to 35 MAF per annum.” This decline is further aggravated by the fact that the figure of 35 MAF is only a statistical average. “The average annual discharge volume of the last ten years 1994-2004 was approx 6.8 MAF. In the extremely dry period 2000-2004 only approx. 2 MAF per year have been released downstream of Kotri Barrage”. Again, “the water released during Rabi season has declined very strongly after 1965. In 22 years out of 39 years the discharge volume of the Rabi season was less than 1.0 MAF. In 7 years since 1965 almost no water was released during the Rabi season”. Not only are the statistical averages deceptive, a substantial part of the current outflow comprises water that legally belongs to India and will eventually be used by it. Finally, the state wants to further reduce this outflow by ten times to 3.6 MAF: “President Musharraf said, according to a study carried out by international consultants, 3.6 million acres feet (MAF) of water must flow downstream Kotri Barrage every year, and 20 MAF of water once in five years. He added the 3.6 MAF water would be available after a dam was built.” (Dawn, December 12, 2005).

The common perception of development is really a vulgar perception of development. It narrowly emphasizes the need for more production and bases itself on spreading the fear of hunger and deprivation to create a favourable public opinion for expanding irrigation through mega-storages. It does not take into account that, even in the US, many go hungry or without healthcare in a country where the annual per capita income is \$48,000. This view does not take into account the fact that, in most cases, deprivation is not a problem of production, but a problem of distribution.

For the purposes of this study we have decided to rely predominantly on studies commissioned and carried out by panels and investigators on behalf of the federal government or studies by the departments of the federal and provincial governments, to make the facts as authentic as possible. We have also quoted major non-government organizations (NGOs) such as IUCN, international multilateral organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB), and a number of reputed experts. We start by looking at the river-related land, agriculture, and water issues of Sindh.

Riverine forests

The riverine forests on river islands and close banks of the Indus are critical ecosystem components and have traditionally been a source of livelihood for a large number of rural Sindhi people living in the area. They affect climate, act as grazing ground and forage for livestock, supply firewood, construction material, and medicinal herbs, control soil erosion, store freshwater for the recharge of groundwater reserves, and provide habitats for a large number of fauna, especially birds.

The scarcity of flow in the Indus has already degraded the extensive flood plain forests and the rest are threatened. According to an FAO forest cover assessment, Pakistan belongs to countries with the lowest forest/non-forest ratio (0-9%). Between 1981 and 1990, the FAO reported a 4.3 per cent decrease in forested area in the region and a 0.6 per cent deforestation rate per year. The location and extent of forested area in the riverine areas and Indus delta has been analyzed using satellite images, and the results show a significant decline of forest cover in both ecosystems.

According to the Pakistan government's own published study, "Riverine forests are flood plain forest where Indus is the sole source of water. Growth and regeneration depends on annual flood water availability. Gradual decrease of inundated forest area due to reduced flows and sediment deposition has increased unproductive areas and increased stress on the existing tree growth and regeneration" (GoP, Study II 2005: 40).

It should be noted that the above and following comments are from a study conducted by a consortium of organizations including Lahmeyer International GmbH Germany (the current consultants for Bhasha-Diamer Dam) and conducted under the auspices of the Government of Pakistan. The relevant pages of the study have been mentioned against the references quoted. We continue:

Flow duration analysis for the post-Kotri period shows that for an average year, the river bank-full flow will be exceeded for approximately 37 days. In a dry year practically no over-bank flow will take place, the estimated survival time for the Babul tree (the most valued species) in complete drought is 2 years. Riverine vegetation is declining at an alarming ratio. Total loss of 30.6% of vegetation cover has taken place over 23 years (1978-2001). It is likely that drought of the past five years further worsened this situation. Biotic pressure in the form of wood removal, grazing and encroachment is the other important factor in the reduction of riverine forests" (GoP, Study II 2005: 13).

The data prior to 2000 show that low floods (200,000 to 350,000 cusecs) have been occurring almost every two years but after 2000 exceptional drought has been experienced with annual discharges to the tune of 0.745, 1.924 and 2.152 MAF for the years 2000-01, 2001-02, 2002-03 respectively. The situation however, improved in 2003-04 when 20.16 MAF discharge was received. But Kharif season 2004-05 was again a dry year with only 0.204 MAF discharge at Kotri downstream.

According to approximate information obtained from the Forest Department, a discharge of up to 300,000 cusecs may inundate about 20% of the forest. This amount remains confined within the banks....About 35% of the forest may be inundated during discharges of up to 400,000 cusecs, 60% of the forest may be inundated during discharges of up to 500,000 cusecs and 90% at discharges of up to 700,000 cusecs. The balance of 10% is flooded only during super floods i.e., above 700,000 cusecs.

Vegetation in the riverine area has degraded significantly. Recent growing stock has decreased as determined by present volume tables (Memon 2000). Babul decreased by 57% Babul mix by 52%, Kandi by 35%, Devi by 51% and Devi mix by 47% (GoP, Study II 2005: 38).

Effects on Katcho: the annual flood plain

The drying up of the Katcho or sailaba area (the riverine area) with further declines in Indus flows consequent on storage at KBD is another key issue for Sindh. This is an area of some 1.8 million acres, 595,000 acres of which are forested, and 600,000 acres of which are rich grazing land in the form of a 4-km-wide strip on both sides of the Indus. The latter finally merges into the delta formed by the river at the end of its course. It also includes farmlands which “are modified habitats of agricultural crops planted after clearing rank growth outside forests. Encroachment on forest areas is not uncommon. Sugarcane, maize, and vegetables are the main crops grown during summer while wheat, vegetables, and fodder are common winter crops. Bananas are grown extensively in the riverine area. Irrigation is supplied by lifting water from the river channel and water collected in surrounding depressions. Irrigation water is also frequently supplied by pipes and sub-canals from the canal network outside the flood protection bunds (FPBs). Farmland area has increased from 4,352 ha to 18,346 ha, as shown by an analysis of satellite imagery acquired in October (GoP, Study II 2005:50-51).

The katcho supports a rich agriculture and a large number of cattle and goats. A part of this fertile land is sown only with residual moisture left after floods, while the rest is watered using shallow tube-wells. Inundation takes place only when the river discharge exceeds 300,000 cusecs in flood season, which now occurs about every 2 years. With further reservoirs upstream, the annual flooding of the katcho will become more infrequent. The federal government considers this a happy situation but for local farmers, it is a serious blow for riverine agriculture. According to the federal government, the katcho can be irrigated by tube-wells, saving peasants the bother of removing the turbines every year during flood season; in any case the problem is being raised by illegal *wadera* occupants of the katcho. But if the legality of occupation is important as far as releasing water is concerned, then most of Pakistan is illegally occupied by the beneficiaries of the British Raj.

Degradation of the Indus delta

The fan-shaped Indus delta has been built by silt brought from upland and deposited at the mouth of the river into the sea. According to an IUCN study (2003), “The present delta covers 600,000 hectares and is characterized by 17 major creeks and innumerable minor creeks, mud flats and fringing mangroves (Maynell and Qureshi 1993).”

Discussing the ecology of Indus delta, Ahmed (1997) reports:

The fauna and flora of river deltas all over the world are part of a balanced ecosystem which has evolved over [geological time]. Estuaries, where river water mixes with sea water, are believed to serve as storehouses of nutrients for fish and shellfish larvae and juveniles. They also act as sanctuaries for marine life and are important sources of inshore fisheries. However, with the decrease in the river outflow below Kotri from 81.11 MAF in the pre-Kotri period (1955-56) to 35 MAF annually now and changes in the pattern of the spread of flows limiting most of it to two months in a year and practically no water during drought the ecosystem has undergone great degree of degradation.

The Indus estuary at Keti Bunder has now been practically obliterated since no fresh water is allowed to reach it for 10 months of the year because of [upstream storages].... since the Indus River does not discharge any sediment into the Arabian sea through the Keti Bunder Delta for the greater part of the year. Therefore, the beaches in the creeks of Hajamro, Turshian and Khobar are undergoing erosion due to lack of replacement sand.... the tidal creeks representing the old abandoned delta of the Indus near Karachi are now characterized by high salinities, principally due to lack of any significant freshwater input from any source.... salinities rise as high as 41.3‰ in shallow spots within the creeks (Ahmed and Rizvi, 1980; Rizvi et al. 1988). It is only during the rainy season of July to September that salinities fall between “27 to 29‰” (Ahmed and Rizvi, 1980; Huda and Ahmed, 1988).

There is a direct correlation between water and sediment flows. As the water flow of the Indus has decreased, so have the sediment loads which reach the mouth of the delta. It has been estimated that the Indus used to transport 400 million tonnes of silt annually to the deltaic region before 1947. This was reduced to 100 million tonnes between 1977-1992. The remaining silt load today is estimated at 35 million tonnes or less (Keerio and Bhatti, 1999 in GoP, Study II, 2005:74).

Mangroves ecosystems require the input of silt from riverine sources. The silt brings nutrients and minerals to them as well as providing them with new substrate. Particularly in semi-arid regions, such as the Indus Delta, the self production of organic matter and the amount of dissolved or suspended minerals is not sufficient to meet the requirement for optimal growth of the mangroves forests. This deficit can therefore only be made good with riverine import from upstream areas.” (:73).

In a detailed study of the Indus delta, Haq (1999) points out that water discharge is estimated to be one tenth of its pre-1940s value (Milliman et al. 1984) while the sediment flux is negligible (from 400 million tonnes to just 30 million tonnes

annually). The active delta has shrunk to less than one tenth of its original size (from 2,600 km² to 260 km² [Khan 2005]), severely compromising the previously extensive, river-dominated estuarine system. The year-round flow in the delta is now restricted to a single channel. Subsidence related to the decline in silt input is estimated to be 2 to 4 mm per year. If one adds the projected rate of the global component of sea-level rise of up to 6 mm year in the 21st century, the Indus delta could experience a relative rise of sea-levels up to 8 to 10 mm/yr. At this pace, the inundation of the delta could be rapid, at a lateral sea advance rate of several m/year.

A 2007 BBC report on Indus delta produced by M. Ilyas Khan who visited the delta region reported the following:

Keti Bandar was once a thriving river port in the Indus river delta region in southern Pakistan, with impressive public buildings, a customs office and warehouses for exports. Today, it can barely stay above water. And the water levels keep rising.

Two years ago, the high tide barely came up to the ruins of a rice mill located just outside the town. Now that has been completely submerged. While there is still time to save Keti, the town of Kharo Chhan, about 20 minutes drive east, has reached the point of no return. 'In 1946, it was a part of the mainland,' says Abdullah Murgher, a local farmer. It is now an island, about 30 minutes' boat ride from the shore. The signs of a prosperous past are still visible, such as the crumbling pillars of a vast villa that belonged to a Hindu village head.

The soft mud plates between the creeks, enriched by hundreds of millions of metric tones of silt load carried down by the river each year, were the most fertile in Sindh province. The 1921 British Imperial Gazette for Sindh cites the chief produce of the delta region as rice paddy, bananas, camels, charcoal and timber. Wool and fish products were also produced in large quantities. Until 1935, cargo boats regularly sailed up the Ochito Creek to Keti harbour from where they collected products for export to the Middle East. 'More than 160 settlements, spread over 1.3m acres of delta, have been lost to the sea since 1970,' said Nadir Akmal Leghari, the Sindh Minister for Irrigation (BBC 2007).

These facts have been verified by a World Bank study (WB 2005b) of Badin and Thatta, two coastal districts in Sindh: According to the revenue report of 1897:

...the land of this region was very fertile and the areas of Shah Bander, Keti Bander, Karochan and Mirpur Sakhro had a rich productive potential. These delta lands produced red rice which was not only sufficient for the region but was also exported. The gazetteer of Karachi from 1929, reports that the rice crop was grown on such vast areas that it was not possible for the local people to harvest the crop. Boats full of people from the

Kathiawar Region of India used to come to harvest the crop. The region was covered with mangrove forests and timber was exported to Muscat, Aden and the Kutch peninsula. The harbours of Keti Bandar and Shah Bander used to be full of boats from around the region.

The report (WB 2005b) continues:

Historically, fresh water flows to the delta have been about 150 Million Acre Feet). In recent years, even though 10 MAF per annum was agreed under the inter-provincial accord, the flow below Kotri has been far less in any given year. The Indus River used to bring with it silt which was rich in nutrients. These rich silt deposits were the main factor behind the fertility of the area along the banks. However, the construction of dams and barrages has reduced the silt from reaching the river downstream. Furthermore, the flow of the Indus was preventing seawater intrusion onto the lands along the coasts in the delta region. Today, the coastal eco-system of the delta is under stress from seawater intrusion and an increase in salinity. Many areas along the coast have been inundated and the livelihoods of the fishing and farming communities along the coast are under pressure.

According to one estimate 2 million acres of fertile delta have been eroded due to inadequate release of water in the Indus downstream of Kotri (Guam Akber, Director, WWF-Pakistan. The News, June 7, 2009).

Mangroves

The ecological significance of the mangrove forests in the delta region on the interface between freshwater and the saline water of the sea is now well established and in the context of Kalabagh Dam has become a major environmental concern in Sindh. According to an IUCN study (2003):

The mangrove ecosystem of the Indus Delta is perhaps unique in being the largest area of arid climate mangroves in the world. As annual rainfall is so low in the region mangroves are almost wholly dependent on freshwater discharges from the river supplemented by a small quantity of runoff and effluents from Karachi.

Mangroves have been decimated mainly by low Indus flows below Kotri, according to the Environmental Concerns Report (GoP Study II 2005) of the international group set up by the Government of Pakistan:

The mangroves ecosystem of Indus Delta is gradually deteriorating. There has been a 16.5% loss in mangroves forest cover from 1978 to 2001. There are several reasons for this decrease. Human pressure is substantial ... camel browsing ... there is an increase in salinity of the delta area, as progressively less freshwater and sediment is released below Kotri Barrage.

Large areas of mangroves have been lost to the sea due to erosion. The persistence of current trend will badly affect the mangroves in the Indus Delta 25-30 years from now. In order to improve this situation 4.7 MAF water is required below Kotri Barrage per annum (:12).

All mangroves require a certain amount of freshwater to thrive. Some very salt tolerant species, such as *Avicennia marina* which is in effect the only species left in the Indus Delta can cope with almost fully saline condition... (:74).

The survival of the highly salt-tolerant species *Avicennia marina* proves that, contrary to the prevalent view, overgrazing and excessive use by local communities has not played the main role in the contraction of mangrove forests, and the shrinkage has resulted largely from a decline of freshwater inflows from the Indus.

The Environmental Concerns Report (GoP 2005) continues:

But although the most salt tolerant of mangroves may be able to survive in almost fully saline conditions, they will suffer and may cease reproduction activity altogether. These mangroves of the Indus delta, together with other plants and animals have synchronized their reproduction activity with the peak of the monsoons where they can rely upon freshwater flows which dilute the extreme saline conditions.

An estimate of how much freshwater the mangroves need is out of necessity rough as the mangroves ecosystem is a complex of multi-factorial relationships and processes. A figure of 10 MAF has been widely quoted as the minimum annual discharge below Kotri to sustain the mangrove ecosystem. Our estimates put the figure at 4.7 MAF (GoP, Study II 2005: 75).

According to the IUCN, mangroves play an important role in supplying firewood, wood for construction, and forage for goats and camels. They also support wildlife like jackals, wild boars, reptiles, and migratory fowl birds (IUCN 1991). The environmentally protective and economic role of the mangroves has also been reiterated by the World Bank-Government of Sindh Socioeconomic study of Badin and Thatta. Replacing the natural protective role of the mangroves with physical barriers (dykes, walls, etc.) would entail enormously high capital and maintenance costs (Khan 2005).

Shiva (2002) has elaborated that mangroves reduce wind velocity and floods, absorbing the energy of wave and tidal surges, thus protecting the land behind from cyclones and erosion. Mangroves are also useful in treating effluent, as the plants absorb excess nutrients such as nitrates and phosphates, thereby preventing contamination of shore waters. Local communities depend on mangrove ecosystems for food, medicine, fuel wood, and construction materials. Mangrove forests are also desirable for fish and shrimp growth, as they provide important nutrients (Shiva 2002).

Emphasizing the economic significance of the Indus delta, the IUCN study (2003) notes:

At least three quarters of the Delta's rural population depend, directly or indirectly, on fishing as their main source of income, and most of Pakistan's commercial marine fishery operates in and around the mangrove creeks on the coast of Sindh Province. A large proportion of fish and crustaceans spend at least part of their life cycle in the mangroves, or depend on food webs originating there (Meynell and Qureshi 1993).

It is estimated that the mangrove estuaries are four to five times more productive than tropical estuaries without mangroves. Again, compared to agricultural land growing wheat (acre for acre), mangroves are three times as productive.

The World Bank (2005b) notes that

...mangroves depend upon a steady supply of fresh water to keep the salinity levels within certain limits. The mangrove system of the delta is thus under stress from the high seawater salinities resulting from the reduction of freshwater input to the delta from the Indus. The Indus Delta mangroves used to occupy 345000 hectares along the entire Sindh coast. Recent estimates show that the area of mangroves is now only 160,000 to 200,000 hectare due to lack of freshwater as well as overexploitation (WB 2005b).

Fisheries

Inland fishery in Sindh engaged nearly 74,000 fishermen in Sindh (Sheikh 2009) and it is estimated that Sindh's freshwater lakes account for 65 per cent of the total freshwater fisheries in Pakistan.

Regarding the effect of decreasing Indus flows on fish and other fauna and flora of the riverine and delta ecosystem, the Environmental Concerns Study (GoP, Study II 2005) concludes:

The low flow of water in Indus river below Kotri Barrage from January to May and drought conditions for some years have diversely affected the riverine and delta ecosystem. The estuarine fauna and flora has disappeared in most parts of the delta and the biodiversity of the mangroves has decreased. The habitat and niches of the riverine and marine animals reduced. The breeding places of fin and shell fish silted up. Less intermixing of fresh and brackish water has increased salinity at the delta affecting the breeding and rearing of fish and shrimps ... The production of Palla [fish] was 2384 metric tons in the year 1955 which increased to 7869 metric tons in the year 1959..... Later on it continued to decrease and now it is only 184 metric tons (year 2001) the production of shrimps also decreased to 19000 metric tons against 33900 tons in the year 1993 this is due to high

salinity, reduced breeding, overfishing by small mesh nets by boats and trawlers” (GoP 2005, Study II: 88-89).

Again the same study mentions: “Decreased water flows downstream of Kotri, and frequent no flow during the winter season, river habitat no longer supports the population of Indus blind dolphin (*Platanista gangetica minor*)” (:46).

The combined World Bank-Government of Sindh socioeconomic study of Badin and Thatta (WB 2005b) found that the decline in Indus flows has forced people to shift from agriculture and livestock to fishing. But fishing itself is suffering from a decline in catch which, apart from other reasons, is due to the falling levels of Indus water and rising aquatic toxicity.

River Pollution

The water of the Indus River is already polluted, apart from receiving effluents from many population centers; it also receives seepage water from the katcho (Indus active flood plain) area during the closure of the Sukkur barrage gates 5 months a year. The katcho, comprising 1.849 million acres, is now cultivated using chemical fertilizers and major quantities of pesticide. The seepage waters of the katcho combined with pesticide residues return to the river bed during the low flow season and contaminate the Indus waters. The same waters of the Indus downstream of Kotri are used for irrigation purposes in the Kotri barrage command area (over 3.0 million acres). Finally, the waters of the Indus are used for drinking by the urban population of Hyderabad, Badin, and Karachi. If the right bank outfall drain (RBOD) seeps into the Indus, it will add further to the pollution of this water supply.

The river receives poisonous contaminants from agrochemical-laden irrigation returns, industrial effluent, and municipal waste. However, the level of pollution is also determined by the amount of water in river: with decreased flows, contamination is more concentrated.

Freshwater lakes

The arid land of Sindh, interestingly, is home to a large number of freshwater lakes. Seven of these, including Manchar, Keenjhar, Hamal, Haleji and Chotiari, have been designated Ramsar sites by the United Nations. They are not only natural reservoirs of freshwater for village communities but also supply drinking water to major urban centers. They have been home to migratory birds such as ducks, geese, flamingos, ibises, coots, gulls, terns, cormorants, herons, and egrets for breeding, staging, passage, and wintering (Kureshi 2008b) and other biodiversity. Many migratory birds travel this route from as far as Kazakhstan and Siberia. These lakes are a source of livelihood for a large population. They have already lost their pristine character, are much polluted, and dwindling in size, while many are turning into saltwater lagoons with the consequent loss of biodiversity, fishery catch, and hazardous health impact on populations using their water. The increase in surface and groundwater salinity and intensive use of agrochemicals in modern agriculture in Sindh finds its way through

runoff seepage and drains into these freshwater lakes with the consequent loss of fish and other biodiversity, making the water increasingly unfit for human consumption. While pollution is increasing, the water in the lakes, dependent on flows from the Indus, is decreasing, undermining the multiple roles of these wetlands.

Manchar is the biggest shallow water natural lake in Pakistan. Situated in Dadu district, it is a large source of freshwater in an arid region. It is flanked by the Kirthar hills in the west, the Laki hills in the south and the Indus in the east. During heavy rains, the lake extends northwest covering an area of 350 to 520 km² (Wikipedia 2009) and storing up to 1 MAF of water (Kureshi 2008b). It has been providing livelihoods for a large number of fishermen and irrigation water for crops. Having acted as an outfall for the main Nara valley drain (MNVD), salinity has increased, making the lake a source of poisoning for the Indus when its water are released during the monsoon. The yearly fish catch has decreased from 3,000 tonnes in 1950 to 150 tonnes now. Lake Keenjhar, located in Thatta district, is a big source of water supply for Karachi. It receives industrial effluents from the Kotri industrial area, irrigation returns from the surrounding lands, and sewage and garbage from communities in the vicinity. Lake Haleji, which is the largest water fowl reserve in Asia (Wikipedia 2009), is in danger of eutrophication from irrigation returns carrying agrochemicals.

Human Migration

The joint Government of Sindh-World Bank report on socioeconomic conditions in the coastal districts of Badin and Thatta points out:

In the past, these coastal villages used to rely on multiple sources of income depending upon the household resource ownership. While fishing formed a major part of their livelihoods, crop farming was also a key component as each family had access to some land which they cultivated on a subsistence basis. The first diversion of livelihoods from crop and livestock farming towards the fishing sector coincided with the decrease in the fresh water flows in the Indus Delta. These changes forced the agricultural communities to shift their livelihoods to fisheries. Livestock ownership was an additional strategy for supplementing household consumption needs and as a store of value. Wood cutting enabled households to meet their fuel needs as well as supplement incomes for the poorer households. The decrease in water availability and increase in salinity was a source of pressure on all the diverse livelihoods (WB 2005b).

For many, fishing has become a livelihood of the last resort, but the yield, too, is decreasing.

A large number of fisherman population has shifted from Keti Bundar, Shah Bundar and other coastal villages to villages near Korangi creek besides Karachi due to reduced catches, shortage of drinking water and absence of civic amenities (GoP 2005, Study II: 88-89).

The Indus plays a central role in the psyche, society, and culture of the Sindhi people. Further storage facilities upstream are likely to render that portion of the Indus below Sukkur dry for most of the year. Many Mohanna people living along the Indus will become homeless and the Indus that is the “Darya Shah” or “Zindah Pir” for Sindhis will be polluted further and reduced from a once mighty river to a mere expanse of shallow water.

A recent study conducted by foreign consultants with the assistance of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) shows that increasing poverty in Sindh, particularly in its coastal areas, and widespread unemployment has led to migration from rural to urban centers, especially in Karachi, leading to a growing number of slums in the city. The study finds that poverty in the coastal areas has stricken at least 54 per cent of Sindh’s population. Of this, 79 per cent constitute the poorest. According to the study, the depletion of mangrove forests has resulted in less protection for fish, and also in over-fishing/undersized fish catch and an overall decline in fish catch. Additional forces engaged in fishing or dependence on fishing has resulted in a smaller income per household, thus increasing poverty in the coastal community of the area (Dawn, February 19, 2007).

The WB (2005b) study on the socioeconomic condition in Badin and Thatta districts found that rampant poverty prevails in the two districts, especially in the coastal parts where 44 per cent of the population lives:

The current combined population of the districts of Thatta and Badin is estimated to be around 2.26 million. Participatory assessments in the area indicate that as much as 86 percent of the population in the districts see themselves as poor and only 10 percent perceive of themselves as non-poor. However, the people with the most threatened and vulnerable livelihoods are the people along the coastal areas.

The study continues:

Survey interviews with households, government officials, NGOs, and community representatives indicate that there is an out-migration that is both seasonal and permanent in character... The households surveyed also pointed out that while out-migration has been going on for a long time, there was an increase in the last four years coinciding with the extreme weather events and natural disasters in the area. Nearly 27 percent of the households reported migration from among their families between 2000 and 2004. Most families that migrated relocated to Golarchi and Karachi followed by Badin and other locations.

The principal reason for out-migration is the lack of drinking water and health facilities. The two districts are limited in terms of their access to water supply and sanitation. Only 26 per cent of the people included in the survey had access to water supply from within the village. In some areas like Keti Bander and Shah Bander

drinking water was being purchased at a high cost from private tankers by all households, and the lack of access to drinking water was one of the principal reasons that households out-migrated. “There is significant out-migration, especially, from the coastal areas of Thatta as a result of the shortage of drinking water and disruption of livelihoods...” WB (2005b).

Degraded soil and groundwater resources

The problem of water-logging and salinity

Nearly 30 per cent of some 18 Mha of irrigated land in Pakistan is affected by moderate to severe water-logging and salinity; over 16 per cent has been degraded by severe water-logging, and over 14 per cent affected by severe salinity. (Haider 2000, Bashir, Dawn Sept. 28, 2006; Gillani 2001). In Sindh, the ratio is 50 per cent (Jahangir and Ali 2003; Bengali and Shah 2003). In absolute terms, 6.3 Mha of irrigated land has been affected, of which 1.1 Mha are dense sodic soils that are extremely difficult to reclaim (Riaz, Dawn September 2001). WAPDA reported the following salinity distribution over four years from 1987/88 to 1991/92:

Table 1: Surface Salinity distribution

	Slightly Saline		Moderately Saline		Strongly Saline	
	Annual Report 1987-88	Annual Report 1991-92	Annual Report 1987-88	Annual Report 1991-92	Annual Report 1987-88	Annual Report 1991-92
Pakistan	12	11	7	6	9	8
Punjab	8	7	5	4	3	3
Sindh	19	19	11	10	20	18
NWFP	14	8	4	2	4	2
Balochistan	17	17	5	5	4	4

Source: Various annual reports of WAPDA.

Before the advent of canals in the second half of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century, the system was in balance and there were no problems of water-logging and salinity. The problem of water-logging and salinity is a consequence of canal irrigation with seepage and water loss especially from canals and irrigated fields on the one hand and insufficient drainage on the other, leading to the buildup and rise of the water table. “WAPDA studies indicate that 78.3 per cent of the groundwater recharge in the Indus Basin is received through seepage from irrigation canals and losses from water courses from fields” (WAPDA 1988). The contribution of river water to groundwater recharge is 6.15 per cent (GoP Study II 2005:193; WB 2005a).

As the water table approaches the surface (severe water-logging occurs at 5 ft or less from the surface), the capillary rise of water and its surface evaporation leads to the

buildup of salt on the surface. Under conditions of impeded drainage, surface water and rain are unable to wash away the accumulated salts, while the salts contained in water used for irrigation also start building up on the surface. Plants too can concentrate salts in the soil when irrigated with brackish water.

Technical solution I: sinking tube-wells

As a result of canal irrigation, the problem of water-logging and salinity was already there on the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and was only aggravated by the water works built under the Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan sought foreign expertise and assistance in 1948 to help control water-logging and salinity (Ahmed 2003). To control the rising problem, it was decided to lower the water table by sinking thousands of large-capacity tube-wells (turbines and pipes both imported from US through a debt arrangement) under the 77 Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARPs) all over the country (16,000 large-capacity SCARP tube-wells). Private tube-wells followed in large numbers. The former, however, carry 1,500 ppm of total dissolved solids as against 150-250 ppm carried by canal water (Chaudhry et al 2002). While the deep large-capacity SCARP tube-wells helped in partially decreasing the extent of water-logged soils by lowering the water table and initially decreasing the extent of salinity from 7 Mha to 4.5 Mha (due to the availability of more water to wash down salts), these tube-wells have now become a major cause of secondary salinity as the quality of groundwater has generally deteriorated with pumping and the passage of time (Chaudhry et al 2002:1). Small-capacity private tube-wells have proved somewhat better. They pump from shallower depths and carry an intermediate salt content of 500-700 ppm. According to another estimate “while the 107 MAF canal water adds 15 million tons of salt, 55 MAF from the 430000 farmer tube wells adds 53 million tons, the 2274 SCARP tubewells alone add a massive 20 million tons to the environment each year (Ahmed 2003)”. It is therefore obvious that we cannot go on sinking tube-wells without adding to the problem.

The same holds true for canal irrigation. Over time, it has helped bring a large area, now over 18 Mha (Habib 2006) under cultivation and thus greatly expanded agricultural production. But beyond a point, the natural balance between discharge and recharge has been disturbed, leading to water-logging and salinity. In the long run, the construction of every high dam adds to the problem of water-logging and salinity by increasing the extent of irrigation and by adding to the system losses. According to WAPDA, these losses amount to 10 MAF at present, but other studies estimate more. According to A M Kazi, former senator and minister for irrigation, the Government of Sindh will increase the system losses by another 4 MAF after the construction of Kalabagh Dam (Kazi 2003).

Groundwater degradation

Freshwater reserves of groundwater lie in the form of lensoid ribbons below and in the vicinity of rivers and canals where surface water seeps into the ground. Downwards and even on the sides, this freshwater may interface with brackish or

saline water. A certain ratio needs to be maintained between the recharge and discharge of groundwater aquifers. If the recharge is insufficient or the pumping is excessive, brackish or saline water from below or from the sides may degrade the quality of the pumped water. Excessive extraction of groundwater from a fresh-body without corresponding recharge “runs the risk of salt-water encroachment either by the upconing of salt-water from below the wells or by lateral flow to them from adjoining salt-water occurrences” (Muller et al 2003). The same principle should apply to the interface between Sindh’s freshwater aquifers and saline sea water. If freshwater reservoirs are not properly recharged because there is little or no flow in the Indus (which is the only river in Sindh), saline water is likely to encroach from below, from the side, or from the sea. Punjab, on the other hand, has a relatively large reservoir of freshwater under its soil from where tube-wells pump as much as 44 MAF (Chaudhry et al 2002) of water every year to supplement its canal water share of 56 MAF. Groundwater in Sindh is saline in 80 per cent of irrigated areas (Habib 2006) and is unfit for both drinking and irrigation. Consequently, Sindh is able to draw only 2.5-3.5 MAF a year (see Table 2, PCRWR 2003) to supplement its canal water share of 42.94 MAF (Nation, Jan. 7, 2006). Since 2003, thousands of new tube-wells have been installed in all provinces of Pakistan. Obviously, the new groundwater pumping figures must be higher. One current estimate is that Sindh might be pumping around 10 MAF (Zaigham Habib, personal communication, 2009), in which case Punjab should also be pumping a higher figure now than the quoted 44 MAF. In any case, the argument regarding the imbalance between groundwater resources in Punjab and Sindh would still be valid. According to Pervez Musharraf, the then President of Pakistan, “The underground water in Sindh is brackish, unfit for drinking or irrigation. Therefore, we cannot sink tubewells there, and Sindh is dependent on irrigation,” (WAPDA Khabarnama, 2006). A cursory look at the map (Fig. 1) is enough to show the different extents of the freshwater zones in Punjab and Sindh.

Table 2: Groundwater potential and withdrawal in Pakistan

Total groundwater potential	55.00 MAF
Present groundwater withdrawals	49.00 MAF
Punjab	44.00 MAF
Sindh	2.50 MAF*
NWFP	2.00 MAF
Balochistan	1.00 MAF

Source: Member Water (WAPDA) presentation on canal lining to Chief Executive, 2000. From Chaudhry et al (2002)

*3.50 MAF (PCRWR 2003); Around 10 MAF (Zaigham Habib pers. comm., 2010)




Figure 1: Ground water quality in irrigated areas of Indus Basin. 0 to 125 feet depth.

Technical solution II: mega-drains

After the failure of SCARP and the increasing salinization of Sindh’s agricultural lands starting in 1984, two major surface drainage projects were envisaged and planned: the first one on the left bank and the second on the right bank of the Indus. A National Drainage Programme (NDP) was launched in 1997.

Left bank outfall drain

Mega projects, although intended to correct the problems arising from previous technological interventions in agriculture and despite preliminary investigations, may

lead to unpredictable consequences because they represent yet another human intervention: they disrupt the natural system and may end up creating more harm than good. This is the case with the left bank outfall drain (LBOD), which has damaged the agri-economy of Thatta and Badin in Sindh. The LBOD was constructed to drain out brackish and saline groundwater resulting from irrigation on the left bank of the Indus. Starting in 1984, the LBOD was finally constructed at a cost of Rs31 billion and reported a failure by the World Bank's own inspection panel in July 2005. It has disrupted the natural drainage system, and led to flooding, aggravated salinity, and destroyed prize natural wetlands. The project has serious design defects and serves to choke off the natural drainage from the area. Its last section, the 42-km-long tidal link has been designed to discharge 3,500 cusecs of water from Nawabshah, Sanghar, and Mirpurkhas districts. The discharge from the Kotri surface drain is 4,864 cusecs. The tidal link is not only unable to accommodate the discharge from the Kotri surface drains but also obstructs the flow from the Kotri surface drains into natural lakes and creeks. The result is a growing pool of stagnant saline water, rise in the water table, and salinization of surrounding land. During storms, the tidal link becomes an inlet for sea water instead of an outlet.

The solution to the problem of water-logging and salinity, therefore, does not lie in expanding the irrigation system or continuing to add tube-wells or opting for costly mega projects like the LBOD. Instead, it lies mainly in conserving water through canal lining and through better irrigation and farming practices and by avoiding mega interventions in the natural cycle, whether through storage, irrigation, SCARP, or drainage. Conservation through better irrigation and farming practices is linked to education, cultural change, and participatory governance. This is a socio-centric approach dependent on human up-gradation and mobilization, and is not generally favored by international lending organizations like the World Bank, who stress participation but end up favoring costly techno-centric mega-engineering solutions.

Right bank outfall drain (RBOD)

The gross command area of the Indus right bank canals is 3.45 MA with annual canal withdrawals of 14.17 MAF from the Guddu and Sukkur barrages. The present drainage facilities are not only insufficient; they have caused deterioration in the Manchar and Hamal lakes. In order to alleviate the water-logging and salinity problems of the agricultural area on the right bank of the Indus, a master drainage plan was prepared in 1991 and its first phase, RBOD stage-1, or Lower Indus Right Bank Stage-1 (LIRB-1) was initiated in 1993.

The LRIB Stage-1 project covers an area of 1.63 MA where new drainage facilities are to be provided and existing drainage schemes are to be improved. The total drainage effluent from 1.03 MA will be recycled into irrigation channels while that from 0.6 MA will be conveyed to the RBOD.

At the time of construction in 1932, Sukkur Barrage identified the need for adequate drainage. Later the main Nara valley drain was constructed using a natural depression

between the west sloping Indus alluvium and the east-facing piedmont slopes of the Kirthar hills. It was linked to Hamal Lake in the north and Manchar Lake in the south and was to have carried flood flows from Hamal Lake to Manchar Lake as well as escape flows from the Rice canal via the Pitchered Escape. However, the continuous disposal of saline drainage effluent into Manchar and Hamal lakes has degraded and spoiled the water in both lakes.

The RBOD catered for the development of approx 4.45 MA of land irrigated by the right bank canals of the Sukkur and Guddu barrages. It was originally planned to drain the RBOD into the Indus River near Karampur (Sehwan). But the plan faced stiff resistance from local people on the basis that the environmental effects of mixing more than 2,100 cusecs of water with a salinity level of nearly 2,000 ppm with the waters of the Indus would be disastrous, not only for biodiversity but for the land irrigated by the Indus downstream of Kotri as well as for its use as a source of drinking water and groundwater recharge. Subsequently, the project was redesigned to drain the RBOD directly into the sea.

According to WAPDA, the RBOD will save 4.32 million acres from water-logging and salinity, improve the general water table, and restore Manchar Lake to its original clean condition while providing a livelihood to thousands of fisherman. However, there is a trust deficit here and many people think that the same problems are likely to emerge later just as they did in the case of the LBOD. It is feared that the disposal of poisonous waters in the estuaries might further threaten the biodiversity of the Indus delta and its natural livelihood sources, including the mangroves and fisheries. There are fears of backflow during high tide, the possibility of seepage toward the Indus in areas where the drain and the river come close, and of breaches when the water rises.

Megaprojects are not the answer

Megaprojects have been eulogized for a long time: the highest or biggest dam, the largest contiguous irrigation network, the tallest building, and the longest bridge. We have come to base our values on the Guinness Book of Records. This feudal ego has been replaced by neoliberal sell-points like the highest tower, an under-the-sea hotel, or the world's most expensive hotel in the urbanization of Dubai. Only recently has it begun to dawn on people that biggest is not necessarily best. The bigger the project, the less people required to participate. In many cases, small is better than big. It is important to relate projects to the scale of a country's own technical capability, level of political governance and financial resources. Megaprojects are sold to Third World countries by developed countries who want to build this dependency, knowing full well that Third World countries cannot execute these projects by themselves. Dependence on foreign loans, foreign expertise, and foreign technology has become synonymous with a certain type of development and growth which is really only a non-sustainable bubble like the financial boom on the eve of the twenty-first century. It eventually leads to sterility and the barrenness of culture, exhaustion of resources,

impoverishment of people, and backwardness of human resources. For Third World countries, small is best and self-reliance is the right course.

Megaprojects generally entail the disruption of human settlements and internal and international migration. The migration of Mirpur communities to Britain in the wake of Mangla Dam in the 1960s is a case in point. Human migration in the Third World is not just a question of moving from one state to another as it is in the United States. Our society is not yet atomized and human settlement is firmly grounded in social relations that are essential if society is to grow and evolve on a healthy trajectory. The building of a dam is not merely a question of monetarily compensating the communities required to migrate. No amount of money can be a substitute for the loss of relations, history, and culture. Money and social values are just not interchangeable.

Parade of technologies

Crops require water but soil requires less water which can be drained. How are we to resolve these contradictory requirements? First, we introduced large-scale irrigation technology; after it raised the water table and resulted in water-logging and salinity, the second technology of tube-wells was introduced to resolve the problems created by the first. This time the purpose was to lower the water table and wash down the salts. Initially, tubewell irrigation lowered the water table in some areas and even lowered salinity. However, the water from tube wells has two to ten times more salts than canal water (total dissolved salts (TDS), canal water 150 mg/l, shallow private tube-wells 600 mg/l, SCARP tube-wells >1500 mg/l) leading to the greater salinization of land after the initial wash-down. Second, excessive pumping has degraded the quality of groundwater with the intrusion of saline water from the bottom (up-coning) or from the sides (side-coning) into what was previously a freshwater aquifer. At places the water table has been lowered to the level of brackish or saline groundwater. Tube-wells thus eventually produce more salinity than decreasing it. The third technology was the National Drainage Programme (NPD) and its two mega surface drainage, the LBOD and RBOD. These two drainage networks on the two sides of the Indus were designed to collect saline groundwater and take it to the sea. But the mega-engineering intervention of the LBOD has choked natural drainage systems, created swamps where none existed, created a passage for tidal water and ocean storms to move inland and make freshwater bodies saline, and damaged fisheries in particular and biodiversity in general. The RBOD is a more recent phenomenon and fears have been expressed as to the pollution threat to the lakes, the Indus, and the estuarine area's natural drainage. The World Bank has now promised to give further loans to rectify the harmful effects of these mega drainage projects.

Instead of jumping at new loans, we should consider what is happening. We have been trying to control and subdue nature through the use of technology. Instead, we should try and understand natural systems and work in harmony with nature. First, nature demands minimum intervention. Thus we should avoid mega-projects and try to look for smaller, local alternatives. Second, we should make our agriculture more

organic and less techno-centric, using indigenous seed, natural manure, and traditional practices of crop rotation and diversified farming, all of which use far less water and are more suited to the local climatic conditions. This is not to say that we should ignore scientific advances and discovery, but being scientific is one thing and techno-centric another. Paradoxically, sometimes less technology is more scientific. For example, processed food involves technology but fresh food is better. The use of agrochemicals like pesticides is a technology that degrades soil and causes cancer. Organically produced food is healthy. We cannot make a pharmaceutical sales representative our doctor and we cannot ignore prevention and rely solely on cure. Ignoring nature and the excessive reliance on technology gives rise to an endless stream of new problems and new solutions. Economically, it may represent growth but socially it demeans the quality of life. In the words of the World Bank Report (2005a), “But as with everything watery, solving one problem gives rise to another.”

Do we need more irrigation?

WAPDA has lined up a large number of dams, barrages, and canals under its Vision 2025. Some of these are under construction. Five major dams were approved in a cabinet meeting held in November 2006: “The President and the federal cabinet have decided that five major dams – Kalabagh, Akhori, Munda, Diamer-Basha and Kurram Tangi – will be completed before 2016.” (Dawn December 1, 2006). There is also the Gomal Zam Dam, the Sehwan Barrage Complex, the construction and remodeling of canals like the Thal Canal, Greater Thal Canal, Jalalpur Canal, Chashma Right Bank Canal, Thar/Rainee canals, Katchi Canal, Dadu Canal, and Dajal Branch Extension.

The standing explanation for all that is that Pakistan requires more irrigation water if it is to meet its food needs, meet the current water requirements for its agriculture, and bring additional land under cultivation.

It may be that irrigation will increase production in the short run but the technical, social and political costs are so high that the case for further expanding canal irrigation must be carefully scrutinized. The World Bank has backed all post-Independence storage and irrigation projects in Pakistan, but in the words of its own 2005 report on Pakistan’s Water Resources it had to admit: “Arguably, overall use for irrigation needs to decline so that there are adequate flows into the degrading delta.”

We have already noted that some 30 per cent of the land in Pakistan has been lost to water-logging and salinity (50 per cent in Sindh). The problem of water-logging and salinity is a direct result of canal irrigation. We have also seen that technical solutions to the resulting problems in the form of SCARP tube-wells and the National Drainage Programme in Sindh have solved some problems but added more in terms of salinity and drainage. It is therefore important to delve into the question, ‘Do we really need more irrigation?’ The issue is somewhat akin to the need to expand roads to meet the growing traffic in urban areas. A recent presentation on the expansion of the canal-side road in Lahore admitted that, in 15 years’ time, the traffic would have expanded to fill the widened roads, thus requiring further expansion. Unless we take a critical view, the land may suffer, the country’s

unity and cohesion may suffer, but the need for more irrigation will never end. The case for more irrigation merits some critical examination.

Virtual water export. A recent initiative by multinationals is the purchase of large tracts of arable land in Third World countries. This global land grabbing is in line with the desire for primitive accumulation and taking over world-wide control in agriculture. The government of Pakistan responded in 2009 by deciding to sell, to start with, one million acres of arable land to foreign countries who would take production home. This is the virtual export of water. In the words of V.K. Labhsetwar, Director International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID):

“The Virtual Water Concept implies that importing food grains is cheaper than investing in large scale water transfers or for that matter reservoirs. In other words grow food, where water is abundant and transport food to water scarce regions, where food is required.... But how does this concept solve the problem of numerous emerging developing and least developed countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa having scarce water, relatively high population and low GNP?” (Labhsetwar 2003).

Are we building new reservoirs and canals because our farmers need more water or are we building these to water the lands to be owned by foreigners? Seepage will also take place from the water supplied to foreign-held lands and the adverse consequences will have to be mopped up by the poor people of Pakistan.

Industrial agriculture requires three to ten times more water. The Green Revolution of the 1960s was about high-yield variety seeds, the use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and mechanization. The new seeds and agrochemicals together required 3 to 10 times more water compared to previously used indigenous seed and organic manure. In the words of the eminent environmentalist Vandana Shiva, “Chemical monocultures of the Green Revolution use ten times more water than the biodiverse ecological farming systems” (Shiva 2009).

Growing water-thirsty crops increases water requirement. There are water-thirsty cash crops like sugarcane, cotton, and rice to consider. “In the 1970s the World Bank ... forced states like Maharashtra [India] to stop growing water prudent millets like *jowar* which need 300 mm of water and shift to water guzzling crops like sugarcane which need 2500 mm of water” (Shiva 2009). On the other hand, “by transforming the soil into a water reservoir through increasing its organic matter content, biodiverse organic systems reduce irrigation demand and help conserve water in agriculture.” A substantial part of cash crops like cotton and even rice is exported. It is not for food that we require more water, it is for exports. Exports may be required but we cannot lose sight of the fact that the export of agricultural produce is the virtual export of water.

Seventy per cent of water diverted for irrigation may be lost on the way. How much irrigation do crops really need? Prior to the introduction of large-scale canal irrigation by the British, crops were dependant on the rains, building weirs, the local and seasonal diversion of water from rivers, use of groundwater from dug wells, and rain and

flood water harvesting in ponds and lakes. Water was not only used prudently, it was also used locally and long distance transport was not involved.

According to a 2002 report on “water and new technologies” by the Global Change Impact Studies Centre (GCISC) set up with the support of the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Government of Pakistan, more than 70 per cent of the available surface water of the Indus and its tributaries is lost in its conveyance and application, as against canal diversion of 107 MAF of water, crops barely use 31 MAF. The main causes of losses are seepage, overflow, distorted, silt-loaded banks, vegetation, convoluted sections, and rodent holes, etc. A considerable amount of water wastage occurs in the form of application losses due to undulations in the fields and obsolete agricultural and irrigation practices at the farm level. Conveyance losses in canals and water courses are around 25 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively. The application losses in fields are around 25 to 40 per cent (Ahmad 2002).

Production can be increased without increasing irrigation. The World Bank is the biggest protagonist of building more dams but it has to admit that not only does the overall use for irrigation need to decline but also that production can be increased without increasing irrigation:

Reduced water supplies in the irrigated areas have little detrimental impact on production (at least in the short run), in part because water-logging and salinity are reduced, and in part because limited water supplies are used more carefully when there are shortages. But the bottom line is that it is quite possible to substantially increase production with existing supplies of water. (WB 2005a).

What it goes to prove is that the potential for saving and conserving water is far more than the potential from new storage facilities. We have more than enough water; we should use it sparingly and not simply go on expanding its wasteful use. However, this requires education and cultural uplift among farmers, land reforms to make them owners of the land and its production, better organization, and better governance. These are software or socio-centric solutions. The government, on the other hand, finds hardware or techno-centric solutions easy and the World Bank finds them more lucrative for advancing loans.

Conclusion

Environmental degradation is real and related to declining flows in River Indus: There is need to realize that the soil and groundwater resources of Sindh are not just threatened, they have already degraded to an alarming degree. Upstream mega engineering projects have already drawn too much water from the Indus and upset the natural hydrological cycle. It is now clear that there is an environmental price in downstream Sindh that we will have to pay for any further storage. The decline in flow of the Indus has already degraded the fertility and biodiversity of a once flourishing delta, and threatens to further shrink the riverine forests, grazing grounds, and fertility of the katcho, increasing the concentration of pollution in the

river and freshwater lakes, decreasing recharge, increasing groundwater salinity, and leading to encroachment from the sea. IUCN pleads the case of ecosystems:

Contrary to the dominant development imperative that favours the allocation of water to large-scale, commercial uses such as dams, reservoirs, irrigation and hydropower schemes, Pakistan's ecosystems, too, are economic users of water. Yet the economic benefits of water-based ecosystems are rarely factored into river basin planning, or into water allocation decisions. The economic costs and losses arising from such omissions can be immense, and often irreversible, impacting on some of the most fragile ecosystems and the poorest and most vulnerable human groups. (IUCN 2003).

Nature abhors intervention: Excessive intervention that comes from megaprojects in ecosystems is counterproductive. Like the human body, nature can take interventions in water systems only up to a point beyond which there could occur irreparable damage to soil, to fauna and flora and to the availability and quality of groundwater. Megaprojects like major dams, link canals, LBOD, and RBOD also increase our dependence on foreign loans, foreign expertise, and foreign technology, eventually leading to new problems.

Irrigation is a double edged sword: Interestingly, while Sindh is engaged in a life-and-death struggle for more flows into the Indus, excessive irrigation has laid waste huge tracts of good land, causing water-logging and salinity. Sindh needs more water but less irrigation. The case for less irrigation is even more relevant to Punjab, which has an advantage in terms of rain and groundwater. More irrigation is counterproductive. While irrigation is required for agriculture in arid areas, excessive irrigation creates problems of drainage, increases water-logging, decreases downstream outflows in rivers, and degrades the soil. There is immense potential for conservation.

We could do with much less irrigation: Of the present canal diversion of 107 MAF, crops really use only about 31 MAF (Ahmad 2002). The rest is infiltrated, evaporated, or is in excess of the real need. Currently, a dependency has been built on chemical fertilizers, pesticides and hybrid seeds all of which together require large volumes of water. Genetically modified seeds, which the government now wants to introduce on the advice of the multinational seed corporations like Monsanto and Cargill, will require even more water, quite apart from the potential for other environmental hazards and unpredictable biological consequences. A lot of water can be saved by changing to indigenous seeds, organic manure, the old practices of diversified and rotational cropping and less water demanding crops. Other avenues for saving water include leveling fields, lining canals, and water channels. We need to move away from the practice of flood irrigation toward the use of sprinklers and drip-irrigation and more intelligent farm practices. Finally, land reform is the most urgent need and is much overdue.

Land reform and ownership by the tiller is the most important step toward improving agricultural productivity, conserving resources, and improving farm practices. Unfortunately, current policies go in the reverse direction. Instead of breaking big

feudal landholdings, we are moving toward the pauperization of small farmers and merging of small farms into corporate mega-farms in the name of modernity, technology, and investment. Such industrial farming may increase production in the short run but is likely to destroy the soil and pauperize farmers in the long run.

Building more dams for irrigation related storage is not the answer. Sindh's case is that there is just not enough water in the Indus to justify another storage dam on the river and that the construction of any such dam will further dry out the Indus and prove to be disastrous for Sindh's economy and ecology. Punjab has a much larger reservoir of fresh groundwater and three times more rain, while Sindh has only the Indus. Eliminating this resource will cause the difference between existence and extinction to narrow fast. As an equal partner in the federation and as the lower riparian, Sindh now wants to exercise its right to veto.

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Review

Rajiv Chandrasekaran 2007. *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad's Green Zone*. 368 pp. Hardcover. London: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC. Reviewed by Kamal Munir.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran spent almost two years in Baghdad as the Washington Post's Iraq Bureau Chief. Not many people could have used this opportunity better. Based on his observations inside and sometimes outside the Green Zone, his interviews with various officers of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and his conversations with various Iraqis, he has managed to produce a riveting account of the American intervention in Iraq. While all of us have read hundreds of reports on Iraq in the past several years, most of these are confined to news reportage of suicide bombings, American casualties, statements from Iraqi or American governments or messages of support from the coalition. For the first time, someone has put these sound bites into perspective. Chandrasekaran takes us into a country that has been torn apart by those pretending to be its best friends. What plans do they have for post-conflict Iraq? Amidst all the talk of liberating Iraqis, what is actually being accomplished? And notwithstanding all the claims of the 'necessity' of American presence in Iraq, what is the nature of this presence?

Chandrasekaran's journalistic training has served him well. This is not a polemic. Nor is it a political analysis of the American adventure in Iraq. It is a simple narration of his observations. He takes us into Baghdad's Green Zone, a seven square mile American enclave in central Baghdad, and introduces us to the members of the CPA, who reside in Saddam's Republican palace within the Green Zone, as well as to hapless Iraqis whose fate is decided inside this Zone but whose lives could not be further removed from the reality within it.

Chandrasekaran allows us a glimpse into the life of the American viceroy in Iraq, Lewis Paul Bremer III, who is perpetually surrounded by burly submachine gun-toting bodyguards, all on contract from Blackwater, and each making \$1,000 per day. Bremer's background, his immense desire to mark his arrival in Iraq by taking bold, albeit foolish decisions, and his staunch ideological commitment to free-market policies help us put his actions and their consequences into perspective. These actions are mirrored in those of his subordinates, who it appears, were never inclined even remotely to deliver on all the claims that the Bush government was making of bringing Iraq into the twenty first century as a 'democratic' or 'free' nation.

Take for instance, how the Americans chose to bring law and order to Iraq and 'retrain' Iraqi police. Before the war, the crime situation in Iraq was exemplary with

the exception of the few instances where Saddam's friends and family would abuse their positions. Shops in Baghdad didn't close until 10 pm and the city's restaurants stayed open past midnight. Nobody worried about driving home in the dead of night after dinner parties. Police presence on roads was hardly noticeable. Iraq had one of the lowest crime rates anywhere.

In stark contrast, after the war, it was impossible to find an Iraqi citizen who had either not been a victim of a violent crime himself or did not know someone who had been. Law and order had completely broken down, and ordinary people feared for their lives in broad daylight. The Iraqi police were almost non-existent having been driven away by the invading Americans.

Early assessments of the situation convinced American policy makers that around 7,000 foreign police advisors would be needed to reorganize the Iraqi police. The Americans sent just one: Bernie Kerik. Kerik was something of a celebrity, having made his mark in the media after the World Trade towers collapsed on 9/11. He was a rough street cop who loved to give interviews to the media. Once in Iraq, he proceeded to do what he did best: give interviews to the media emphasizing how safe Iraq was - while he hired a team of South African bodyguards to protect himself. He had complete and utter disdain for everything Iraqi, especially the people, and did not for a second consider it his responsibility to do anything that would make Iraq safer. Needless to say by the time he left the crime situation in Iraq was much worse than when he arrived. Sending Bernie Kerik to Iraq is a clear reflection of how seriously Americans took the plight of Iraqis.

Then there was Jay Hallen, a 24 year old American who had never studied any economics or finance, nor followed financial markets, but who was nevertheless put in charge of building a new stock exchange for Iraq, only to fail miserably. And David Dunford - a retired ambassador was put in charge of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. Before taking charge he received a briefing packet: a 4 page memo that according to him, seemed to be written by a summer intern. When his requests for further info from the state department went unanswered, he posted a plaintive query for advice on an Internet message board. The message essentially said "Here I am, and I don't have a clue as to what to do."

But the case that Chandrasekaran describes in greatest detail is that of John Agresto. Agresto arrived 10 months before the end of American rule (while the rule continued, it was handed over ostensibly to an elected Iraqi government) to rehabilitate Iraq's university system - more than 375,000 students enrolled at 22 campuses almost all of which had been decimated in the looting that greeted American arrival in Iraq. Agresto had no background in post-conflict reconstruction and no experience in the Middle East. In fact his experience in higher education was also limited. The institution he ran, St.John's College in Santa Fe, had fewer than 500 students. But as Chandrasekaran found out, Agresto was connected: Donald Rumsfeld's wife had been on the St.John's board and Dick Cheney's wife had

worked with him at the National Endowment for the Humanities. These were sufficient credentials to put him in charge of Iraq's higher education system.

Agresto concluded that given the damage the Americans had caused, Iraq's universities needed more than \$1 billion to become barely functional again. However, much to Agresto's disbelief, the Americans earmarked a paltry \$25 million for rehabilitating it. And when Agresto asked for this sum, he was told that the money was earmarked for grants to American universities that wanted to establish partnerships with Iraqi universities. As Chandrasekaran describes, "Agresto was dumbstruck". American universities? What about rehabilitating looted buildings? Restocking libraries? Rebuilding science laboratories?

He asked to see the proposals that American Universities had submitted to get these funds. His request was denied. Only after threatening USAID with a Freedom of Information Act request, was he shown the proposals. He read the documents in near disbelief. The University of Hawaii's College of Tropical Agricultural had been selected to partner with the University of Mosul's College of Agriculture to provide advice on "academic programs and extension training". Not only was Mosul's near-alpine climate far from tropical but the college had been burned to the ground during American's onslaught on Iraq. What it need, first and foremost was a roof.

A consortium led by the University of Oklahoma was tapped to work on "leadership strengthening" with 5 Iraqi schools including the University of Anbar, based in Ramadi, where no American dared to venture, however well protected from air and land. Similarly, a team from State University of New York at Stony Brook won a \$4 million grant to modernize curricula in archaeology at four of Iraq's largest universities – schools where students were sitting outside on the ground because it lacked any furniture.

What were a celebrity police man, who had difficulty placing Iraq on the map and a 24 year old who knew nothing about financial markets doing in Iraq in the name of post-conflict reconstruction? Why were millions of reconstruction dollars being doled out to American universities for phantom projects? Half-way through Chandrasekeran's description of Iraq, it begins to dawn upon you that the Americans had not given any thought to post-conflict reconstruction at all. Their presence in Iraq essentially served three purposes: Neutralize a state that had become a threat to its interests in the region, re-establish control over a key supplier of oil, and most importantly, forcibly transform a rich quasi-socialist country into a free-market heaven and hence a dependent state.

It is the third prong of this strategy that Chandrasekeran describes in detail. De-Baathification was essential to turning Iraq into a pliant, hollow shell of a state. Under the guise of eradicating "Saddamism" around 50 thousand Iraqis were fired simply because they were associated with the Baath Party. Bremer, who took instructions straight from the White House overruled all subordinates who pleaded that without these people, Iraq could not function. These so-called Baathists were

the brains of the government - the ones with all the critical information, knowledge and understanding. With them gone, the CPA wouldn't be able to run an ice-cream shop. However, Bremer and his local supports like Ahmad Chalabi argued that a wholesale purge of the Baath party was necessary to demonstrate America's commitment to a new political order in Iraq. If the old guard were allowed to stick around, they maintained, there would be no way a democracy would bloom. All senior officials with any association with the Party were summarily dismissed. The effect on all ministries and government departments was catastrophic to say the least – with one stroke of Bremer's pen they had lost 3/4th of their knowledge. However, if Iraq was to be turned into a dependent state, this was essential.

The second step was bringing free market economics to Iraq. Before the war, Iraq was a social welfare state. Government jobs, either in a factory or a ministry or in the security services were plentiful and guaranteed you a salary for the rest of your life. Almost everything was heavily subsidized. Petrol was sold for less than a nickel a gallon and electricity was free. Department stores, managed by the ministry of Trade sold imported shoes, watches and other luxuries at a fraction of their international prices. On top of that, every family received monthly food rations from the state. Education, even college, was free. So was healthcare. Iraq's healthcare and university systems were regarded as the best in the Arab world before Iraq was pushed into a war with Iran. Iraq was one of the richest countries in the Middle East and the most literate, but it was a socialist economy.

Enter Peter McPherson, President of Michigan State University, who was made the Economic Policy Director, and told that his job was to bring capitalism to Iraq. McPherson was Milton Friedman re-incarnated, a firm believer in the power of the market. He was entrusted with the implementation of a plan that had been prepared long ago to transform Iraq's socialist economy into a free-market haven. The plan was detailed in a confidential 101 page document titled "Moving the Iraqi Economy from Recovery to Sustainable Growth". The goal of the American occupation, according to the document, was to lay the "groundwork for a market oriented private sector economic recovery". The plan envisioned the sale of SOEs through a "broad based mass privatisation program". There was no mention of unemployment, the most critical economic problem before Iraq. Nor was there any plan to combat it. Instead, paragraph after paragraph detailed how the Iraqi economy was to be privatised.

McPherson didn't need any persuading. He intended to privatise the Iraqi economy in 130 days – the total leave he had asked for from his University. McPherson's belief in the free market was exemplified by his view that the looting of government property in Iraq was a positive development. When Baghdad's municipal bus drivers began driving their own routes and pocketing the fees, or when hundreds of police cars were stolen and turned into private taxis, McPherson cherished them as important steps in the privatisation of Iraq.

The healthcare system was a classic case. Take Yarmouk hospital, once one of Baghdad's largest and busiest medical centers. Until the 1980s, it had been one of the best medical centers in the Arab world. Jordanians, Syrians and Sudanese travelled to Baghdad for operations. That changed with the imposition of sanctions on Iraq. Sanctions meant that the hospital was deprived of critical supplies. However, with the arrival of the Americans, it took a nosedive. As Chandrasekaran describes, after a year of American occupation, the hospital, like everything else outside the Green Zone, looked like a disaster zone:

“Nothing was clean. The bedsheets were soiled, the floors were streaked with blood, the toilets overflowed. The rooms lacked the most basic equipment to monitor a patient's blood pressure or heart rate. Operating theatres were without modern surgical tools or sterile implements. The pharmacy's shelves were bare. In the emergency room, a few blood stained gurneys cast dim shadows on the floor. There was no defibrillator, no respirator, no blood transfusion equipment, and no syringes of epinephrine.”

Again, the man appointed to fix all this was James Haveman Jr., who had been community director of Health for the Republican governor of Michigan. Before his stint in the government, he ran a large Christian adoption agency in Michigan which persuaded pregnant women not to have abortions. Upon his arrival in Iraq, Haveman did not attempt to prevent epidemics, improve health facilities, stock pharmacies with anti-biotics or provide clean drinking water to millions of Iraqis who were now deprived of these basic necessities. Instead he urged the health ministry to mount an anti-smoking campaign. Next he moved to privatise whatever was left of Iraq's once enviable healthcare system.

Like the state owned companies in the health sector, other SOEs were first slowly asphyxiated and then sold off by CPA orders. Interestingly, at several junctures the American leadership in Iraq encountered resistance from their own subordinates in this process. However, at such junctures, McPherson and Bremer brought in economists from the World Bank, who made convenient presentations on how protectionist policies were the reason the Middle East was lagging behind Africa in FDI, and how these had to be dismantled if Iraq was to become a developed country. None of these presentations acknowledge that Iraq was in fact the most advanced country in the region before the Americans got involved. And when confronted with the slight hitch that under the Hague conventions, it was illegal to sell assets of an occupied country, Tom Foley, a major Republican Party donor, and McPherson's replacement in Iraq stated: “I made a commitment to the President that I'd privatise Iraq's businesses....I don't give a shit about international law”.

While in the long-run, Iraq was to be brought to its knees, in the short-run, it served as the latest location for what Naomi Klein calls Disaster Capitalism. Dick Cheney's company Halliburton was given a multi-billion dollar contract for maintaining most things within the Green zone. Consultants such as BearingPoint Inc. were similarly given contracts worth millions of dollars for transforming the Iraqi economy. And

military contracts such as Custer Battles or Blackwater made millions from highly dubious activities in Iraq. Apart from the major contractors, the opening of Iraqi economy opened up the floodgates to imports. Within months of the American invasion millions of new cars were imported into Iraq as were other consumer products.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran's book makes it abundantly clear that the occupation of Iraq was never anything but the complete annihilation of a once proud and thriving society, and the creation of a dependent state. Anyone who still doubts it should read this eye-opening account.

Review

Muhammad Abdul Qadeer. 2006. *Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformations in a Muslim Society*. New York: Rutledge. Reviewed by Hassan Nawaz Gardezi.

The book under review is a study of social and cultural change from the perspective of a sociologist and city planner. The forces of change discussed are the same as have been transforming the developing societies namely, population growth, urbanization, industrialization, modernization, and the making of ethnic and national identities.

The study is based on secondary sources, author's personal experiences as well as anecdotal evidence drawn from Pakistani newspapers, journals and electronic media. No particular theoretical framework is adopted to organize the narrative although sociological concepts and terminologies are extensively employed. Broadly speaking a culturalist approach, as opposed to class analysis, is used to conceptualize changes that have taken place in Pakistan since the creation of the state in 1947. The history of Pakistan is periodized by using cut-off points based on shifts in political regimes. Thus, the first period (1947-71) ends with the fall of Ayub Khan's dictatorship and secession of East Pakistan. The second period (1971-77) begins and ends with the elected government of Zulfikar Bhutto, while the Third period (1977-c2004) is ushered in with Zia's military *coup*.

Underlying the forces of social and cultural change in Pakistan are envisaged three processes of modernization, indigenization and Islamization. Modernization which begins in the first period is seen as a "hybrid" process. It does not represent a complete break from Pakistan's indigenous social and cultural traditions; it rather incorporates them in an adaptive manner. A conceptual model of this process is presented in the chapter titled "Urban Transformations" to illustrate how the country's economy has changed. Over the course of time there have emerged in this economy three interconnected "sectors," functioning side by side, which are labelled Modern, Bazaar, and Illicit. The modern sector consists of Western type commercial and industrial corporations, banks, cultural organizations, civil and military bureaucracies etc. It operates by and large according to traits associated with modernization, such as impersonality, rationality, bureaucratic management, new technologies and "English speak." The bazaar sector typically includes farming, wholesale and retail businesses, transport and artisan workshops. It operates primarily according to traditional and indigenous norms in the vernacular idiom, with room for the expression of tribal, kinship and familial ties. The illicit sector includes smuggling of goods, drug trafficking, unlicensed manufacturing, black marketing etc. It operates on the basis of illegal but internally institutionalised

practices. It also makes up a considerable part of the economy, constituting “40 percent of Pakistan’s national income” by some estimates.

Each of these sectors is divided vertically into “circuits,” in which the functionaries occupy “higher and lower” positions in terms of earning potential, social status and power. Thus, in the upper circuits of the modern and bazaar sectors are found company managers and landlords respectively, while their lower circuits are occupied by clerical workers and labourers in that order. Similarly rich black-marketers will be found in the upper circuit of the illicit sector while in its lower circuit are found bootleggers and common thieves. The circuits are not just classes however, it is observed. The functionaries in different circuits are rather “lifestyle” groups interlinked to each other “symbiotically” across circuit and sector lines.

Indigenization is a process which mediates between tradition and modernity. In the case of the economic model referred to above “the modern sector has some indigenous norms and practices and the bazaar sector adopts technological innovations and new processes that enhance its business interests.” Indigenization, conceived in the sense of “traditions being grafted onto modernity,” is a pervasive feature of social and cultural change in Pakistan. Whether it is in the sphere of family and kinship, community and civil society or interaction in daily life, change in Pakistan is anchored in traditional norms and practices. Traditions are, however, “not stagnant;” they are in fact being improvised and “reinvented” all the time in the process of adapting to what is new, Western or modern. This process is by and large involuntary and not necessarily efficient or harmonious. “Pakistan’s institutional change is following a path that is explosive, unbalanced, and full of contradictions, heading towards a modernity of its own brand,” it is observed

Islamization is the third process which has had a strong impact on the social and cultural transformation of Pakistan. It receives considerable attention throughout the book and a special chapter is devoted to “Islam and Social Life.” The first period of Pakistan (1947-71) was the “secular era.” However, this was also the period when certain “defining events” took place leading to the Islamization of Pakistani state and society, eventually giving rise to political Islam with a “violent streak.”

In 1949 the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan adopted the Objectives Resolution which affirmed that sovereignty in Pakistan belongs to Allah. In 1953 the Islamists, with jamaat-e-Islami in the forefront, instigated street riots in Punjab seeking the declaration of Ahmadi sect of Islam non-Muslim by the state, a demand that was later conceded before the close of the second period. In 1956 the first constitution of Pakistan was framed which declared the state an Islamic Republic and stipulated that no law shall be enacted which might be “repugnant” to the teachings of Islam.

In the 1971 civil war in East Pakistan the Jamaat-e-Islami organized Islamist youth groups which are “blamed for the cold blooded murder of Bengali intellectuals and professional.” This was a new turn in the activism of the Islamists which “marked

the first systematic collaboration of the army and Islamists in general and the Jamaat in particular,” in the perpetration of targeted violence.

During the elected government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his populist party (1972-77), Islam was used as an “oppositional force.” A grand coalition called Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) spearheaded by Islamist political parties and joined by those disgruntled with Bhutto’s nationalization program launched a bloody street campaign to oust the incumbent government and implement Nizam-e-Mustapha (Prophet’s system). The campaign “shook Bhutto’s government but the army chief, General Zia-ul-Haq brought it down.”

Once in power General Zia used Islam as a tool to legitimize his military rule (1978-1988), opening the door for mullahs to dictate state policy. His government “fully adopted the cultural agenda of Jamaat-e-Islami and other orthodox Islamists.” The process of Islamization also took a more violent turn when Zia aligned Pakistan with the US to oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Islamic political parties were assigned special roles to foment jihad and recruit young men to be trained and armed to wage America’s proxy war against the Soviet backed government in Kabul. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops the “Afghan jihad spilled over into Pakistan in the form of bomb blasts, the gun and drug trade, and battling militants.”

There is no doubt that Islamic symbols and routine observances of pieties “have swept through much of public life” since the 1980s. But all this infusion of Islam in daily life and social institutions has failed to create “a virtuous, moral, and orderly Islamic society,” it is observed. On the contrary Islamic measures undertaken by the state and non-state players have had the effect of reinforcement of traditionalism, sectarian violence, and jihadist terrorism which has become the “conditions of life” in Pakistan.

From the author’s discussion of modernization, indigenization and Islamization it can be concluded that these processes produce effects on social and cultural change occurring in Pakistan, but do not give it any predictable functional direction. Modernization in Pakistan is not a uni-lineal process leading to economic development on the pattern of developed western countries or even China, Singapore or Malaysia. In Pakistan modernization is a “hopscotch” process producing “lopsided” and “unbalanced” development, observes the author. The process of indigenization acts as a bridge between tradition and modernity, but it also produces dysfunctional cultural and institutional lags. Islamization is by and large a process that “has emerged as a parallel force of social change in Pakistan.” It has less to do with economic and social improvements and more to do with politics of culture and belief.

What kind of an overall picture of social and cultural transformation of Pakistan can one get from all this? The author does a good job of unravelling a wide spectrum of changes, ranging from the epidemic of sectarian violence to the minutia of everyday life. But by choice he does not offer a paradigm or general theoretical framework to explain these changes and help the reader to interconnect them. The concepts of

institutional and cultural lags are used extensively to describe the unevenness of changes that are taking place in the material and institutional spheres of life in Pakistan. Another recurring concept is that of “segmentation” of economic and social life. Pakistan, traditionally an organic society, is said to be splitting into “segments or groups that differ from each other not only economically and materially, but also culturally and socially.” Social classes are also categorized as segments in this process, conceived primarily as “lifestyle” groups. That pre-empts any class analysis based on economic and power relations in society.

Thus, the reader will not find a central theme or logic in this narrative of change that can give a holistic picture of different strands of change in Pakistan’s society and culture. “Social change is messy and full of contradictions,” it is observed. Social change in Pakistan is not only messy in its causation but also in terms of its desirability. Whether it is the discussion of urbanization and housing, population growth, economic development, the process of modernization, or Islamic revival, there is always an awareness that all is not well with the way things are changing in Pakistan. In a brief Epilogue taking a look at the future the author puts it more bluntly: *Pakistan will be around in 2050 though it will certainly be nightmarishly crowded ..., hyperurbanized, relatively poor, and reaching limits of land, water, and environmental resources.*

Add to this the escalating violence and destruction in the name of Islam and it becomes obvious that even the present generations of Pakistan in their 40s and younger face a very grim future if some drastic plans are not put in place and executed in order to manage and even reverse some of the current trends of change. But it appears rather baffling that the author, a senior social scientist and intellectual of Pakistan, offers no specific recommendations or plans of change in line with the economic, social and cultural realities so meticulously investigated.

It is hardly a consolation to read that “Pakistani state has shown resilience and an ability to muddle out of its crises.” It also does not sound a very credible solution of the “mess” to recommend that the “state has a special role in managing social change through deliberate reconstruction of institutions.” All change in Pakistan, has not occurred in an un-deliberated and naturalistic manner. Every civil and military government, for example, has been heavily involved in the Islamization project, as revealed by author’s own narrative, culminating in the current crisis of Pakistan’s integrity and security. Similarly the state in Pakistan has been the sole engineer of the country’s economic development plans, reflecting of course, the class interests of the ruling elite and its US advisors and creditors. One would have surely benefited more from a work like this if the author had offered a critical examination of what the Pakistani state has accomplished in the past and what can be expected of it in the future.

Review

Shoab Sultan Khan 2009, *Aga Khan Rural Support Programme, A Journey through Grassroots Development*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

The book under review provides a comprehensive account of the formative phase of the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP). What makes it an interesting reading is that it is an autobiographical account of grassroots rural development as experienced by Shoab Sultan Khan (SSK), the first General Manager of AKRSP. SSK first encountered the 'rural support methodology' in 1959 when he met Akhtar Hameed Khan (AHK) while working as Sub-divisional magistrate in Brahmanbaria sub-division. This sub-division was selected, at that time, by AHK for field training in rural development of district level officials. After a decade of work experience as a conventional civil servant, circumstances once again drove SSK to rural community development work in 1972 when he was appointed as Director of Pakistan Academy of Rural Development (PARAD) at Peshawar. As Director PARAD, SSK got an opportunity to experiment with the Comilla approach (as developed by AHK) at Daudzai Thana of Peshawar District. A few years later, he got an opportunity to apply this approach, as UNICEF consultant, in Sri Lanka at Mahaweli Ganga rural development project.

Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP), 'the mother of all' rural support programmes in Pakistan was started in late 1982. It covered five districts in Northern Areas and one district in NWFP-Chitral. The programme covered all the union councils in these districts. Over 4800 community organizations, called Village Organization (VO) and Women Organizations (WO) have been formed in 90 per cent of the villages. Around 85 per cent of the estimated 152000 rural households have been enrolled as members. AKRSP has played a significant role in the development process of Northern Areas. With its support, rural communities have built and improved over 2500 small physical infrastructure projects (including micro-hydel power units), trained 49000 community members in a variety of vocations, planted millions of forest trees, established community-based orchards and vegetable gardens and developed thousands of hectares of land for cultivation. The AKRSP participatory approach, it is claimed, has considerably improved household incomes and empowered both men and women members.

AKRSP's main objective was to improve the quality of life of about one million rural poor of the Northern Areas. It did not adopt a pre-determined strategy in achieving this objective. It evolved its strategy through a continuing dialogue with local communities. In order to receive AKRSP's assistance and guidance the local village communities were required to undertake three activities: a) to form a social organization around a sustainable productive activity in which its members would

participate on a long term basis, b) to generate savings to build equity capital to be used as collateral in order to obtain loans for individual and collective investments, c) to develop skills to increase productive capacity at the local level. AKRSP offered one time grant for a productive physical infrastructure project (PPI), development of new skills for income, employment, provision of small individual loans, farm inputs and new technologies to improve productivity and management of resources.

Several methods were used to publicize the AKRSP programme. The AKRSP management established informal and formal links with elected representatives, government officials and local elite in order to inform them of the AKRSP philosophy and approach. These contacts played an important role in creating a demand in the village organizations for partnership with AKRSP as well as in creating an interest of foreign and local donors for the support of AKRSP.

AKRSP had a two tier governance structure: Board of Directors (BoD) and the Management (General Manager and his team). In the formative years the Board and the Management had complete unanimity of views on goals and operating principles. The organization structure of AKRSP was also simple with a management group of seven in the core office at Gilgit and three field offices. Each field office comprised a Social Organizer (SO), a sub-engineer and an agriculture officer. Three distinct features which characterized the organization and management of AKRSP in the earlier ten years were responsible for its outstanding success, i) strong and stable leadership provided by the first General Manager, Shoaib Sultan Khan, ii) frequent and open meetings and exchanges among the core group and the field staff, iii) centralized but flexible and informal system of decision making with strong links with local communities and field staff.

One major reason for AKRSP's success has been the generous financial support it has received from several donors since its inception. The financial resources of AKRSP up to 2006 amounted to Rs. 5.1 billion, 85 per cent of which was contributed by donor grants. Nearly two thirds of the programme funds were used on community physical infra-structure schemes, 13 per cent on community organizations, 9 per cent on enterprise development and 7 per cent for natural resources management.

AKRSP methodology for rural community development has received wide recognition inside and outside Pakistan. In 1992 the Government of Pakistan provided 500 million rupees to the then General Manager of AKRSP (Shoaib Sultan Khan) to apply and extend the AKRSP approach to human development to the whole of Pakistan. This resulted in the setting up of the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP). Over the years, seven additional rural support programmes have been started by provincial governments and in some welfare or development projects. The rural support programmes have in due course organized themselves into RSPN (Rural Support Programme Network). AKRSP approach has also been introduced in many countries beyond Pakistan especially in the SAARC countries. UNDP has adopted this approach under the SAPAP (South Asia Poverty Alleviation Programme) for the whole of South Asia.

AKRSP was inspired by the so called Comilla Model of comprehensive rural development launched in 1959 at the Pakistan Academy of Rural Development led by the renowned rural community development specialist Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan. The central idea of the Comilla approach was to stimulate (agricultural and rural) development through grassroots cooperative participation of the people. The Comilla approach spurned those strategies which sought to promote development through experts from outside the local community. It rejected the idea of imposing a pre-conceived blue print of development on a rural community. It emphasized bottom up development and self-reliance. It focused on development issues which were identified by the members of the local community and tried to develop strategies in continuous dialogue with the concerned people.

The rural support programmes including AKRSP do not live up to the very high standards laid down by Akhtar Hameed Khan. He stressed that any development programme should not depend on foreign aid. In case of such dependence it will not be sustainable. In order to emphasize this point he contrasted the donor funded RSP's with the self-financed Chinese communes. He felt the people should themselves raise resources for development. In the worst case they should take loan but no grant. He opposed acceptance of grants even from government. He also derided high salaries paid to managerial and professional staff of the rural support programmes. He set a personal example by receiving only modest salary for himself in rural support programmes and for work in the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP).

A criticism of different kind emanated against rural support programme approach from within the programme. One CEO of a rural support programme declared that credit (provided by RSPs to its members) was not a source of strength but a bad habit which engendered dependence in individuals and communities. A more effective approach would be to focus on improving the social sector services and physical infrastructure by linking communities to outside service providers (e. g. government departments) through focus groups (village committees for schools, health care, water courses).

In defence of the rural support programmes it has been stated that it is not possible to live up to the very austere standards demanded and practised by Akhtar Hameed Khan. Good managers and professionals cannot be hired on modest salaries. As to self reliance, some communities are so poor that it is unrealistic to expect them to raise resources on their own. In case of Northern Areas, even Akhtar Hameed Khan relented and accepted the provision of some form of grant. It is a basic requirement of the AKRSP approach that each member of a CO (Community organization) must make a financial contribution to the CO fund. It is however never able to raise a substantial amount. The need for outside subvention will always remain. The need to link communities to government departments for the delivery of basic services is understandable. There is, however, a pressing need to train communities, individually and collectively, to develop skills to access goods and services from government agencies. It is easier said than done. The rural support programmes do not seem to have met with much success in this regard. In many cases they have set up parallel services or functionaries to provide the urgent services such as veterinary medicine or agricultural assistance.

The most significant contribution of rural support programmes is to highlight the need to mobilize the rural poor and to organize them into community organizations. Hardly any individual or organization or government agency in Pakistan was doing this in a meaningful way over a considerable length of time. In fact, the major failing of the traditional government administration inherited from the colonial rule is that no infrastructure whatsoever existed below the district level for this purpose. Government administration or devolution of power or some form of local government can acquire some meaning only with the creation of community organizations at the local level especially in the rural areas. Elected local councils by themselves do not empower local communities. It may, however, also be admitted that mobilizing and organizing people is not an easy task. After years of work rural support programmes have succeeded in covering only a limited number of the districts and within the districts limited number of union councils and within the union councils only a small proportion of the households. It has also been noted that around one fifth of the community organizations formed by the rural support programmes are not active. These difficulties apart, thanks to the work of rural support programmes, it is increasingly recognized that the need to organize people especially the poor, at the grassroot level, into community organizations is a prerequisite for any meaningful social change and development.

Review

Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett 2009. *The Spirit Level*. London: Published by Allen Lane. Hardcover Price £20.00. Reviewed by Munir Ghazanfar.

Most of us know that social and health problems have a downward gradient among classes but this book is about more than that. The authors have painstakingly and decisively documented that the gradient is not only related to inequality within societies but societies themselves take on the identity of individuals when they are viewed through the coefficient of inequality prevailing within them. Unequal societies act like poor people. The more unequal a society the greater the degree of health and social problems. It has the interesting corollary that a relatively poor but more equal society can be much better in health and social terms than a richer but more unequal society. So that beyond a certain level a rise in per capita income is pointless and adds nothing to the level of satisfaction of the society. At this stage and perhaps even earlier the society can advance its social objectives only by redistributing incomes and wealth to create a fairer community.

The 'Spirit Level' is an indictment of neoliberalism i.e., the current stage of capitalism. The book documents that growth under the present day neoliberal policies is counterproductive to all social objectives of a society and interestingly for all classes in a society.

Although the authors concede we all need a certain minimum level of physical infrastructure and services and a corresponding income to buy the necessities of life but the rise in income is meaningful only so far and not beyond when it adds nothing to the social standards of the society. Some of the richest but more unequal countries consistently fare poor on all health and social markers while those with much less per capita but more equality fare far better.

Although the study specifically covers developed Western countries its conclusions and findings are equally relevant to the underdeveloped Third World countries, given their different conditions.

Japan, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Belgium and Netherlands are more equal societies and they consistently secure top grade on health and social markers with Japan at the very top both in equality and social markers. US is the consistent leader in poor health and social markers with UK, Portugal, Australia, New Zealand close behind. These are societies with the highest degree of inequality among the developed countries.

The authors have plotted each health and social marker individually against relative inequality between developed societies and towards the end they plotted a combined index of all health and social indicators and relative inequality and obviously we find

more or less the same line graph emerges for each indicator as well as for the combined index with US topping on the worst side and Japan on the best. The authors have simultaneously carried out a similar exercise relating inequality coefficient of US states with the social and health indicator for the same. The line graphs for the US states only collaborate the conclusion drawn from the study for the countries.

This review has essentially kept the structure of the study intact and used extensive excerpts.

A paradox resolved

It is a remarkable paradox that, at the pinnacle of human material and technical achievement, we find ourselves anxiety-ridden, prone to depression, worried about how others see us, unsure of our friendships, driven to consume and with little or no community life. Lacking the relaxed social contact and emotional satisfaction we all need, we seek comfort in over-eating, obsessive shopping and spending, or become prey to excessive alcohol, psychoactive medicines and illegal drugs.

As citizens we have lost sight of any collective belief that society could be different. Instead of a better society, the only thing almost everyone strives for is to better their own position – as individuals – within the existing society.

As soon as anything psychological is mentioned, discussion tends to focus almost exclusively on individual remedies and treatments. Political thinking seems to run into the sand.

But the truth is that both the broken society and the broken economy have resulted from the social and economic process of the growth of inequality.

The financial collapse of 2008 is very instructive. It tells us it was the economy which broke individual businesses. If we want to reconstruct the individual businesses we should focus on the economy not on the individual businesses. The second lesson is the broken society just like the broken economy has resulted from the growth of inequality. Inequality causing a demand deficit on one side and an extreme concentration of wealth on the other was a more basic cause of economic collapse than any other financial practice by the banks.

How do you increase production and growth in the developed societies where employment is close to full? The only way is improvements in cultural capital, social capital, organization, education and technology. It is this last that is technology that has been made the fulcrum of growth. But secular technologies alone tend to decrease employment and have not contributed to people's wellbeing although they have increased profits.

To find the true cause of the health and social problems affecting the rich Western societies Wilkinson and Pickett collected internationally comparable data on nine different problems that they could find reliable figures for. The list included *level of trust; mental illness (including drug and alcohol addiction); life expectancy and infant mortality;*

obesity; children's educational performance; teenage births; homicides; imprisonment rates; and social mobility (The last not available for US states). The authors included only irrefutable non-controversial data sources like UN, US government and EU and such that made it consistent in comparative terms.

Briefly they found health and social problems were more in countries as in the individual states of the US with bigger inequalities and also that unequal societies were bad societies no matter how rich.

Not only health and social problems are more common in countries with bigger income inequalities the two are extraordinarily closely related – chance alone would almost never produce a scatter in plot after plot in which countries lined up.

Interestingly the view that social problems are caused directly by poor material conditions such as bad housing, poor diets, lack of educational opportunities and so on implies that richer developed societies would do better than the others. But this is a long way from the truth: some of the richest countries do worst.

The authors found economic inequality leads to cultural inequality which leads to social and health inequality and degradation. If, on the other hand, a society is poor but equal the cultural and social differences are minimal and so are the problems.

Inequality and the rise in anxiety

The individual is sensitive to the wider society's inequality. But the problem is not a matter of the individual's psychology but of the state of society (inequality) that needs to be changed. Understanding inequality gives us a policy handle whereby by addressing inequality in the society we can change the behavior of millions of individuals at the same time. Jean Twenge analyzed 269 studies conducted in the US between 1952 and 1993 and found that people are far more anxious today than they used to be.

One of the most important recent developments in our understanding of the factors exerting a major influence on health in rich countries has been the recognition of the importance of psychological stress. Frequent or prolonged stress affects our immune and cardiovascular system. The three most powerful sources of stress are: low social status, lack of friends, and stress in early life.

Outward signs of success job, income, education, clothes produce a sort of ranking of human race by ability and that makes a difference.

Our perceived ranking in others eyes is so important and can produce so much stress that violence most commonly is triggered by a loss of face or humiliation. Advertisement too may make us feel of less worth thus promoting violence in the society. Pride and shame provide social evaluative feedbacks as we experience ourselves as if through others eyes.

Inequality as social divider

Inequality, not surprisingly, is a powerful social divider, perhaps, because we all tend to use differences in living standards as markers of status differences. We tend to choose our friends from among our near equals and have little to do with those much richer or much poorer. And when we have less to do with other kinds of people, it's harder for us to trust them.

The French historian and philosopher Alex de Toacqueville toured throughout US in 1831. He was surprised by the equality among the white Americans and the exclusion of blacks and other natives. Slavery he thought could only be maintained because the African-Americans were viewed as the 'other'. So much so, he wrote that "a European is to other races what man himself is to the animals" (p371).

Political scientist Robert Putnam of Harvard University, in his book 'Bowling Alone', writes "Community and equality are mutually reinforcing ... In terms of the distribution of wealth and income, America in the 1950s and 1960s was more egalitarian than it had been in more than a century... Those same decades were also the high points of social connectedness and civic engagement ... Sometime around 1965-70 America reversed course..."

Inequality and health

US and UK are amongst the most unequal societies in the developed world.

A million British children – one in ten between the ages of 5 and 16 – are estimated to be mentally ill. It has been suggested that in any secondary school with 1,000 students, 50 will be severely depressed, 100 will be distressed, 10-20 will be suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder and between 5-10 girls will have an eating disorder.

And how are adults doing in these same two societies? In the UK, in a national survey conducted in 2000, 23 per cent of adults had either a neurotic disorder, psychotic disorder, or were addicted to alcohol or drugs, 4 per cent of adults having more than one disorder. In 2005, doctors in England alone (not the whole of Britain) wrote 29 million prescriptions for anti-depressant drugs, costing over £400 million to the National Health Service. In the USA, one in four adults have been mentally ill in the past year and almost a quarter of these episodes were severe; over their lifetime more than half will suffer from a mental illness. In 2003, the USA spent \$100 billion on mental health treatments.

More than diet or smoking it is stress that is responsible for heart disease, gastroenteritis, depression and cancer. And inequality as explained above constantly generates stress in such societies.

According to psychologist Oliver James the culture of placing a high value on acquiring money and possessions and looking good in the eyes of others is like a virus, that he calls the affluenza virus, which places us at greater risk of depression, anxiety, substance abuse and personality disorder.

Stress has been found to be the cause of many diseases particularly heart disease, chronic lung disease, gastroenteritis and depression. The heart disease is thus three times as common among the lowest grade employees who are the most highly stressed.

A study by Harvard school of Public Health revealed friends, marriage and belonging to a religious group or voluntary organization decrease death rate from heart disease. Social relationships and embeddedness among equals decrease stress improving health and longevity.

Health spending in the USA is the highest in the world yet a baby born in the highly unequal society of the US has a lower life expectancy and 40% higher risk of dying in the first year after birth than a Greek baby where both the per capita income and health spending is less than half of US.

Once again to prove his point that inequality is a more basic determinant of health than per capita health spending. Wilkinson and Pickett quote a Columbia University study which revealed that black men in Harlem were less likely to reach the age of 65 than men in Bangladesh.

Wilkinson and Pickett quote the dramatic example of how reductions in inequality can lead to rapid improvements in health as Britain's experience during the two World Wars reveals. In the decades that contained the world wars life expectancy increased at a faster rate although material standards declined during both wars. However, both wartimes were characterized by full employment and considerably narrower income differences – the result of deliberate govt policies to promote cooperation with the war effort.

In contrast, Russia has experienced dramatic decreases in life expectancy since the early 1990s, as it moved to a rapid rise in income inequality.

In the USA and in the UK obesity has dramatically increased since the 1970s and spread to children. The present surge in obesity cannot be explained on genetic basis and if it due to decline in physical activity we should expect to see more obesity among richer people who have more food and more cars. But interestingly with the increase in inequality the patterns of prevalence of obesity, heart disease etc among classes have reversed and they are now far more common among the poor classes. However, obesity and related chronic diseases are not equally common in all affluent countries. In the USA the most unequal country, just over 30 per cent of adults are obese; a level more than 12 times higher than Japan, the least unequal country, where only 2.4 per cent of adults are obese. It seems that poor people in more unequal societies are under chronic stress and not only eat more high fat, high sugar food but respond to food in different way than people who are not stressed.

Educational Attainment

Although good schools make a difference, the biggest influence on educational attainment, how well a child performs in school and later in higher education, is family background.

In an unequal society children living in low-income families experience more family conflict, disruption and violence. Inequality, however, occurs at all tiers and therefore, difficulties in family relationships and parenting are not confined to the poor. Many studies have shown that internationally educational scores are closely related to income inequality with Finland and Japan faring the best and US and UK, the most unequal societies, faring the worst.

Teenage births: recycling deprivation

Like the issues discussed earlier, the teenage birth rate is strongly related to relative deprivation and to inequality.

Teenage birth rates are higher in communities that also have high divorce rates, low levels of trust and low social cohesion, high unemployment, poverty, and high crime rates. Studies show that teenage motherhood is a choice that women make when they feel they have no other prospects for achieving the social credentials of adulthood, such as a stable intimate relationship or rewarding employment. Sociologist Kristin Luker claims that it is 'the discouraged among the disadvantaged' who become teenage mothers.

The differences in teen birth rates between countries are striking. The USA and UK top the charts. At the top of the league in our usual group of rich countries, the USA has a teenage birth rate of 52.1 (per 1,000 women aged 15-19), more than four times the EU average and more than ten times higher than that of Japan, which has a rate of 4.6. Most recently based on 2009 research Larry Finer Guttmachers director for domestic research reported the teenage pregnancy rates were now up at 71 per 1000 US girls aged 15-19. Mexico led the states at 9 per cent, followed by Nevada, Arizona, Texas and Mississippi. New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, Minnesota and North Dakota had the lowest rates.

Violence: Gaining respect in unequal societies

US murder rate is 64 per million, more than four times higher than the UK (15 per million) and more than twelve times higher than Japan, which has a rate of only 5.2 per million.

James Gilligan is a psychiatrist at Harvard Medical School, where he directs the Center for the Study of Violence, and has worked on violence prevention for more than thirty years. In his books, *Violence* and *Preventing Violence*, he argues that acts of violence are 'attempts to ward off or eliminate the feeling of shame and humiliation – a feeling that is painful, and can even be intolerable and overwhelming – and replace it with its opposite, the feeling of pride'. Time after time, when talking to men who had committed violent offences, he discovered that the triggers to violence had involved threats – or perceived threats – to pride, acts that instigated feelings of humiliation or shame.

Gilligan goes so far as to say that he has ‘yet to see a serious act of violence that was not provoked by the experience of feeling shamed and humiliated ... and that did not represent the attempt to ... undo this “loss of face”’.

Reckless, even violent behaviour comes from young men at the bottom of society, deprived of all the markers of status, who must struggle to maintain face and what little status they have, often reacting explosively when it is threatened.

Increased inequality ups the stakes in the competition for status: status matters even more. In fact the impact of inequality on violence is better established and accepted than the many other effects of inequality.

Imprisonment rates

US and UK are one of the highest prison populations in the world. In the USA there are over 2 million people in prison or 576 persons per 100,000, UK has 124 per 100,000 and Japan has 40 per 100,000 i.e., 14 times lower than US. Since 1984 the state of California built only one new college but twenty one new prisons.

Prison data also shows the more unequal of the countries as well as the more unequal of the US states are more punitive. The harshness of US prison system has been repeatedly condemned by such bodies as Amnesty International and UN Committee against Torture. They have repeatedly expressed concern against incarceration of children in adult prisons, the prevalence of sexual assaults within prisons, the shackling of women inmates during childbirth, use of electro-shock devices to control prisoners, use of prolonged solitary confinement etc. Indeed the degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons.

Social mobility: unequal opportunities

In more unequal societies rich parents tend to have children who are rich and poor parents tend to have children who stay poor; social mobility is low.

People living in high poverty areas have so many disadvantages like increased commuting times increased risk of traffic accidents, worse schools, exposure to gang violence and so on. Once trapped it becomes very difficult to get out of these areas.

Culture is another trap. Material inequality becomes overlaid with markers of social difference between people including their accent, clothing, language, choice of reading material, appreciation of music and art etc. People pass these on to their children so that they in turn will succeed in school and work, make good marriages, etc. This is how elite becomes established and maintain their elite status. Despite the modern ideology of equality of opportunity these matters of taste and class keep people in their place.

Far from enabling the ideology of the American Dream, the USA had the lowest mobility rate among the eight countries for which data was available. Germany came in the middle and Canada and the Scandinavian countries had much higher mobility.

Dysfunctional societies

Wilkinson and Pickett emphasize health and social indicators cannot be treated as distinct sociological entities each of which can be dealt with separately. Society according to them is more like an organic whole wherein all functions are linked together. If for instance, a country does badly on health, you can predict with some confidence that it will also imprison a larger proportion of its population, have more teenage pregnancies, lower literacy scores, more obesity, worse mental health, and so on. Inequality seems to make countries socially dysfunctional across a wide range of outcomes. Internationally, at the healthy end of distributions we always seem to find the Scandinavian countries and Japan.

At the opposite end suffering high rates of most of the health and social problems, are usually the USA, Portugal and the UK. The same is true among the fifty states of the USA. Among those that tend to perform well across the board are New Hampshire, Minnesota, North Dakota and Vermont, and among those which do least well are Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama.

An interesting observation by the authors is just how big the differences between societies are in the rates of the various problems discussed. Across whole populations, rates of mental illness are five times higher in the most unequal compared to the least unequal societies. Similarly, in more unequal societies people are five times as likely to be imprisoned, six times as likely to be clinically obese, and murder rates may be many times higher. The reason why these differences are so big is, quite simply, because the effects of inequality are not confined just to the least well-off: instead they affect the vast majority of the population.

Similarly, the decrease in life expectancy in Eastern European countries in the six years following the collapse of communism (1989–95) was shown to be greatest in the countries which saw the most rapid widening of income differences.

Even when you compare groups of people with the same income, you find that those in more unequal societies do worse than those on the same income in more equal societies.

Our societies emphasize good food, education, upbringing to make a healthy and well behaved person but healthy and well behaved persons are results of a more equal society as the authors have shown. They are social phenomena.

Economic systems and social behaviour

We have become attentive to friendship and social status because the quality of social relationships has always been crucial to well-being, determining whether other

people are feared rivals or vital sources of security, co-operation and support. So important are these dimensions of social life that lack of friends and low social status are among the most important sources of chronic stress affecting the health of populations in rich countries today.

Economic theory has traditionally worked on the assumption that human behavior could be explained largely in terms of an inherent tendency to maximize material self-interest. But the authors quote a series of experiments using economic games, which have now shown how far from the truth this is. Our present tendency to maximize material gain is in fact the result of and not a cause of the system of economic relations.

Inequality and environmental sustainability

Wilkinson and Pickett have devoted a chapter to the social basis of carbon emissions and related global warming. The authors trace the greatly increased carbon emissions to competitive consumption. They point out that “the carbon emissions caused by the consumption of a rich person may be ten times as high as the consumptions of a poorer person in the same society. A great deal of what drives consumption is status competition. As inequality increases status competition, we have to struggle harder to keep up.

Is it problem individuals or problem society?

Wilkinson and Pickett emphasize there is need to recognize that the mainstream media and professionals emphasize psychosocial wellbeing as dependent on what can be done at the individual level, using cognitive behavioural therapy – one person at a time – or on providing support in early childhood, or on the reassertion of religious or ‘family’ values.

Every problem is seen as needing its own solution – unrelated to others. People are encouraged to take exercise, not to have unprotected sex, to say no to drugs, to try to relax, to sort out their work-life balance, and to give their children ‘quality’ time. The only thing that many of these policies do have in common is that they often seem to be based on the belief that the poor need to be taught to be more sensible. The glaringly obvious fact that these problems have common roots in inequality and relative deprivation disappears from view.

Technology and society

In an excellent section on the historical march of technological change Wilkinson and Pickett marshal evidence to suggest that the tide of technology is unstoppable and forcefully taking us to a world of equality. And it is only at great cost and much difficulty that we are battling to save our inequality. The authors point out that throughout that large swathes of modern economy technological change is rapidly reducing variable costs. For everything that can be copied digitally, additional copies

cost little or nothing either to produce or to distribute over the internet. This applies to all music, to all computer software and games, to films, to all books and to the written word in any form, to all information and to pictures.

Though less dramatic than in the digital economy, the trend towards rapidly diminishing variable costs may also apply to many other areas of technology, including the products of nano-technology, biotechnology, electronically printed components and genetic engineering. These new technologies hold out possibilities of more efficient solar power, cheaper medicines and more economical new materials.

Instead of maximizing the benefits of the new technologies, we find ourselves with institutional structures which have fought to restrict this new potential through the use of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). The dramatic lowering of variable costs puts a rapidly widening gap between the maximization of profit and the maximization of public benefit.

To the argument that inequality protects employment, innovation and motivation Wilkinson and Pickett point out that we should not allow ourselves to be cowed by the idea that higher taxes or any restrictions on the rich will lead to their mass emigration and economic catastrophe. We should remember that not rich but more egalitarian countries live well, with high living standards and much better social environments. Nor should we allow ourselves to believe that the rich are scarce and precious members of a superior race of more intelligent beings on whom the rest of us are dependent. That is merely the illusion that wealth and power create.

Rather than adopting an attitude of gratitude towards the rich and preserving inequality, we need to recognize what a damaging effect they have on the social fabric. The financial meltdown of late 2008 and the resulting recession show us how dangerous huge salaries and bonuses at the top can be.

Reducing inequality would not only make the economic system more stable, it would also make a major contribution to social and environmental sustainability.

About the Authors

Richard Wilkinson has played a formative role in international research on inequality and the social determinants of health, and his work has been published in ten languages. He studied economic history at the London School of Economics before training in epidemiology and is Professor Emeritus at the University of Nottingham Medical School and Honorary Professor at University College London.

Kate Pickett is a Senior Lecturer at the University of York and a National Institute for Health Research career scientist. She studied physical anthropology at Cambridge, nutritional sciences at Cornell and epidemiology at Berkeley before spending four years as an Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago.